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Abstract 
 The primary aim of this thesis was to investigate the relationship between rumination and 
selective attention, in particular, whether the tendency to ruminate is associated with impaired 
attentional disengagement from negative information. It is well-established that the tendency to 
ruminate in response to negative mood is a key vulnerability factor in the development of 
depression (Nolen-Hoekseman, Wisco, & Lyubomirsky, 2008; Watkins, 2008), but attempts to 
understand the underlying processes contributing to heightened ruminative disposition have been 
relatively limited.  Recently, a number of researchers have suggested that rumination may be 
characterised by biased attentional processing of negative information, particularly that 
individuals with high levels of ruminative disposition may have difficulty disengaging their 
attention from negative information (e.g., Koster, De Lissnyder, Derakshan, & De Raedt, 2011).  
 Studies One and Two each investigated the relationship between individual differences in 
ruminative disposition and selective attention for negative information, using a modified dot-
probe task designed by Grafton, Watkins, and MacLeod (2012) to enable the discrete assessment 
of biases in attentional engagement and disengagement. Study One found that heightened levels 
of dispositional ruminative brooding, as assessed by both the Ruminative Responses Scale (RRS; 
Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991) and an in-vivo assessment of ruminative disposition, were 
associated with impaired attentional disengagement from negative relative to positive 
information. Similarly, Study Two also found that heightened levels of ruminative disposition 
were associated with impaired attentional disengagement from negative information, particularly 
for depression relevant stimuli presented for 1000ms. 
 Study Three sought to extend these findings using an eye-tracking assessment of selective 
attention to measure the spontaneous allocation of attention between stimuli. However, 
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ruminative disposition was not significantly associated with any index of attentional bias during 
the eye-tracking assessment, neither with biased attentional disengagement, nor with biased 
attentional engagement or maintenance of attention. 
 Study Four then sought to replicate findings from Study Two using a selected sample of 
individuals with high and low levels of ruminative disposition. Participants in the high 
rumination group demonstrated greater attentional bias for depression relevant negative stimuli 
presented for 1000ms in comparison to those in the low rumination group. However, this 
between group difference reflected a general attentional preference for negative relative to 
positive stimuli (i.e., composite of attentional engagement and disengagement bias), but no 
specific difference in attentional disengagement bias or attentional engagement bias was 
observed.  
Finally, Study Five took a first step towards investigate the causal relationship between 
rumination and selective attention by investigating the causal effect of rumination on attentional 
bias. Although there no main effect of induced rumination on attentional bias was observed, the 
effect of induced rumination on attentional bias was found to be moderated by ruminative 
disposition. However, contrary to hypotheses, individuals with low levels of ruminative 
disposition demonstrated an attentional bias for valence-incongruent stimuli, which shifted to a 
bias for valence-congruent stimuli as ruminative disposition increased. 
Overall, there was support across the studies for the primary hypothesis that heightened 
ruminative disposition is associated with impaired attentional disengagement from negative 
information. However, the findings do not suggest that ruminative disposition is exclusively 
associated with attentional disengagement bias, but instead indicate that facilitated attentional 
engagement may also be involved under some circumstances. 
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CHAPTER ONE: Introduction and Literature Review 
 
 It is well-established that the tendency to ruminate in response to negative mood is a key 
vulnerability factor in the development of depression (Nolen-Hoekseman, Wisco, & 
Lyubomirsky, 2008; Watkins, 2008). However, although there has been considerable research 
investigating the negative consequences of rumination, attempts to understand the underlying 
processes contributing to heightened ruminative disposition have been relatively limited. 
Recently, a number of researchers have suggested that rumination may be characterised by 
biased attentional processing of negative information, particularly that individuals with high 
levels of ruminative disposition may have difficulty disengaging their attention from negative 
information (e.g., Koster, De Lissnyder, Derakshan, & De Raedt, 2011).  The primary aim of this 
thesis is to further examine the relationship between rumination and attentional bias for negative 
information, particularly focusing on whether the tendency to ruminate is associated with 
impaired attentional disengagement from, or enhanced attentional engagement with negative 
information. 
The thesis consists of five studies investigating the relationship between rumination and 
biased attentional processing of negative information. Chapter One consists of a literature review 
which focuses on introducing and defining the concepts of rumination and selective attention, 
outlining theoretical models and empirical evidence indicating a relationship between rumination 
and selective attention, and finally highlighting the unresolved research questions which the 
thesis will attempt to address.  
Studies One and Two (Chapters Two & Three) each investigated the relationship between 
individual differences in ruminative disposition and selective attention for negative information, 
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using a modified dot-probe task designed by Grafton, Watkins, and MacLeod (2012) to enable 
the discrete assessment of biases in attentional engagement and disengagement. In both studies, 
ruminative disposition was assessed using both the Ruminative Responses Scale (RRS; Nolen-
Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991), but Study One also employed an in-vivo assessment of ruminative 
disposition designed to mitigate the limitations of retrospective questionnaire measures. Study 
Three (Chapter Four) sought to extend these studies using an eye-tracking assessment of 
selective attention, alongside both the RRS and in-vivo assessments of ruminative disposition. In 
each of these studies, it was hypothesised that heightened levels of ruminative disposition would 
be associated with more impaired attentional disengagement from negative relative to positive 
stimuli.  
Study Four (Chapter Five) then sought to replicate findings from Study Two using a 
selected sample of individuals with high and low levels of ruminative disposition. Study Four 
also assessed general deficits in attentional control using a response-probe variant of the anti-
saccade task, in an attempt to investigate whether rumination-linked attentional bias and 
attentional control deficits are functionally related, or represent separate facets of heightened 
ruminative disposition.  
Study Five (Chapter Six) took a first step towards examining the casual relationship 
between rumination and selective attention, by investigating the effects of negative rumination 
and positive basking on attentional bias. It was hypothesised that participants in the negative 
rumination condition would demonstrate greater attentional bias for negative relative to positive 
stimuli compared to those in the positive basking condition. Furthermore, Study Five also 
investigated the hypothesis that the effects of induced rumination would be moderated by 
ruminative disposition, such that individuals with higher levels of ruminative disposition would 
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demonstrate a more pronounced bias towards negative stimuli in the negative rumination 
compared to positive basking condition.  
Finally, the general discussion (Chapter Seven) considers the theoretical implications of 
the thesis findings for attentional processing models of rumination, strengths and limitations of 
the thesis, and directions for future research. 
The literature review will first outline conceptual definitions of rumination, along with 
evidence for the causal role of rumination in vulnerability to depression, and a brief 
consideration of the distinction between rumination and worry (Section 1.1). Next, the concept of 
selective attention will be outlined, followed by a discussion of paradigms for the assessment of 
selective attention, and evidence for the role of attentional bias in emotional vulnerability 
(Section 1.2). The literature review will then consider theoretical models proposing an 
association between rumination and biased attentional processing of negative information 
(Section 1.3), and outline the empirical evidence in support of these models (Section 1.4). 
Finally, the literature review will discuss unresolved questions from previous research, which the 
studies conducted in this thesis will aim to address (Section 1.5). 
1.1 Rumination 
According to the Response Styles Theory, rumination is conceptualised as a form of 
recurrent negative thinking, involving “behaviour and thoughts that focus one’s attention on 
one’s depressive symptoms and on the implications of these symptoms” (Nolen-Hoeksema, 
1991, p. 569). In particular, this typically involves dwelling on the causes, meanings and 
consequences of negative events and feelings. For example, rumination might involve thoughts 
such as ‘Why do I get depressed when other people don’t?’ (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991, p. 569). 
Other theorists have adopted broader conceptualisations of rumination, such as control theory 
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accounts proposing that rumination is triggered by and involves thoughts focused on perceived 
discrepancies in progress towards valued goals (Martin & Tesser, 1996; Roberts, Watkins, & 
Wills, 2013; Watkins, 2008). These theories are not necessarily inconsistent, as failure to achieve 
or progress towards valued goals is also likely to result in negative affect, and individuals 
experiencing high levels of negative affect are likely to hold the goal of escaping persistent 
negative mood, which would result in rumination about negative feelings (McIntosh, 1996). 
Nolen-Hoeksema also proposes that the tendency to ruminate in response to negative 
mood (i.e., ruminative disposition) is a stable, trait-like response style, and is typically assessed 
using the Ruminative Responses Scale (RRS; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991), which asks 
participants to indicate how often they engage in a range of ruminative responses during sad or 
depressed mood. Findings have generally supported the proposal that rumination is a stable, trait-
like style of responding to negative mood. Nolen-Hoeksema, Morrow, and Fredrickson (1993) 
found in a diary study that the majority of participants demonstrated consistent styles of 
responding to depressed mood. Furthermore, studies have found the RRS to have significant test-
retest reliability (Just & Alloy, 1997; Kuehner & Weber, 1999; Nolen-Hoeksema, Parker, & 
Larson, 1994; Sakamoto, Kambara, & Tanno, 2001), although one study where insufficient test-
retest reliability was reported must also be noted (Kasch, Klein, & Lara, 2001). Also, the 
predictive validity of the RRS has been supported by studies where scores have been found to 
predict the extent to which participants report engaging in ruminative responses to an episode of 
depressed mood (Just & Alloy, 1997, marginally significant; Sakamoto et al., 2001), and also 
ruminative self-focus in general (Moberly & Watkins, 2008). Such findings support both the 
conceptualisation of rumination as a stable, trait-like response style, and the validity of the RRS 
as a measure of ruminative disposition. 
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There is also considerable evidence suggesting that heightened ruminative disposition 
plays a causal role in both the onset and maintenance of depression (for reviews see Nolen-
Hoeksema, Wisco, & Lyubomirsky, 2008; Watkins, 2008). Higher levels of ruminative 
disposition are associated with greater vulnerability to depression, as demonstrated by studies 
where the RRS prospectively predicted the onset of depressive episodes in initially non-
depressed individuals (Just & Alloy, 1997; Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000; Nolen-Hoeksema, Stice, 
Wade, & Bohon, 2007), and even mediated the effects of other risk factors in the development of 
depression (Spasojevic & Alloy, 2001, same sample as Just & Alloy, 1997). More generally, 
numerous prospective studies have found that the RRS predicts future depressive symptoms after 
controlling for initial symptoms, in both initially non-depressed participants (Abela, Brozina, & 
Haigh, 2002; Butler & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1994; Hong, 2007; Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000; Nolen-
Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991; Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 1994; Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2007; 
Sakamoto et al., 2001; Schwartz & Koenig, 1996; Smith, Alloy, & Abramson, 2006) and patients 
with clinical depression (Kuehner & Weber, 1999; Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000; Rohan, Sigmon, & 
Dorhofer, 2003), although one non-replication must be noted (reported in both Kasch et al., 
2001; Lara, Klein, & Kasch, 2000). Prospective studies using measures other than the RRS have 
also supported the finding that rumination predicts future depressive mood, including diary 
studies (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 1993; Young & Azam, 2003), ratings of interview transcripts 
(Nolen-Hoeksema, McBride, & Larson, 1997) and experience sampling (Moberly & Watkins, 
2008). 
Further support for the causal role of rumination in vulnerability to depression is 
provided by experimental studies. A ruminative self-focus induction, where participants are 
instructed to focus on current feelings, is consistently found to exacerbate negative mood relative 
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to a distraction condition, in dysphoric participants (Lavender & Watkins, 2004; Lyubomirsky, 
Caldwell, & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1998; Lyubomirksy & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1995; Morrow & 
Nolen-Hoeksema, 1990; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1993; Watkins & Teasdale, 2001). 
Furthermore, relative to distraction, ruminative self-focus has also been found to increase various 
elements of negative cognition related to depression, including negative interpretations and 
pessimism about future events (Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1995), negative future 
thinking (Lavender & Watkins, 2004), and negative autobiographical memory recall 
(Lyubomirksy et al., 1998).  
However, it is important to note that subsequent analyses of the RRS have suggested that 
rather than representing a single, unitary construct, rumination involves distinct subtypes, which 
appear to influence whether it has maladaptive or adaptive consequences (Watkins, 2008). Factor 
analysis conducted by Treynor, Gonzalez, & Nolen-Hoeksema (2003), after removing items 
specifically referring to depressive symptoms, identified two distinct subtypes labelled 
‘brooding’ and ‘reflection’. The brooding component was interpreted as “a passive comparison 
of one’s current situation with some unachieved standard” (Treynor et al., 2003, p. 256) and 
includes items such as thinking “Why do I always react this way?” and “What am I doing to 
deserve this?” In contrast, the reflection component was interpreted as “a purposeful turning 
inward to engage in cognitive problem solving to alleviate one’s depressive symptoms” (Treynor 
et al., 2003, p. 256) and includes items such as “Analyze your personality to try to understand 
why you are depressed” and “Go some place alone to think about your feelings”. Brooding might 
thus be characterised as more passive, judgemental, and evaluative, and reflection as more active 
and non-judgemental. Also, whereas brooding was found to be associated with both greater 
concurrent depression and future depression, reflection was associated with greater concurrent 
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depression, but reduced future depression (Treynor et al., 2003). Subsequent research has also 
found that brooding, but not reflection, prospectively predicted depressive symptoms in 
adolescents (Burwell & Shirk, 2007) and was associated with higher mean levels of negative 
affect (Moberly & Watkins, 2008). Hence, although brooding is considered to be maladaptive, 
reflection appears to represent a less maladaptive form of rumination, and it is thus important for 
research to distinguish between these different components. 
Rumination is one particular example of repetitive negative thought (see Watkins, 2008 
for a review of different forms of repetitive thought), but another similar and likely related type 
of negative repetitive thought is worry, which has been defined as “a chain  of thoughts and 
images, negatively affect-laden and relatively uncontrollable... on an issue whose outcome is 
uncertain but contains the possibility of one or more negative outcomes” (Borkovec, Robinson, 
Pruzinsky, & Depree, 1983, p. 9). These processes are similar in that they both involve repetitive 
and uncontrollable focus on negative material (Ehring & Watkins, 2008; Watkins, 2008), and 
there is some debate over the extent to which these concepts can be considered distinct processes 
(Borkovec, Ray, & Stober, 1998; Segerstrom, Tsao, Alden, & Craske, 2000). Dispositional 
measures of worry (the Penn State Worry Questionnaire, PSWQ; Meyer, Miller, Metzger, & 
Borkovec, 1990) are highly correlated with measures of ruminative disposition (Fresco et al., 
2002; Hong, 2007; Muris, Roelofs, Meesters, & Boomsma, 2004; Segerstrom et al., 2000), have 
both been found to be associated with greater levels of depression and anxiety (Borkovec et al., 
1983; Chelminski & Zimmerman, 2003; Fresco et al., 2002; Harrington & Blakenship, 2002; 
Meyer et al., 1990; Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000; Segerstrom et al., 2000; Starcevic, 1995), and in 
experimental manipulations both worry and rumination increase anxiety and depression 
(Andrews & Borkovec, 1988; Blagden & Craske, 1996; McLaughlin, Borkovec, & Sibrava, 
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2007). However, whereas rumination is conceptualised as repetitive thought primarily revolving 
around past losses and current negative feelings (i.e. depressive content), the content of worry is 
characterised as being based on potential threats, often future oriented,  (i.e. anxious content). 
Worry and rumination have also been found to have different concurrent and prospective 
relationships to symptoms after controlling for one another, such that although worry predicts 
both depression and anxiety, rumination uniquely predicts depression (Hong, 2007; Muris et al., 
2004). Although the issue of whether worry and rumination represent the same or distinct 
processes remains unresolved, the present thesis will primarily investigate the relationship 
between depressive rumination and selective attention. However, given the potential overlap 
between anxious worry and depressive rumination, some consideration will be given to relevant 
literature on the relationship between worry and selective attention, and how this might inform 
our understanding of the attentional basis of rumination. 
1.2 Selective Attention 
Selective attention refers to an attentional filtering process involving the allocation of 
attentional resources to specific stimuli within the internal or external environment.  Individuals 
can be said to have a bias in selective attention if they demonstrate a systematic tendency to 
attend to a particular type of stimulus over others. It has long been suggested that certain groups 
of individuals may tend towards attentional biases for particular types of information, notably 
that those suffering from various emotional disorders may be biased towards mood or concern 
relevant information, and that this may causally contribute to their emotional vulnerability (e.g., 
Beck, 1976; Bower, 1981). 
Important distinctions have also been drawn between different components of selective 
attention at which attentional biases might operate (Clarke, MacLeod, & Guastella, 2013; Posner, 
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1980; Posner & Petersen, 1990). Attentional engagement refers to the selection and initial 
orienting of attention towards stimuli, whereas attentional disengagement refers to the 
withdrawal of attentional selection from stimuli. Biased attentional processing of stimuli can 
involve a systematic bias in either of these attentional components. A bias in attentional 
engagement would be characterised by faster or more frequent initial orienting of attention 
towards relevant stimuli. Alternatively, attentional bias might involve impaired disengagement 
characterised by greater maintenance of attention or difficulty diverting attention away from 
relevant stimuli.  
The following section will first consider various experimental paradigms for the 
assessment of selective attention, including the separate assessment of attentional engagement 
and disengagement bias, before considering evidence for the association between selective 
attention and emotional vulnerability. 
1.2.1 Paradigms for measuring selective attention 
 Emotional Stroop task.  One early measure that attempted to index selective attention is 
the emotional Stroop task (Mathews & MacLeod, 1985), where word stimuli are presented in 
different ink colours, and participants are required to name aloud the colour the word is printed 
in. The time taken to name the colour is proposed to reflect the extent to which selective 
attention to the content of the word interfered with colour naming (Stroop, 1935). As such, an 
attentional bias can be inferred from relative latencies to name the colours of words of different 
emotional valences. For example, longer naming latencies for negative relative to neutral words 
would indicate greater attentional interference from negative information. However, it is not 
clear that such effects are necessarily a result of attentional bias, as there are other factors that 
may influence colour naming latencies on the Emotional Stroop task (Algom, Chajut, & Lev, 
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2004; de Ruiter & Brosschot, 1994). In particular, slower colour naming for negative words 
could result from either general response slowing (e.g. startle effect) or attentional avoidance of 
negative words. Therefore, many researchers do not consider the emotional Stroop task as an 
unambiguous measure of selective attention (Algom et al., 2004; de Ruiter & Brosschot, 1994). 
Response probe paradigms. A more robust and commonly used paradigms for 
measuring selective attention is the dot-probe (or attention probe) task developed by MacLeod 
and colleagues (MacLeod, Mathews, & Tata, 1986). In this paradigm, two stimuli are 
simultaneously presented on a computer screen (e.g., negative and neutral words), followed by a 
probe appearing in the same spatial location as of one of the stimuli. The participant is then 
required to press a button as fast as possible in response to this probe. Early versions of this 
paradigm involved a probe detection task, where participants were simply required to press the 
response button as soon as the probe was detected (e.g. MacLeod et al., 1986), but later versions 
have incorporated differentiation tasks, where participants are required to press different buttons 
depending on either the location or identity of the probe displayed (see Mogg & Bradley, 1999; 
Salemink, van den Hout, & Kindt, 2007). It is assumed that participants’ reaction times in 
response to the probes will be dependent on the spatial allocation of attention (i.e. faster 
responding to probes appearing in an attended as opposed to unattended location; see Posner, 
Snyder, & Davidson, 1980), as determined by the previously presented stimuli. An attentional 
bias can therefore be inferred based on participants response latencies to probes replacing 
different types of stimuli. For example, faster responses to probes appearing in the location of 
threatening words relative to probes replacing neutral words would suggest greater attention for 
threatening relative to neutral stimuli, thus indicating an attentional bias for threatening 
information. 
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A key strength of the dot-probe task is than unlike the emotional Stroop task, any 
observed differences in attentional bias for different types of stimuli cannot be accounted for by 
alternative explanations (MacLeod et al., 1986). Firstly, since participants are required to execute 
a neutral response (button pressing) to a neutral stimulus (the probe), this eliminates the 
possibility of response biases. Secondly, since the two stimuli to be compared are presented 
simultaneously, this means that it controls for the potential influence of response slowing in the 
presence of emotional stimuli (Mogg, Holmes, Garner, & Bradley, 2008). Thus, differences in 
reaction times must indicate enhanced attentional processing of one stimulus relative to another.  
However, although the dot-probe paradigm provides a clear and unambiguous measure of 
selective attention, one limitation of the original version is that it cannot distinguish between 
attentional engagement and disengagement bias (Clarke et al., 2013; Koster, Crombez, 
Verschuere, & de Houwer, 2004; Mogg et al., 2008; Yiend, 2010). Faster responding to probes 
appearing in the same location as the prior emotional stimuli could potentially result from either 
enhanced attentional engagement with such stimuli or greater difficulty disengaging attention 
from them once it has been allocated. Consequently, selective attention as indexed by the 
original dot-probe task will reflect the combined influence of any bias in attentional engagement 
and disengagement (Grafton et al., 2012). Thus, researchers wishing to discriminate between 
these two types of attentional bias must use alternative paradigms. 
Another similar paradigm which is often claimed to be able to distinguish between 
engagement and disengagement bias is the exogenous cuing task based on the Posner paradigm 
(Posner et al., 1980). In this paradigm, a single cue is presented in one of two locations on a 
computer screen, followed by a probe in either location, to which participants must execute a 
response. In order to measure selective attention, response latencies for probes following 
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emotional and neutral cues are compared (e.g. Fox, Russo, Bowles, & Dutton, 2001; Yiend & 
Mathews, 2001). Attentional engagement is inferred by comparing response latencies on valid 
trials (i.e. the probe appears in the same location as the cue), with faster responses being argued 
to indicate facilitated engagement. In contrast, attentional disengagement is inferred by 
comparing response latencies on invalid trials (i.e. the probe appears in the opposite location to 
the cue), with slower responses supposedly indicating impaired disengagement. 
However, subsequent researchers have identified two limitations which significantly 
compromise the ability of the exogenous cuing task to differentiate between attentional 
engagement and disengagement bias (Clarke et al., 2013; Grafton & MacLeod, 2014; Grafton et 
al., 2012; Mogg et al., 2008). Firstly, in order to infer bias in attentional disengagement using 
invalid trials, it is necessary that attention is initially engaged with the cue stimuli to an 
equivalent degree regardless of valence or participant group. Otherwise, any observed difference 
in response latencies to probes presented distally to different types of stimuli may be a result of 
variations in initial engagement with the cue stimuli, rather than relative speed of disengagement. 
Since the exogenous cueing task allows for such variations in initial engagement, measures of 
disengagement bias will be confounded by any existing bias in attentional engagement. 
Secondly, this paradigm fails to control for the generic influence of particular stimuli on 
response latencies, because attentional bias is inferred by comparing trials where emotional 
stimuli are presented with those where they are not. This criticism is particularly relevant, since 
Mogg et al. (2008) demonstrated that anxious participants do in fact show general response 
slowing following the presentation of threatening stimuli. Thus, any relative slowing in 
responses to probes appearing distally to threatening cues observed in this group could be 
accounted for by this general slowing effect, without invoking impairments in attentional 
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disengagement. Simultaneously, such response slowing could also obscure any bias in 
engagement with threatening stimuli, which would otherwise be indicated by speeded processing 
of probes cued by negative relative to neutral stimuli. As a result of these two important 
limitations, the exogenous cuing task fails to provide a clear distinction between attentional 
engagement and disengagement bias. Furthermore, due to the second limitation regarding the 
potential confound of response slowing, it also does not provide an unambiguous measure of 
selective attention. 
Some researchers have also attempted to address the issue of attentional engagement and 
disengagement biases using a modified version of the dot-probe task where response latencies to 
emotion congruent and incongruent probes replacing emotional-neutral stimulus pairs are 
compared with response latencies following neutral-neutral pairs (Koster et al., 2004; Koster, 
Crombez, Verschuere, Van Damme, & Wiersema, 2006; Salemink et al., 2007). However, this 
approach is subject to the same limitations as the exogenous cuing task outlined above, meaning 
that this also cannot provide an adequate measure of engagement and disengagement bias. 
Recently however, Grafton et al. (2012) have developed a new version of the dot-probe 
task which avoids these limitations, and is therefore able to clearly distinguish between 
attentional engagement and disengagement bias (see Figures 2.1 & 3.1). In this version of the 
task, on each trial the participant is first informed by an arrow display where to initially allocate 
their attention between two locations on the screen. A cue then appears in this location, followed 
by a pair of stimuli (e.g. an emotional and a neutral word) in each of the two locations, and then 
finally a probe in either of the two locations. The participant must then perform a probe 
differentiation task, to indicate whether the probe is the same or different to the cue. Since 
participants must attend to the cue in order to accurately perform the task, this ensures that 
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participants’ attention is secured in a designated location prior to the presentation of the stimulus 
pair. Disengagement bias is measured using trials where attention is initially secured in the same 
location as the subsequent emotional stimulus, with slower responding to probes appearing away 
from the emotional stimulus (i.e., the neutral stimulus) relative to probes appearing in the 
location of the emotional stimulus, indicating impaired disengagement from emotional stimuli. 
In contrast, engagement bias is measured using trials where attention is initially secured away 
from the subsequent emotional stimulus, with faster responding to probes appearing in the 
location of the emotional stimulus relative to the location of the neutral stimulus indicating 
facilitated attentional engagement with the emotional stimuli. The task also allows for general 
response slowing to be controlled for through comparison with response latencies for both 
probes presented away from emotional stimuli and following neutral-neutral stimulus pairs. 
Eye-tracking paradigms. A limitation of all attention probe tasks using reaction time 
data is that they can only provide ‘snapshots’ of attention at the time of probe presentation, 
meaning that we cannot know the patterns of attentional distribution before or after probing 
(Mogg & Bradley, 2005; Yiend, 2010). This is a particular problem for the investigation of later 
stages of selective attention and studies using longer stimulus presentation durations, as attention 
may shift multiple times before the presentation of the probe (Yiend, 2010). Thus, although 
reaction time data from attention probe tasks may be a suitable measure of early selective 
attention, they are less useful for assessing the maintenance of attention over time. Furthermore, 
reaction time data may be less accurate for participants with slow or variable motor responses, 
which may be the case for many clinical populations, particularly individuals suffering from 
depression (Mogg & Bradley, 2005). 
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An alternative approach that is able to overcome these limitations is the measurement of 
attentional distribution via eye-tracking. Eye-movements are closely linked to attention, as 
individuals typically direct their gaze towards stimuli that attract their attention (Jonides, 1981), 
and there is a mandatory shift in attention prior to every eye-movement (Kowler, Anderson, 
Dosher, & Blaser, 1995). Eye-tracking technology allows for the continuous assessment of 
attention allocation, thus allowing for a more accurate and relatively direct assessment of 
patterns of attentional distribution throughout the entire stimulus presentation duration. Eye-
movements are also less likely to be influenced by motor-slowing deficits, allowing for more 
accurate measurement in groups at risk of this confound (Mogg & Bradley, 2005). 
There are a variety of experimental tasks that can incorporate eye-tracking to measure 
selective attention. One common approach involves the free-viewing of simultaneously 
presented stimuli of differing valences (e.g. Eizenman et al., 2003; Kellough, Beevers, Ellis, & 
Wells, 2008), with selective attention indexed by the amount of time spent fixated on particular 
types of stimuli. This is arguably a particularly ecologically valid index of selective attention, 
because it assesses where participants naturally allocate their attention between a range of 
competing stimuli. Some researchers have also combined eye-tracking with experimental cueing 
tasks such as the dot-probe and exogenous cueing tasks (e.g. Mogg, Millar, & Bradley, 2000; 
Sears, Thomas, LeHuquet, & Johnson, 2010). Similar to the approach adopted in Grafton et al.’s 
(2012) modified dot-probe task, these paradigms can be modified to assess attentional 
engagement and disengagement bias depending on where attention is secured prior to stimulus 
presentation (Clarke et al., 2013).When attention is initially secured in a location distal to 
emotional stimuli, attentional engagement can be inferred by latency to fixate on emotional 
stimuli relative to neutral stimuli, whereas when attention is initially secured in a location 
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proximal to emotional stimuli, attentional disengagement can be inferred from latency to saccade 
away from emotional stimuli relative to neutral stimuli.  
Visuals search tasks. Another common paradigm for measuring selective attention is 
visual search tasks, where participants are required to detect target stimuli embedded within an 
array of distracting stimuli (e.g., sad facial expression within an array of neutral faces; Öhman, 
Flykt, & Esteves, 2001; Rinck, Becker, Kellermann, & Roth, 2003). There are two main ways in 
which such tasks can be used to assess attentional bias. Firstly, attentional bias can be inferred 
from relative speed to detect emotional (e.g., happy or sad faces) compared to neutral targets 
(e.g., neutral faces) within arrays of neutral distractors (i.e., detection paradigm), reflecting the 
degree to which attention is drawn towards emotional stimuli, with greater attentional bias for 
emotional stimuli indicated by faster detection latencies for emotional relative to neutral targets. 
Alternatively, attentional bias can be inferred from relative speed to detect neutral targets within 
arrays of emotional relative to neutral distractors (i.e., distraction paradigm), reflecting the 
degree to which attention is held by emotional stimuli, with greater attentional bias for emotional 
stimuli indicated by slower detection latencies for targets within emotional relative to neutral 
arrays of distractors. Some researchers have also combined visual search tasks with eye-tracking, 
such that latency to fixate on emotional targets is measured during detection paradigms, whereas 
latency to fixate on neutral targets is measured during distraction paradigms (e.g., Rinck, 
Reinecke, Ellwart, Heuer, & Becker, 2005). 
Some researchers have proposed that these two variants of the visual search task can be 
used to distinguish between attentional engagement and disengagement bias (e.g., Pineles, 
Shipherd, Mostoufi, Abramovitz, & Yovel, 2009; Pineles, Shipherd, Welch, & Yovel, 2007), 
such that the detection paradigm assesses attentional engagement bias, whereas the distraction 
32 
 
paradigm reflects attentional disengagement bias. However, as pointed out by Clarke et al. 
(2013), these variants of the visual search paradigm do not meet the necessary criteria to 
adequately distinguish between attentional engagement and disengagement bias, as distraction 
paradigms will be susceptible to behavioural freezing effects, and detection latencies will be 
dependent on both attentional engagement with and disengagement from distracting stimuli. 
Internal shift task. Whereas response probe and visual search paradigms assess selective 
attention for external stimuli, some researchers have proposed a distinction between attention for 
external visual-spatial stimuli and internal information, such as thoughts, feelings, and internal 
representations of stimuli in working memory (Chun, Golomb, & Turk-Browne, 2011). As a 
result, De Lissnyder, Koster, and De Raedt (2012a) developed the internal shift task (IST) which 
assesses ability to shift internal attentional focus between emotional and neutral representations 
of stimuli. In the IST, participants are required to perform a mental count task based on either the 
emotional expression of facial stimuli (e.g., count the number of negative and neutral faces; 
emotional condition) or non-emotional features of facial stimuli (e.g., count the number of male 
and female faces; non-emotional condition). As such, participant’s internal focus of attention is 
directed towards either emotional or non-emotional features of stimuli. Depending on the 
experimental condition, the IST can be used to assess both general attentional switching abilities 
and valence-specific bias in attentional switching. General attentional switching abilities can be 
inferred from switching costs (i.e., performance on switch relative to no-switch trials) in the non-
emotional condition. In contrast, attentional bias can be inferred from relative switching costs 
within the emotional condition, by comparing performance when switching from the processing 
of emotional to neutral stimuli (e.g.., switching from counting a negative face to counting a 
neutral face), and vice-versa. Greater attentional bias for negative information would be 
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indicated by greater relative impairment switching from the processing of negative to neutral 
information. However, although the IST has the advantage of assessing attentional bias for 
internal representations of information, it is not clear to what extent this is a pure measure of 
selective attention. It is possible that biases in other aspects of cognition, such as memory and 
inhibition may influence performance on the IST.  
Emotional flanker task. In the emotional flanker task (Fenske & Eastwood, 2003), 
participants are required to identify the valence of a centrally presented emotional target 
stimulus, whilst ignoring flanker stimuli, which can be either congruent (i.e., same valence as the 
target), incongruent (i.e., opposite valence to the target), or neutral. The degree to which 
response latencies are slower in the presence of incongruent stimuli (interference effect) or faster 
in the presence of congruent stimuli (facilitation effect) indicates attentional interference from 
flanker stimuli. Thus, attentional bias can be inferred from the relative degree of interference and 
facilitation effects from different emotional stimuli. However, as with the IST, it is not clear 
whether the emotional flanker task is a pure measure of attentional bias, as performance on this 
task may be influenced by biases other aspects of cognition, such as inhibition, working memory 
and priming.  
Attentional bias modification. Each of the paradigms discussed so far can be used to 
measure selective attention, but it is also possible to manipulate attentional biases using 
attentional bias modification (ABM), in order to investigate the causal effects of attentional bias. 
ABM techniques typically involve modifying tasks originally used to measure attentional bias, 
such that the contingencies of an attentional task are manipulated in order to induce biased 
attention either towards or away from emotional stimuli (Hertel & Mathews, 2011). One of the 
most common ABM approaches involves manipulating the contingencies of the dot-probe task 
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(e.g., MacLeod, Rutherford, Campbell, Ebsworthy & Holker, 2002; Mathews & MacLeod, 
2002), such that target probes disproportionately appear in the location of particular stimuli. For 
example, if target probes mostly appear in the location of negative stimuli, then faster responding 
can be achieved by preferentially directing attention towards the location of negative stimuli, 
thus encouraging an attentional processing bias towards negative stimuli. In contrast, if target 
probes mostly appear in the location distal to negative stimuli, faster responding can be achieved 
by preferentially directing attention away from the location of negative stimuli, so attentional 
bias towards negative stimuli is discouraged. Visual search tasks have also been used to modify 
attentional bias, by manipulating the types of stimuli participants are required to search for (e.g., 
Dandeneau, Baldwin, Baccus, Sakellaropoulo, & Pruessner, 2007). For example, whereas 
instructing participants to search for negative stimuli among non-negative distractors induces 
attentional bias towards negative stimuli, instructing participants to search for non-negative 
stimuli among negative distractors reduces attentional bias for negative stimuli. Such ABM 
techniques have generally been shown to be effective at changing attentional bias, as assessed by 
the standard tasks described above (see Clarke, Notebaert, & MacLeod, 2014 for review) 
1.2.2 Selective attention and emotional vulnerability 
There is strong converging evidence from studies using the experimental methodologies 
outlined above indicating that selective attention for negative information is associated with 
emotional vulnerability. In particular, there is strong evidence relating anxiety to an attentional 
bias for threatening information (for reviews see Armstrong & Olatunji, 2012; Bar-Haim, Lamy, 
Pergamin, Bakermans-Kranenburg, & van Ijzendoorn, 2007; Cisler & Koster, 2010; Dalgleish & 
Watts, 1990; Mogg & Bradley, 2005). Initial studies using the dot-probe task found that 
clinically anxious participants were consistently faster to respond to probes that appeared in the 
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prior location of threatening words relative to neutral words, whereas normal controls showed 
the opposite pattern of results, and were faster to respond to probes appearing away from 
threatening stimuli (MacLeod et al., 1986). Multiple studies have since found a similar bias for 
threatening stimuli using the dot-probe task in both clinically anxious (Bradley, Mogg, White, 
Groom, & de Bono, 1999; Mathews, Ridgeway, & Williamson, 1996; Mogg, Bradley, & 
Williams, 1995; Musa, Lepine, Clark, Mansell, & Ehlers, 2003; Taghavi, Neshat-Doost, Moradi, 
Yule, & Dalgleish, 1999; Tata, Leibowitz, Prunty, Cameron, & Pickering, 1996) and high-trait 
anxious participants (Bradley, Mogg, Falla, & Hamilton, 1998; Koster, Verschuere, Crombez, & 
Van Damme, 2005; MacLeod & Mathews, 1988; Mogg & Bradley, 1999; Tata et al., 1996), and 
also that higher levels of state anxiety are associated with greater bias for threat within non-
clinical samples (Bradley, Mogg, & Millar, 2000; Mogg, Bradley, de Bono, & Painter, 1997). 
Furthermore, recent studies using Grafton et al.’s (2012) modified dot-probe task to assess 
attentional engagement and disengagement bias have found that heightened levels of anxiety 
vulnerability are associated with both facilitated attentional engagement with, and impaired 
attentional disengagement from threatening stimuli (Grafton & MacLeod, 2014; Rudaizky, 
Basanovic, & MacLeod, 2014). One study has also suggested that there may be an interaction 
between state and trait anxiety, as high-trait anxious participants demonstrated a greater increase 
in bias for concern-relevant threatening stimuli during a period of elevated state anxiety relative 
to low-trait anxious participants (MacLeod & Mathews, 1988).  
Findings from eye-tracking studies have supported and extended the evidence for an 
attentional bias towards threat in anxiety, demonstrating that anxious participants initially orient 
towards threatening stimuli more frequently and more quickly than non-anxious controls during 
free-viewing and dot-probe tasks (Armstrong, Olatunji, Sarawgi, & Simmons, 2010; Calvo & 
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Avero, 2005; Felmingham, Rennie, Manor, & Bryant, 2011; Gamble & Rapee, 2010; Mogg et 
al., 2000; Mogg, Garner & Bradley, 2007; Rinck & Becker, 2006), consistent with threat-
vigilance models of attention in anxiety (see Armstrong & Olatunji, 2012, for review and meta-
analysis). Similarly, eye-tracking during visual search tasks has demonstrated that anxious 
individuals are typically faster to fixate on threat stimuli embedded in neutral distractors than 
non-anxious individuals (Miltner, Krieschel, Hecht, Trippe & Weiss, 2004; see Armstrong & 
Olatunji, 2012, for review and meta-analysis). 
Evidence for selective attention in depression, however, has typically been more mixed 
(for reviews see Dalgleish & Watts, 1990; Mogg & Bradley, 2005; Peckham, McHugh & Otto, 
2010). Various dot-probe studies found no evidence of selective attention in depression (Hill & 
Dutton, 1989; MacLeod et al., 1986; Mogg et al., 2000; Neshat-Doost, Moradi, Taghavi, Yule, & 
Dalgleish, 2000) and some have even suggested that co-morbid depression may suppress 
attentional biases towards threat in anxiety (Musa et al., 2003; Taghavi et al., 1999). However, 
other studies have found evidence of selective attention towards negative information in 
depressed and dysphoric participants using the dot-probe task (Bradley, Mogg, & Lee, 1997; 
Donaldson, Lam, & Mathews, 2007; Gotlib et al., 2004a; Gotlib, Krasnoperova, Yue, & 
Joormann, 2004b; Joormann & Gotlib, 2007; Mathews et al., 1996; Mogg et al., 1995; Shane & 
Peterson, 2007).  
These inconsistencies may be explained by considering the particular circumstances 
under which attentional biases are found in depression (Mogg & Bradley, 2005). Firstly, the 
relevance of particular stimuli to the disorder of interest may be important, as many of the 
studies failing to find a bias for negative information in depression only used threatening stimuli, 
which are likely to be more relevant to anxiety disorders and less relevant to depression. Studies 
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directly comparing selective attention for different types of stimuli in depression have found 
biases for socially but not physically threatening words (Mathews et al., 1996), depression-
related but not anxiety-related words (Bradley et al., 1997), and sad but not angry faces (Gotlib 
et al., 2004a; Gotlib et al., 2004b). In addition, a number of studies have suggested that stimulus 
exposure duration may be relevant, finding that depressed participants only demonstrate a bias 
on the dot-probe task at exposure durations of at least 1000ms (Bradley et al., 1997; Donaldson 
et al., 2007), suggesting that selective attention in depression may operate at later stages of 
processing than in anxiety. The extent to which particular dot-probe studies converge with these 
experimental conditions is able to account for many, although not all of the inconsistent findings 
in depression (Mogg & Bradley, 2005). Thus, there is evidence to suggest that depression may be 
specifically associated with attentional bias for depression relevant stimuli presented for longer 
exposure durations. 
Converging evidence from eye-tracking studies has also supported the existence of an 
attentional bias in depression, finding that depressed participants demonstrate increased 
maintenance of gaze on dysphoric stimuli during free viewing (Arndt, Newman, & Sears, 2014; 
Eizenman et al., 2003; Kellough et al., 2008; Leyman, De Raedt, Vaeyens, & Philippaerts, 2011; 
see Armstrong & Olatunji, 2012 for meta-analysis), and that dysphoric participants are slower to 
disengage attention from dysphoric stimuli when required (Sanchez, Vazquez, Marker, LeMoult, 
& Joormann, 2013; Sears et al., 2010). In contrast, eye-tracking studies have not found evidence 
of an orienting bias for negative stimuli in depression (Kellough et al., 2008; Mogg et al., 2000; 
Sears et al., 2010; see Armstrong & Olatunji, 2012 for meta-analysis). Thus, the eye-tracking 
evidence suggests that selective attention for negative stimuli in depression involves the 
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maintenance and impaired disengagement of attention from dysphoric stimuli, which is 
consistent with explanations for the discrepant findings from dot-probe studies. 
Selective attention appears not only to be a correlate of depressed mood, but also seems 
to be a factor associated with vulnerability to depression. Previously depressed individuals have 
been found to demonstrate biased attention for negative stimuli similar to the bias observed in 
currently depressed individuals (Joorman & Gotlib, 2007; Sears, Newman, Ference, & Thomas, 
2011). Other studies have suggested that there may be an interaction between trait and state 
variables, such that individual differences in selective attention during sad or depressed mood 
may be associated with vulnerability for depression. Individuals identified as at risk of 
developing depression (children of mothers with recurrent depression) have been found to show 
greater bias for negative facial expressions following a negative mood induction relative to 
controls (Joormann, Talbot, & Gotlib, 2007).  Furthermore, the extent to which participants 
demonstrate biased attention for negative information following a negative mood induction has 
been found to interact with life-stress to prospectively predict future dysphoria (Beevers & 
Carver, 2003). Such findings suggest that the attentional patterns that an individual adopts in 
response to negative mood may be associated with vulnerability to depression, rather than the 
presence of a consistent bias for negative stimuli regardless of mood state. 
Experimental studies employing ABM have also supported the causal role that selective 
attention might play in emotional vulnerability. Initial studies utilising modified dot-probe tasks 
by MacLeod and colleagues (MacLeod et al., 2002; Mathews & MacLeod, 2002) found that 
healthy participants trained to attend to negative stimuli reported stronger negative reactions to a 
stressor than those trained to attend to neutral stimuli. Similarly, participants trained to attend 
away from negative stimuli using a home-based training program have reported reduced anxiety 
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in response to a real-life stressor, as well as reduced trait anxiety in comparison to no-training 
controls (See, MacLeod, & Bridle, 2009). Various studies using ABM programs have also been 
successful in reducing symptoms in anxious populations (Amir, Beard, Burns, & Bomyea, 
2009a; Amir et al., 2009b; Hazen, Vasey, & Schmidt, 2009; Li, Tan, Qian, & Liu, 2008; 
Schmidt, Richey, Buckner, & Timpano, 2009; see Hakamata et al., 2010 for meta-analysis), and 
also in reducing anxiety in response to a public-speaking challenge in socially anxious 
participants (Amir, Weber, Beard, Bomyea, & Taylor, 2008). There is also some research 
successfully utilising ABM to reduced depressive symptoms in dysphoric individuals (Wells & 
Beevers, 2010; Yang, Ding, Dai, Peng, & Zhang, 2015). Such studies suggest selective attention 
plays a causal role in the development and maintenance of emotional disorders, and suggest that 
ABM may have some therapeutic value as an intervention. 
1.3 Theoretical Models of an Association between Rumination and Attentional Processing 
Bias 
Since rumination primarily involves processing of negative content, we might expect 
heightened ruminative disposition to be related to selective processing of negative material, 
including an attentional bias towards negative information (e.g., Watkins, 2008). Initial 
conceptualisations of rumination characterised it as a particular ‘behavioural-attentional style’ 
(Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991, p. 569), where attention is focused on depressive symptoms. Moreover, 
given the close correspondence between rumination and depression, one might expect rumination 
to also be associated with the negative attentional biases found in depression, especially those 
involving depression-related material and longer presentation times. Attentional bias researchers 
have also suggested that the evidence for maintained processing of negative material in 
depression is consistent with evidence of ruminative thinking styles (e.g., Mogg & Bradley, 
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2005), and that deficits in the inhibition of negative material may explain rumination due to more 
difficulty discarding negative thoughts from working memory (Joormann, 2010). In the 
following section, three principal models implicating an association between rumination and 
attentional processing bias will be considered. 
1.3.1 The Impaired Disengagement Account of Rumination 
According to the impaired disengagement hypothesis put forward by Koster and 
colleagues (Koster, De Lissnyder, Derakshan, & De Raedt, 2011), difficulty disengaging 
attention away from negative information is an underlying process contributing to heightened 
levels of ruminative disposition. This model of rumination highlights that the experience of 
negative life events or mood states typically triggers negative ruminative thoughts, termed ‘cued 
rumination’. In this sense, engaging in cued rumination is considered normal and non-
pathological, but when rumination becomes more repetitive and persistent this is characteristic of 
pathological rumination. The disengagement hypothesis suggests that when an individual 
experiences such negative ruminative thoughts, this will generally lead to cognitive conflict 
followed by the recruitment of attentional control resources to disengage from these thoughts and 
reduce this conflict. If the disengagement of attention from negative information is disrupted 
then negative thoughts will be maintained resulting in persistent rumination. Thus, impaired 
attentional disengagement from negative information contributes to a greater tendency to engage 
in persistent, repetitive rumination in response to negative events and mood. This impaired 
attentional disengagement model is illustrated in Figure 1.1. 
41 
 
 
Figure 1.1. Outline of Koster et al.’s (2011) impaired disengagement model of rumination. 
 
Koster et al. (2011) propose two main mechanism through which attentional 
disengagement from negative thoughts can be disrupted. The first is impaired conflict signalling, 
which can occur when individuals have negative self-schemas, meaning that negative thoughts 
are consistent with self-schemas, and thus do not elicit cognitive conflict. In this case, there will 
be reduced attempts to disengage attention from negative thoughts, resulting in sustained 
attentional focus on negative thoughts.  
The second mechanism is through intact conflict signalling, but impaired attentional 
control. Attentional control refers to the ability to selectively attend to relevant information, and 
inhibit the attentional processing of irrelevant information. Thus, if attentional control is 
impaired, individuals will have greater difficulty terminating negative thoughts, leading to more 
persistent rumination. In this case, greater attentional bias for negative information is at least in 
part a direct result of deficits in attentional control. 
It is important to note that whilst Koster et al.’s (2011) model emphasises the role of 
impaired attentional disengagement in contributing to heightened levels of rumination, it does 
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not explicitly discuss the potential role of attentional engagement in rumination. A strong 
interpretation of this model would therefore suggest that, as far as selective attention is 
concerned, only attentional disengagement bias contributes to ruminative disposition, and that 
attentional engagement bias is not associated with ruminative disposition. Alternatively, a more 
open interpretation would suggest that attentional engagement bias could be an additional, 
unspecified factor contributing to heightened ruminative disposition. 
1.3.2 Joormann’s (2010) Cognitive Inhibition Model 
 Joormann’s (2010) cognitive inhibition model of depression proposes a number of ways 
in which deficits in the inhibition of negative material is associated with increased risk for 
depression, including how inhibition impairments might be associated with increased tendency to 
ruminate during negative mood. Inhibition is broadly defined as an executive control process that 
limits the access of information to working memory, and removes no longer relevant information 
(Hasher, Zacks, & May, 1999). With regard to rumination, it is proposed that impaired inhibition 
in the form of greater difficulty removing negative material from working memory is associated 
with increased tendency to ruminate during negative mood.  
Similar to Koster et al. (2011), it is acknowledged that the experience of negative events 
leads to negative mood and the activation of negative cognitions, which are usually transient and 
quickly replaced by cognitions facilitating mood repair. However, if the removal of negative 
material from working memory is impaired, this will result in sustained attentional focus on 
negative cognitions, leading to persistent rumination. Thus, Joormann’s (2010) model also 
predicts that higher levels of ruminative disposition will be associated with impaired attentional 
disengagement from negative information. However, whereas Koster et al.’s (2011) model 
focuses specifically on impairments in attentional control and disengagement, Joormann’s (2010) 
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model incorporates these impairments within broader inhibition deficits in the removal of 
negative material from working memory. 
1.3.3 The Attentional Scope Model of Rumination 
 An alternative attentional processing account of individual differences in ruminative 
disposition is the attentional scope model of rumination (Whitmer & Gotlib, 2013). According to 
the attentional scope model, heightened levels of ruminative disposition are associated with a 
more narrowed attentional scope. A more narrowed attentional scope reduces the array of 
information available for attentional selection, resulting in more constricted and less flexible 
attentional processing. Thus, when negative ruminative thoughts are activated by negative mood, 
individuals with a more narrowed attentional scope will have a more limited array of alternative 
thoughts and actions available to divert attention away from negative thoughts, thus increasing 
the likelihood of repetitive, persistent rumination. In contrast, individuals with a broader 
attentional scope will more easily shift their attention towards a wider array of thoughts and 
activities, thus facilitating the termination of negative thoughts through distraction. 
 According to this account, heightened ruminative disposition is not directly associated 
with an attentional bias for negative information. Instead, rumination-linked attentional bias in 
depressed individuals is a product of a narrowed attentional scope which exacerbates the effects 
of depressed mood on attentional bias. Negative mood states typically result in mood-congruent 
attentional bias (Beevers & Carver, 2003), which is exaggerated by a narrowed attentional scope, 
due to a reduced array of mood-incongruent information available for attentional selection. Thus, 
rumination-linked attentional bias effects are context dependent, such that heightened levels of 
ruminative disposition will only be associated with an attentional bias for negative information 
during negative mood states. 
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The attentional scope model is not necessarily inconsistent with the impaired 
disengagement model. A more narrowed attentional scope could conceivably contribute to 
greater difficulty in disengaging attention from mood-congruent information during negative 
mood states. However, whereas the attentional scope model implies that ruminative disposition 
will only be associated with attentional bias for negative information during negative mood 
states, the impaired disengagement model allows for a relationship between ruminative 
disposition and attentional bias regardless of mood state. Since previous research has mostly only 
investigated the relationship between ruminative disposition and attentional bias within 
depressed participants, it is currently difficult to determine whether this association is dependent 
on mood state, and thus whether rumination-linked attentional bias may be a product of 
narrowed attentional scope or impaired attentional disengagement. 
1.4 Evidence in Support of Attentional Processing Models of Rumination 
1.4.1 Rumination and Attentional Bias for Negative Information 
A number of studies have found evidence that heightened levels of ruminative disposition 
are associated with an attentional bias for negative stimuli using the dot-probe task, thus 
explicitly relating rumination to a bias in selective attention. Donaldson, Lam, and Mathews 
(2007) found that in a sample of depressed participants, RRS scores were positively correlated 
with greater attentional bias for depression relevant negative words presented for 1000ms, but 
not 500ms, relative to neutral words. Similarly, Joormann, Dkane, and Gotlib (2006) found a 
relationship between ruminative disposition and an attentional bias for sad faces presented for 
1000ms relative to neutral faces, but not happy or angry faces, in depressed individuals. The 
relationship was also only significant for the brooding component of rumination, and not for 
reflective pondering, suggesting that the relationship with attentional bias for negative 
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information may be specific to more negative styles of ruminative thinking. Hilt and Pollak 
(2013) also found that adolescents that engaged in rumination in response to a laboratory stressor 
displayed a reduced attentional bias for happy faces presented for 1,500ms relative to neutral 
faces. Thus, heightened levels of ruminative disposition appear to be associated with greater 
attentional bias for depression relevant negative information presented for longer stimulus 
exposure durations, similar to patterns of attentional bias associated with depression. 
The association between ruminative disposition and attentional bias does not, however, 
appear to be simply a by-product of relationship between depression and attentional bias. 
Instead, the relationship between ruminative disposition and attentional bias has been shown to 
remain significant after controlling for current depressive symptoms (Donaldson et al., 2007; Hilt 
& Pollack, 2013; Joormann, Dkane & Gotlib, 2006), indicating that this association is 
independent of depression.  
Such findings that heightened ruminative disposition is independently associated with 
increased attentional bias provide good initial support for models proposing that rumination is 
associated with sustained attentional processing of negative material, as a result of impaired 
attentional disengagement from negative information (Joormann, 2010; Koster et al., 2011). 
However, as outlined above (see Section 1.2.1), the standard dot-probe task used these studies is 
not capable of adequately distinguishing between attentional engagement and disengagement 
bias. Evidence of biased attention only for stimuli presented for longer exposure durations may 
suggest that this bias operates at later stages of processing involving the disengagement of 
attention, but it is unclear whether biases at longer exposure durations necessarily indicate 
impaired attentional disengagement. Thus, based on present findings, heightened ruminative 
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disposition could involve either impaired attentional disengagement from negative information, 
facilitated attentional engagement with negative information, or a combination of both. 
It also worth noting that a couple of studies have examined the relationship between 
ruminative disposition and attentional bias on the exogenous cuing task, but findings from these 
studies have been mixed. LeMoult, Arditte, D’Avanzato, and Joormann (2013) found that 
individuals who reported higher levels of rumination in response to a laboratory stressor 
allocated more attention to emotional relative to neutral information on invalid trials (i.e., trials 
where the probe appears distal to cue stimuli), which was interpreted as evidence of impaired 
attentional disengagement from emotional information. In contrast, Vanderhasselt, Koster, 
Goubert, and De Raedt (2012) found that higher levels of ruminative reflection in response to life 
stress was associated with less attentional allocation to emotional relative to neutral information, 
whereas ruminative brooding was not associated with biased attentional processing of emotional 
information. However, as discussed earlier in this chapter (see Section 1.2.1), the exogenous 
cuing task does not provide an unambiguous measure of selective attention and cannot 
adequately distinguish between attentional engagement and disengagement bias (Clarke et al., 
2013).  
However, it is notable that these studies have primarily only investigated the relationship 
between ruminative disposition and attentional bias within depressed samples. It is therefore not 
yet clear whether findings extend to non-clinical populations. According to the attentional scope 
model (Whitmer & Gotlib, 2013), individual differences in ruminative disposition will only be 
associated with attentional bias for negative information during negative mood states, due to 
narrowed attentional scope exacerbating the effects of negative mood on attentional bias. Since 
previous research has mostly only investigated the relationship between ruminative disposition 
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and attentional bias within depressed participants, it is currently difficult to determine whether 
this association is dependent on mood state, and thus whether rumination-linked attentional bias 
may be a product of narrowed attentional scope. 
There is also promising initial evidence to support the prediction that biased attentional 
processing of negative information is an underlying process causally contributing to increased 
tendency to ruminate. Yang et al. (2015) conducted a randomised control trial investigating the 
effectiveness of ABM as a treatment for depression, in which ABM training attentional bias 
away from negative stimuli was compared to a placebo training and assessment only controls. 
Both depressive symptoms and ruminative disposition were reduced in the ABM relative to 
control conditions. Furthermore, changes in ruminative disposition mediated the effects of ABM 
on depressive symptoms, such that greater decreases in rumination were associated with greater 
reductions in depressive symptoms. However, this study was limited by a relatively small non-
clinical sample of college students. Further replication of the causal effect of attentional bias on 
ruminative disposition, and extension to clinical samples is therefore required to provide 
converging support for this finding. 
1.4.2 Rumination and Inhibition of Negative Information 
A number of studies have also linked heightened ruminative disposition to deficits in the 
inhibition and control of negative material. Higher levels of ruminative disposition have been 
associated with impaired inhibition of previously relevant negative material when switching 
between task settings (De Lissnyder, Koster, Derakshan, & De Raedt, 2010). Using the internal 
shift task (IST), it has also been demonstrated that higher levels of ruminative disposition are 
associated with greater impairments in shifting away from the processing of negative information 
(De Lissnyder et al., 2012a; De Lissnyder, et al., 2012b; Koster, De Lissnyder, & De Raedt, 
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2013).  Furthermore, heightened ruminative disposition has been found to be associated with 
both impairments in preventing irrelevant negative information from accessing working memory 
(Joormann, 2006; Zetsche & Joormann, 2011), and difficulty in removing no longer relevant 
negative information from working memory (Joormann & Gotlib, 2008; Zetsche, D’Avanzato, & 
Joormann, 2012). Similarly, higher levels of ruminative disposition have also been found to be 
associated with greater interference from negative distractors on an emotional flanker task (Pe, 
Vandekerckhove, & Kuppens, 2013). Such findings demonstrate that heightened ruminative 
disposition is associated with a deficit in controlling the processing of negative material, 
consistent with an attentional bias for negative information. Yet, since inhibition involves 
multiple information processing components, it is unclear from these findings whether impaired 
inhibition of negative material reflects a bias in selective attention, or other aspects of 
information processing such as working memory. 
1.4.3 Rumination and General Attentional Control Deficits 
The impaired disengagement hypothesis suggests that rumination-linked attentional bias 
for negative information may at least in part be a result of general deficits in attentional control. 
In support of this proposal, there is considerable evidence for a relationship between heightened 
ruminative disposition and impairments in attentional control. Davis and Nolen-Hoeksema 
(2000) found that individuals with higher levels of ruminative disposition were more likely to 
persist in performing a task according to an old rule after the rule had changed, despite being 
given feedback their responses were incorrect. Similarly, heightened dispositional ruminative 
brooding has been found to be related to impaired inhibition of previous task settings (De 
Lissnyder et al., 2010; Whitmer & Banich, 2007) and impaired switching between different task 
settings on the IST (De Lissnyder et al., 2010; De Lissnyder, et al., 2012b; Demeyer, De 
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Lissnyder, Koster, & De Raedt, 2012). One study also found that ruminative brooding was 
related to difficulty inhibiting orienting responses towards an abrupt cue on an anti-saccade task 
(De Lissnyder, Derakshan, De Raedt, & Koster, 2011), indicating impairments in the control of 
visual-spatial attention.  
However, although research has clearly demonstrated a relationship between heightened 
ruminative disposition and attentional control impairments, such research has yet to assess 
attentional bias and attentional control within the same study. As a result, it is not yet clear whether 
rumination-linked attentional bias and attentional control deficits are functionally associated with 
each other, or whether impaired attentional control and biased attentional processing of negative 
information represent separate cognitive characteristics contributing to higher levels of ruminative 
disposition. In addition to assessing the correlation between rumination-linked attentional control 
deficits and attentional bias, further research investigating the effect of manipulating attentional 
control on attentional bias and rumination will be necessary to test prediction that attentional 
control deficits causally contribute to attentional bias and heightened ruminative disposition.  
1.4.4 Selective Attention and Worry 
Another key line of evidence comes from the worry literature, as since both worry and 
rumination involve repetitive negative thought, it is reasonable to expect that similar processes 
may be involved in each. Aside from the substantial evidence described above implicating 
attentional bias for threat in anxious participants (who are also know to demonstrate elevated 
worry), some studies have also specifically demonstrated a relationship between tendency to 
worry (measured by the PSWQ) and biased attentional processing. Gole, Köchel, Schäfer, and 
Schienle (2011) used an emotional ‘go/no-go’ task to index selective attention, where 
participants were required to make go/no-go decisions (i.e. button press, or withhold press) based 
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on either the semantic meaning of the stimuli (i.e. aversive or neutral) or the syntactic features of 
the word (i.e. upper or lower case letters). Participants in the high worry group had shorter 
reaction times (argued to indicate enhanced attentional engagement), larger commission errors 
(i.e. incorrectly responding to a no-go stimulus, argued to indicate attentional disengagement), 
and fewer omission errors (i.e. failure to respond to a go stimulus, argued to indicate enhanced 
sensitivity), when go stimuli were threat words, relative to neutral words. However, although 
bias in selective attention may be involved in performance on this task, other types of processing 
bias may also be involved which could account for this effect, such as impaired inhibition.  
Another study by Verkuil, Brosschot, Putman, and Thayer (2009) used an exogenous 
cueing task to demonstrate that high trait worry in combination with high trait anxiety was 
associated with reduced inhibition of return (IOR; the tendency to respond faster to invalidly 
cued relative to validly cued trials when stimuli are presented for relatively long periods of time, 
see Posner & Cohen, 1984) for angry faces following an experimentally induced period of worry, 
which has been suggested to indicate impaired attentional disengagement from threat.  
Furthermore, a number of studies have suggested that modifying attentional biases can 
influence worry. Krebs, Hirsch, and Mathews (2010) manipulated selective attention using a 
modified dot-probe task, and found that participants with excessive worry trained to attend to 
threat words reported more negative thought intrusions following a worry period compared to 
participants trained to attend to neutral words, although only when given explicit instructions to 
attend to threat during training. Similarly, Hayes, Hirsch, and Mathews (2010) found that high 
trait worry participants trained to attend away from threatening words and towards neutral words 
using both a modified dot-probe task and a dichotic listening task reported less negative thoughts 
than those who received no training. Unfortunately, because two attention training procedures 
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were used in this study, it is not possible to tell whether either or both contributed to the 
reduction in worry. Yet, such findings are useful because they suggest that attentional biases may 
causally influence repetitive thought. 
Hirsch et al. (2011) used a different paradigm to modify selective attention, specifically 
targeting whether participants engaged or disengaged with the meanings of different types of 
words. Participants were required to make lexical decisions based on either the valence (i.e. 
aversive or neutral) or structure (i.e. upper or lower case) of various threatening or non-
threatening words. The contingencies of the task were then set up to either encourage or 
discourage attentional engagement or disengagement from the meanings of threatening words. 
Participants encouraged to engage with threat reported more negative thoughts following the 
worry task than those discouraged from engaging with threat. However, procedures designed to 
influence disengagement from threat did not produce any differences in worry. Thus, this 
procedure sheds some doubt on the suggestion that difficulty disengaging attention from relevant 
information influences repetitive thought. 
Given the conceptual differences between worry and rumination, particularly in terms of 
their primary content, it is not entirely clear to what extent associations between worry and 
attentional bias will extend to rumination. Overall though, these findings from generally provide 
further support for the proposal that biased attentional processing of negative material is 
associated with negative repetitive thought. 
1.5 Unresolved Questions 
Despite theoretical accounts implicating attentional bias for negative information in 
rumination, the empirical evidence for this relationship is currently limited. Much of the research 
used to support the disengagement hypothesis has focused on general and valence-specific 
52 
 
deficits in inhibition and attentional control, and can be explained without necessarily invoking a 
specific bias in selective attention. Findings that ruminative disposition is associated with 
impaired inhibition of negative material (De Lissnyder et al., 2010; Joormann, 2006) could be 
explained by greater sensitivity to priming from negative stimuli, whereas greater difficulty in 
removing negative material from working memory (Joormann & Gotlib, 2008) could be 
explained by memory biases. Only a few studies to date have demonstrated a relationship 
between ruminative disposition and an unambiguous measure of selective attention by using the 
dot-probe task (Donaldson et al., 2007; Hilt & Pollak, 2013; Joormann et al., 2006). Thus, 
although there is some evidence for a relationship between elevated ruminative disposition and 
attentional bias for negative material, this finding requires further replication to improve 
confidence in its reliability. Similarly, further replication of the finding that this rumination-
linked attentional bias specifically involves bias for depression relevant stimuli presented for 
longer stimulus exposure durations is also required. 
Of particular importance to the impaired disengagement hypothesis, research 
demonstrating a link between ruminative disposition and attentional bias for negative 
information has yet to establish whether this bias involves impaired attentional disengagement 
from, or facilitated attentional engagement with negative stimuli. As outlined above (see Section 
1.2.1), neither the standard dot-probe task nor the exogenous cueing task used in previous studies 
are capable of adequately distinguishing between attentional engagement and disengagement 
bias. Studies utilising the standard dot-probe task found biased attention for stimuli presented for 
longer exposure durations (1000ms or longer; Donaldson et al., 2007; Hilt & Pollak, 2013; 
Joormann et al., 2006), which may suggest that this bias operates at later stages of processing 
involving the disengagement of attention. However, it is unclear whether biases at longer 
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exposure durations necessarily indicate impaired attentional disengagement. Thus, based on 
present findings, heightened ruminative disposition could involve either impaired attentional 
disengagement from negative information, facilitated attentional engagement with negative 
information, or a combination of both. Also, some findings from the worry literature suggest a 
bias in attentional engagement but not disengagement might causally influence this type of 
repetitive thought (Hirsch et al., 2011). 
Clarke et al. (2013) have outlined methodological criteria that must be met by research 
seeking to distinguish between attentional engagement and disengagement bias. In order to 
assess attentional disengagement bias, attention must initially be secured in the location of 
emotional stimuli, followed by assessment of latency to direct attention away from emotional 
stimuli. In order to assess attentional engagement bias, attention must initially be secured in a 
location distal to emotional stimuli, followed by assessment of latency to direct attention towards 
emotional stimuli. Grafton et al., (2012) developed a modified dot-probe paradigm fulfilling 
these methodological criteria, enabling the independent assessment of attentional engagement 
and disengagement bias. Thus, this modified dot-probe task provides an ideal paradigm for 
investigating the hypothesis that heightened levels of ruminative disposition are associated with 
impaired attentional disengagement from negative information. 
In addition, in previous studies investigating the attentional basis of rumination, 
individual differences in ruminative disposition have primarily been assessed using the RRS 
questionnaire measure. However, there are two problems with exclusive reliance on such an 
assessment approach. Firstly, this questionnaire measure does not control for variability in the 
levels of exposure to negative events that respondents may have experienced. Thus, it is possible 
that a high score on the RRS could reflect more frequent, extended or intense exposure to 
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negative events capable of evoking rumination, rather than an increased tendency for rumination 
to be evoked by such negative events. Secondly, the RRS requires participants to draw on their 
long-term memory of past ruminative experience, across an extended period of time, and it is 
well known that retrieval from long-term memory can be highly susceptible to biases, such as 
mood-congruency and recency effects (Kihlstrom, Eich, Sandbrand, & Tobias, 2009; Trull & 
Ebner-Priemer, 2009). Such memory biases may influence participant’s RRS responses in ways 
that compromise sensitive assessment of variability in ruminative disposition, thereby obscuring 
the association between individual differences in ruminative disposition and attentional bias to 
negative information. Thus, whatever association between ruminative disposition, as assessed by 
the RRS, and attentional bias is observed, it is important to seek converging evidence for this 
association from alternative measures of ruminative disposition which mitigates the problems of 
this assessment approach. 
Furthermore, research has primarily only investigated the relationship between 
ruminative disposition and attentional bias within depressed samples. It is therefore not yet clear 
whether findings extend to non-clinical populations. Addressing this issue is particularly 
important with regard to the implications of the attentional scope model of rumination. 
According to the attentional scope model, individual differences in ruminative disposition will 
only be associated with attentional bias for negative information during negative mood states, 
due to narrowed attentional scope exacerbating the effects of negative mood on attentional bias. 
If the relationship between ruminative disposition and attentional bias is demonstrated within 
non-depressed individuals not currently experiencing negative mood, this would suggest that 
narrowed attentional scope cannot fully account for rumination-linked attentional bias. In 
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contrast, if this relationship is only apparent during negative mood states, this would indicate that 
rumination-linked attentional bias may be a product of narrowed attentional scope. 
Further research is also required to investigate the role of attentional control in rumination-
linked attentional bias. The impaired disengagement hypothesis suggests that difficulties 
disengaging attention from negative information may be caused by deficits in attentional control 
(Koster et al., 2011). Yet, although research has clearly demonstrated a relationship between 
heightened ruminative disposition and attentional control impairments (Davis & Nolen-Hoeksema, 
2000; De Lissnyder et al., 2010; De Lissnyder et al., 2011; De Lissnyder, et al., 2012b; Demeyer 
et al., 2012; Whitmer & Banich, 2007), such research has yet to distinguish attentional control 
from attentional bias within the same study. As a result, it is not clear whether rumination-linked 
attentional bias and attentional control deficits are functionally associated with each other, or 
whether impaired attentional control and biased attentional processing of negative information 
represent separate cognitive characteristics contributing to higher levels of ruminative disposition.  
Finally, the majority of research investigating the relationship between ruminative 
disposition and attentional bias has been purely correlational, meaning that the causal 
relationship remains unclear. Koster et al,’s (2011) disengagement hypothesis suggests that 
impaired disengagement of attention from negative information is an underlying process 
contributing to greater tendency to ruminate. However, an equally persuasive case has been 
made that rumination may causally influence biased attentional processing of negative 
information. There is considerable evidence that rumination exacerbates the effects of negative 
mood on information processing biases, including interpretation bias, memory bias, and negative 
future thinking (Lavender & Watkins 2004; Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1995; 
Lyubomirsky et al., 1998). If individuals habitually ruminate during negative mood states, as 
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would be the case for those with high levels of ruminative disposition, such information 
processing biases could become increasingly ingrained and pervasive. Thus, the previously 
observed relationship between ruminative disposition and attentional bias for negative 
information could be at least partly explained by the effects of rumination on cognitive 
processing biases. 
The aim of this thesis will be to further examine the relationship between ruminative 
disposition and attentional bias, in particular whether the tendency to ruminate is associated with 
impaired attentional disengagement from, or enhanced attentional engagement with negative 
information. Whereas previous research investigating the relationship between ruminative 
disposition and attentional bias has not used attentional assessment paradigms that can 
distinguish between biased attentional engagement and disengagement, this thesis will employ 
attentional assessment tasks fulfilling methodological criteria outlined by Clarke et al. (2013) for 
the independent assessment of attentional engagement and disengagement bias. These paradigms 
will include variants of Grafton et al.’s (2012) modified dot-probe task (Studies One, Two, & 
Four) and an eye-tracking assessment of attentional bias (Study Three). Consistent with Koster et 
al.’s (2011) impaired disengagement model, it is hypothesised that heightened levels of 
ruminative disposition will be associated with more impaired attentional disengagement from 
negative information. The thesis will also seek to investigate this relationship within non-
depressed samples of participants, in order to determine whether the relationship between 
ruminative disposition and attentional bias extends to non-depressed populations. Attentional 
control will also be assessed alongside attentional bias, in an attempt to determine whether these 
represent separate or functionally associated facets of heightened ruminative disposition (Study 
Four). Finally, the thesis will take a first step towards examining the causal relationship between 
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rumination and selective attention, by investigating the effect of induced rumination on 
attentional bias (Study Five). 
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CHAPTER TWO: Study One 
 
2.1 Preface 
 The paper reported in the main section of this chapter has been accepted for publication 
at Cognition and Emotion, and is currently in press. 
 The primary aim of Study One was to examine the relationship between ruminative 
disposition and attentional bias using an attentional assessment paradigm capable of 
distinguishing between attentional engagement and disengagement bias. The impaired 
disengagement hypothesis (Koster, De Lissnyder, Derakshan, & De Raedt, 2011) suggests that 
heightened levels of ruminative disposition are associated with impaired attentional 
disengagement from negative information. However, previous studies demonstrating a 
relationship between heightened ruminative disposition and attentional bias for negative 
information (e.g., Donaldson, Lam, & Mathews, 2007; Joormann, Dkane, & Gotlib, 2006) were 
limited by their use of the standard dot-probe task, which cannot distinguish between attentional 
engagement and disengagement bias (Clarke, MacLeod, & Guastella, 2013). Thus, it is not yet 
clear whether this bias involves impaired attentional disengagement from, or facilitated 
attentional engagement with negative stimuli. Study One addressed this limitation by employing 
a modified dot-probe task designed to independently assess attentional engagement and 
disengagement bias (Grafton, Watkins, & MacLeod, 2012).  
 Secondly, Study One aimed to address the limitation that previous research 
demonstrating a relationship between rumination disposition and attentional bias, has exclusively 
relied on the Ruminative Responses Scale (RRS; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991) 
questionnaire measure to assess individual differences in ruminative disposition. However, such 
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questionnaire measures are vulnerable to confounds such as individual differences in exposure to 
negative events and memory biases. Such confounds may influence participant’s RRS responses 
in ways that compromise sensitive assessment of variability in ruminative disposition, thereby 
obscuring the association between individual differences in ruminative disposition and 
attentional bias to negative information. Thus, Study One sought to reduce these limitations by 
also assessing ruminative disposition using an in-vivo measure of increases in rumination in 
response to a controlled negative event. 
Consistent with predictions from the impaired disengagement account of rumination 
(Koster et al., 2011), it was hypothesised that heightened levels of ruminative disposition, as 
assessed by both the RRS and an in-vivo measure, would be associated with more impaired 
attentional disengagement from negative relative to positive stimuli. 
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2.2 Abstract 
Information processing accounts of rumination propose that impaired attentional 
disengagement from negative information may underpin heightened disposition to experience 
ruminative brooding in response to negative mood. The present study examined the relationship 
between individual differences in ruminative disposition and selective attention, using a 
paradigm capable of distinguishing between biases in the engagement and disengagement of 
attention. Results showed that higher dispositional ruminative brooding, as measured by both the 
brooding subscale of the RRS and an in-vivo assessment of ruminative disposition, was 
associated with greater relative impairment disengaging attention from negative compared to 
positive stimuli. These findings thus provide support for the “impaired disengagement” account 
of ruminative brooding. 
 
Keywords: rumination, brooding, attention, disengagement bias, engagement bias 
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2.3 Introduction 
During their lives, bad things will happen to most people. For almost everyone, exposure 
to a bad event will elicit an increase in negative mood state. However, the severity of such 
negative emotional reactions is predicted by individual differences in the degree to which people 
tend to engage in rumination, a form of repetitive negative thinking that involves dwelling on the 
causes, meanings, and consequences of such events and feelings (Nolen-Hoeksema, McBride, & 
Larson, 1997). This observation that heightened negative emotional reactions to events can be 
predicted by elevated disposition to engage in rumination, has motivated researchers to 
investigate the cognitive factors that underpin ruminative disposition (Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco, 
& Lyubomirsky, 2008). Investigators often seek to assess individual differences in ruminative 
disposition using questionnaire measures, most commonly the Ruminative Responses Scale 
(RRS; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991). Factor analysis of the RRS has identified two distinct 
sub-types of rumination, termed ‘brooding’ and ‘reflection’. The former is considered a 
maladaptive form of rumination that involves passively experiencing unpleasant thoughts 
concerning negative events and feelings, whereas the latter is considered a more adaptive form of 
rumination that involves an active attempt to problem solve in order to overcome negative mood 
(Treynor, Gonzalez, & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2003). There is considerable evidence from 
prospective longitudinal studies, and from experimental studies, which suggests that the 
heightened disposition to engage in ruminative brooding, in particular, may play a critical role in 
the etiology and maintenance of depression (c.f. Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008; Watkins, 2008). 
Hence, it becomes crucial to delineate the cognitive processes that contribute to this maladaptive 
form of rumination. 
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Many investigators contend that biases in the selective attentional processing of negative 
relative to non-negative information underpin individual differences in the disposition to engage 
in ruminative brooding (Joormann, 2010; Siegle, Steinhauer, & Thase, 2004), and discriminate 
two facets of attentional selectivity that may be important in this regard (LeMoult, Arditte, 
D’Avanzato, & Joormann, 2013). The first is increased attentional engagement with negative 
information, reflecting a disproportionate tendency for attention to become more readily focused 
on distal information that is negative in emotional tone, and the second is impaired attentional 
disengagement from negative information, reflecting a disproportionate tendency for attention to 
be more firmly held by proximal information that is negative in emotional tone. The 
phenomenological experience of ruminative brooding suggests that it is characterised by 
difficulty in terminating negative thinking, and so it has been hypothesized that individual 
differences in ruminative brooding may specifically be underpinned by impaired attentional 
disengagement from negative information, rather than by increased attentional engagement with 
negative information (Koster, De Lissnyder, Derakshan, & De Raedt, 2011). According to this 
impaired disengagement hypothesis, the heightened tendency to experience the persistence of 
negative thoughts, which characterizes dispositional ruminative brooding, reflects difficulty 
disengaging attention from negative information.  
Some researchers have used the emotional flanker task (Fenske & Eastwood, 2003) to 
assess attentional bias to negative information in rumination. In this approach, participants are 
required to execute a central task in the presence of flanker stimuli that are either negative or 
non-negative in emotional tone. The degree to which participants are slowed to complete the 
central task in the presence of negative flankers, relative to non-negative flankers, reveals 
attentional bias towards the former information compared to the latter. It has been demonstrated 
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that participants who report high levels of ruminative disposition on the RRS show relatively 
increased slowing of central task performance in the presence of negative flankers compared to 
non-negative flankers, consistent with the operation of a rumination-linked attentional bias to 
negative information (Pe, Vandekerckhove, & Kuppens, 2013). 
Other researchers have instead employed the dot-probe task (MacLeod, Mathews, & 
Tata, 1986) to assess attentional bias to negative information in rumination. In this task, 
participants are briefly exposed to stimulus pairs comprising one negative member and one non-
negative member, and are required to quickly discriminate the identity of a probe that is 
subsequently displayed in the location of either one of the two stimulus pair members. The 
degree to which participants are speeded to discriminate probes that appear in the locus of the 
negative information, relative to probes that appear in the locus of the non-negative information, 
reveals attentional bias towards negative compared to non-negative information. It has been 
shown that participants who score higher in ruminative disposition, as assessed by the RRS, are 
disproportionately speeded to discriminate probes in the locus of negative information, compared 
to those in the locus of positive information, suggesting that the distribution of their attention 
favors the locus of negative information (Donaldson, Lam, & Mathews, 2007; Joormann, Dkane, 
& Gotlib, 2006). In these studies, this association between ruminative disposition and attentional 
bias was independent of concurrent levels of depression. 
The findings from these previous studies indicate that heightened ruminative disposition 
is characterised by an attentional bias to negative information. However, these studies are 
constrained by three significant limitations that leave them unable to shed light on the hypothesis 
that heightened ruminative brooding, in particular, is characterized specifically by impaired 
attentional disengagement from negative information. First, these studies have typically not 
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sought to distinguish variation in the disposition to engage in ruminative brooding from variation 
in the disposition to engage in ruminative reflection. Second, they have employed attentional 
assessment tasks that do not enable the independent assessment of biased attentional engagement 
with, and biased attentional disengagement from, negative information. Third, they have relied 
exclusively on the RRS questionnaire measure to assess individual differences in ruminative 
disposition. In the following, we consider each limitation in turn, and illustrate how each can be 
overcome. 
To date, only one study has sought to investigate whether heightened dispositional 
ruminative brooding, in particular, is characterised by an attentional bias to negative information. 
Specifically, using the dot-probe task, Joormann et al. (2006) found that, compared to 
participants with lower levels of ruminative brooding, those with higher levels of ruminative 
brooding displayed greater attentional bias to negative information. In contrast, compared to 
participants with lower levels of ruminative reflection, those with higher levels of ruminative 
reflection did not show greater attentional bias to negative information. Hence, these findings 
provide support for the idea that the heightened disposition to engage in ruminative brooding, in 
particular, is characterised by an attentional bias to negative information. However, Joormann et 
al. (2006) used a conventional variant of the dot-probe task that it not designed to independently 
measure attentional engagement and disengagement bias (Clarke, MacLeod & Guastella, 2013; 
Mogg, Holmes, Gardner, & Bradley, 2008; Yiend, 2010). Thus, this study cannot shed light on 
the hypothesis that the heightened disposition to engage in ruminative brooding is characterised 
specifically by impaired attentional disengagement from negative information. 
Independent assessment of the tendency for attention to be disproportionately captured by 
initially distal negative information (engagement bias), and to be disproportionately held by 
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initially proximal negative information (disengagement bias) requires that, on each trial, 
participants have their initial attentional focus respectively secured in a locus distal to where 
differentially valenced information is presented, or in a locus proximal to where differentially 
valenced information is presented (Grafton & MacLeod, 2014; Rudaizky, Basanovic, & 
MacLeod, 2014). Selective attention can then be assessed in the usual way, by comparing 
discrimination latencies to probes appearing in either the same or opposite location of this 
emotional information. Using this approach, trials on which negative information, relative to 
non-negative information, is presented distal to initial attentional focus enable the assessment of 
biased attentional engagement with negative information, whereas trials on which negative, 
relative to non-negative information, is presented proximal to initial attentional focus enable the 
assessment of biased attentional disengagement from negative information. 
Unfortunately, the approach most commonly used to assess engagement bias and 
disengagement bias, a variant of the Posner cuing task (e.g., LeMoult et al., 2013), does not 
involve systematically anchoring the initial attentional focus of participants in a location either 
distally to, or proximally from, differentially valenced information, and so cannot enable 
independent assessment of these two facets of selective attention (Grafton & MacLeod, 2014; 
Rudaizky et al., 2014). Specifically, in this task, participants are instructed to initially attend to a 
central fixation cue. A single differentially valenced stimulus (negative or positive) is then 
briefly presented, either to the left or right of this initial attentional focus. Next, a target probe, to 
which the participant must rapidly execute a discriminatory response, appears in either the same 
or opposite location to where the single stimulus was just displayed. There are two problems 
with this approach. The first problem is that nothing requires, or verifies, that participants 
consistently follow the instruction to initially attend to the central fixation cue, which raises 
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serious concerns about whether attention is actually secured in this intended initial location. The 
second problem is that the differentially valenced information is then always presented in a 
location distal to the intended initial focus of attention. Thus, on every trial, the first attentional 
response made by participants would be influenced by the degree to which attention is captured 
by this initially distal information when it is negative compared to positive in emotional tone, 
and so the assessment of disengagement bias would be systematically contaminated by 
engagement bias. 
To overcome the problems of such variants of the Posner cuing task, Grafton, Watkins, 
and MacLeod (2012) developed a modified dot-probe task that satisfies the methodological 
requirement that the initial attentional focus of participants is secured either distally to, or 
proximally from, differentially valenced information, thus enabling the independent assessment 
of selective attentional engagement with, and selective attentional disengagement from, negative 
information. Specifically, in this task, participants are initially instructed to attend to an upper or 
lower screen location. An anchor probe is then presented in this attended locus (for 150ms), and 
the participant is required to apprehend its identity. Immediately thereafter, a stimulus pair 
comprising an emotional letter string (negative or positive in emotional tone) and a non-
emotional letter string is briefly displayed, one member appearing in each of the two critical 
screen locations, with equal frequency. Thus, the emotional letter string appears either 
proximally to where the participant is initially attending, or distally from this initial attentional 
focus. A target probe then appears in the location of either one of the two screen loci, and the 
participant is required to determine whether the identity of the target probe matches that of the 
anchor probe. The degree to which speeding to target probes in the locus of the emotional letter 
strings compared to non-emotional letter strings is greater when the emotional letter string is 
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negative compared to positive in emotional tone provides an index of attentional bias to negative 
information. On trials where the emotional letter string appears distal to initial attentional focus, 
this index of attentional bias to negative information reveals increased attentional engagement 
with negative compared to positive information. In contrast, on trials where the emotional letter 
string appears proximal to initial attentional focus, this index of attentional bias to negative 
information reveals reduced attentional disengagement from negative compared to positive 
information. The capacity of this approach to independently assess engagement bias and 
disengagement bias has been validated in a number of recent studies investigating the attentional 
basis of elevated anxiety vulnerability (Grafton & MacLeod, 2014; Grafton, et al., 2012; 
Rudaizky, et al., 2014). Hence, in the present study, we will deliver a dot-probe task, closely 
based on the procedure introduced by Grafton et al. (2012), in order to separately assess these 
two facets of attentional selectivity in rumination. 
Finally, in previous studies investigating the attentional basis of rumination, individual 
differences in ruminative disposition have only been assessed using the RRS questionnaire 
measure. There are two problems with exclusive reliance on such an assessment approach. The 
first problem is that this questionnaire measure does not control for variability in the levels of 
exposure to negative events that respondents may have experienced. Thus, it is possible that a 
high score on the RRS could reflect more frequent, extended or intense exposure to negative 
events capable of evoking rumination, rather than an increased tendency for rumination to be 
evoked by such negative events. The second problem is that the RRS requires participants to 
draw on their long-term memory of past ruminative experience, across an extended period of 
time, and it is well known that retrieval from long-term memory can be highly susceptible to 
biases, such as mood-congruency and recency effects (Kihlstrom, Eich, Sandbrand, & Tobias, 
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2009; Trull & Ebner-Priemer, 2009). Such memory biases may influence participant’s RRS 
responses in ways that compromise sensitive assessment of variability in ruminative disposition, 
thereby obscuring the association between individual differences in ruminative disposition and 
attentional bias to negative information. Thus, whatever association between ruminative 
disposition, as assessed by the RRS, and attentional bias is observed, it is important to seek 
converging evidence of this association effect when ruminative disposition is assessed in a 
manner that mitigates the potential problems associated with this questionnaire measure. Hence, 
in the present study, we also employed an in-vivo procedure to assess individual differences in 
ruminative disposition. Specifically, this involved exposing participants to a standardized event 
in the laboratory capable of eliciting an increase in negative mood state, and assessing their 
levels of rumination immediately before and immediately after this event. An index of 
ruminative disposition, reflecting the degree to which this controlled event served to evoke 
rumination, was obtained by computing the degree to which rumination was elevated post- 
compared to pre- this negative event. Higher levels of ruminative disposition will be revealed by 
greater increases in rumination following exposure to this negative event, relative to before such 
exposure. By ensuring that participants received equivalent exposure to the same negative event, 
under tightly controlled laboratory conditions, and minimizing reliance on long-term memory by 
assessing levels of rumination in very close temporal proximity to this event, we were able to 
minimize the problems associated with the RRS questionnaire measure of ruminative disposition. 
In summary, the purpose of the current study was to empirically test the disengagement 
bias hypothesis put forward by Koster et al. (2011), according to which heightened ruminative 
brooding is characterised by impaired attentional disengagement from negative relative to 
positive information. To do this, we delivered a variant of the dot-probe task, which was closely 
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based on the approach introduced by Grafton et al. (2012), to participants who differed widely in 
terms of their disposition to engage in ruminative brooding. To assess this ruminative disposition 
we employed both the conventional RRS questionnaire measure, and an in-vivo assessment 
procedure, the latter mitigating the potential problems associated with the former approach. 
2.4 Method 
2.4.1 Participants 
Participants were 63 students (17 male, 46 female; mean age = 20.2) from the University 
of Exeter, recruited from the psychology department or via a database of individuals who wished 
to be informed of opportunities to participate in research in the department. Participants were 
screened for depressive symptoms using the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI-II; Beck, Steer, & 
Brown, 1996). Given that the study employed a stressor designed to induce negative mood state, 
for ethical reasons, individuals who scored 20 or above on the BDI, reflecting the standard cut-
off for moderate levels of depression (Beck et al., 1996), were required to be excluded from 
participation in the study by our institutional review board. Overall, participants displayed a low 
level of depressive symptoms (M = 3.30, SD = 3.69). All participants spoke English as a first 
language. 
2.4.2 Assessment of Ruminative Disposition 
 Questionnaire Measure of Ruminative Disposition: Ruminative Responses Scale.  
The Ruminative Response Scale questionnaire (RRS; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991) was 
employed as our questionnaire measure of ruminative disposition. The RRS is a 22-item 
retrospective report measure, which requires participants to indicate the degree to which they 
engage in particular ruminative responses when in a negative mood, on a 4-point Likert scale (1 
= Almost Never, 4 = Almost Always). Of importance to the present study, this questionnaire 
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yields two subscales; ruminative brooding and ruminative reflection. Both of these subscales 
show acceptable reliability and consistency (Treynor et al., 2003). In each case, a higher score 
indicates a greater tendency to engage in each form of rumination in response to negative mood 
state. 
 In-Vivo Measure of Ruminative Disposition: Elevation in Ruminative Thinking in 
Response to a Standardized Negative Event. Ruminative disposition was also measured using 
an in-vivo approach that involved assessing levels of ruminative thinking immediately before, 
and immediately after, exposure to a controlled negative event in the laboratory. As described in 
detail below, this negative event was an anagram failure task. To assess levels of ruminative 
thinking at each of these two assessment points, we adapted the breathing focus task originally 
developed by Hirsch, Hayes, and Mathews (2009). In this task, participants were asked to try and 
focus on their breathing for 5 minutes. Throughout this 5 minute period, a tone sounded 12 times 
at random intervals of between 20 and 30 seconds. Whenever the tone sounded, participants were 
required to report whether they were currently focused on their breathing or were focused on a 
thought. If they were focused on a thought, they were required to give this thought a one or two 
word label, and classify it as negative, positive, or neutral in emotional tone 1. 
At the end of the 5 minute breathing period, the participant rated each recorded negative 
thought on five key dimensions relevant to rumination. Specifically, each negative thought was 
rated from 0 to 4 in terms of frequency (i.e., how often the thought came to mind), duration (i.e., 
how long they were thinking about the subject of the thought), repetitiveness (i.e., how much 
                                                          
1 In addition to having participants rate the negativity of their own thought content, an 
independent rater also verified the participants’ valence ratings. Specifically, a blind assessor 
rated the valence of a random sample of 10% of participants’ thoughts. These ratings showed 
that the assessor evidenced a high level of agreement with participants’ own negative valence 
ratings (86%), thereby establishing convergent validity of the participants’ ratings. 
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thoughts kept coming back to the same idea), severity (i.e., how upsetting or distressing the 
thought was), and control (i.e., how difficult it was to stop or move on to other thoughts; see 
Appendix One for full rating questions and response options). The ratings for each negative 
thought reported during the 5 minute breathing period were averaged across the total number of 
negative thoughts to yield a rumination score for that period. Using this rumination score data, an 
in-vivo index of ruminative disposition was obtained by computing the residuals from a simple 
linear regression predicting rumination scores post-anagram task from rumination scores pre-
anagram task. A higher score on this index reflected a greater tendency to respond to the 
negative event by increasing ruminative thinking, and so indicated heightened ruminative 
disposition.  
 Visual Analogue Assessment of Negative Mood. To assess the impact of the anagram 
failure task on negative mood state, when each tone sounded during the breathing focus tasks, 
participants also completed two visual analogue mood rating scales, each 100 mm in length, that 
assessed state levels of sadness (scale labelled “sad and “happy” at each extreme) and anxiety 
(scale labelled “anxious” and “confident” at each extreme). Responses were scored on a scale 
ranging from 0 to 100. An index of negative mood reactivity to the anagram failure task was 
obtained by computing the residuals from a simple linear regression predicting negative mood 
scores post-anagram task from negative mood scores pre-anagram task. 
Anagram Failure Task. In this anagram task, participants were given three minutes to 
solve 30 supposed anagrams. They were told that the anagram task predicted academic success, 
and that they should expect to solve five or six anagrams. Fifteen of the anagrams were soluble, 
in that their letters could be rearranged to form a legitimate English word, though these anagrams 
had been rated as very difficult to solve. The remaining 15 anagrams were insoluble, as the 
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letters of these anagrams could not be rearranged to form a legitimate English word. Most 
participants were unable to solve any of the anagrams (mean correct = 0.84, SD = 1.26). One 
participant did, however, successfully solve more than five anagrams, and so was excluded from 
the analysis. At the end of the 3 minutes, participants were given their score, together with the 
feedback that this score was below average. 
Beck Depression Inventory (BDI-II; Beck et al., 1996). The BDI-II is a 21-item self-
report measure designed to assess the severity of depressive symptoms. Participants indicate on a 
4-point scale how much they have experienced depressive symptoms over the past two weeks. 
We used a 20-item version of the BDI-II, with the item about suicidal feelings or ideation 
removed at the request of our institutional review board. Higher scores represent greater severity 
of depressive symptoms. This measure has shown good reliability and validity (Beck et al., 
1996). 
2.4.3 Apparatus  
A 22-inch computer monitor and a standard two-button mouse were used to present 
stimuli and record participant responses. 
2.4.4 Experimental Stimuli  
In the present study, we required 64 word pairs each comprising an emotional word and 
neutral word, which were matched in terms of word length and frequency. The emotional word 
stimuli were taken from Grafton et al. (2012; see Appendix Two for full list of emotional word 
stimuli). Half of the emotional words were intended to be negative terms likely to be implicated 
in ruminative thinking (e.g. hopeless, lonely, sluggish), while the other half were intended to be 
positive terms unlikely to be implicated in ruminative thinking (e.g. pleased, calm, fun). These 
emotional word stimuli were rated by 4 graduate psychologists in terms of emotional valence, 
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likelihood of being implicated in ruminative thinking, and arousal. These ratings confirmed that 
our intentions were satisfied. Specifically, the negative words were rated as more negative than 
the positive words, and more likely to be involved in ruminative thinking (both p’s < .001). The 
negative words and positive words did not differ in terms of word length, frequency, or arousal 
(all p’s > .05). 
2.4.5 Attentional Bias Assessment Task 
Each trial began with the appearance of an upper and lower string of asterisks, indicating 
the two critical screen regions, centralised horizontally on the computer screen and separated by 
a distance of 3cm. Between the asterisks was a row of arrows, all pointing to the upper string, or 
all pointing to the lower string, with equal frequency. The arrows directed the participant which 
of the two screen regions to initially fixate attention upon. After one second, the screen was 
cleared, and an anchor probe was briefly presented (150ms) in this attended region. This anchor 
probe was a small (2mm) red line sloping upwards 45° to either the left or right, with equal 
frequency. Immediately thereafter, a word pair was presented, with one word appearing in each 
of the two critical screen regions. On half the trials the emotional member of the word pair 
appeared distal to the initially attended region (permitting the assessment of the biased 
attentional engagement with negative information), and on the remaining half of the trials the 
emotional member of the word pair appeared proximal to the initially attended region (permitting 
the assessment of biased attentional disengagement with negative information). The word pair 
was displayed for either 500ms or 1000ms, with equal frequency. A target probe stimulus then 
appeared in either of the two critical regions, with equal frequency. The target probe stimulus 
was again a small (2mm) red line sloping upwards 45° to either the left or right. Participants 
were required to indicate whether the slope direction of this target probe stimulus matched that 
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of the anchor probe, which was the case on 50% of trials. Participants responded by pressing 
either the right or left mouse buttons, to indicate a match and a non-match, respectively. The 
latency, and accuracy, to make this discrimination response was recorded. Upon detection of the 
participant’s response the screen was cleared, and the next trial began after a 1000ms inter-trial 
interval. This sequence of events is summarized in the example trials shown in Figure 2.1. 
The task consisted of 256 trials in total, split into two equal blocks of 128 trials, with a 30 
second break in between. Across the task, each of the 64 word pairs was presented four times in 
a random order, with the constraint that each pair was presented once before any were presented 
a second time, and each was repeated once before any were displayed for a third time, and so on. 
Calculating Bias Indices. In this task, selective attention to the emotional word members 
of the word pairs is revealed by relative speeding to make discrimination responses to target 
probes appearing in the locus of emotional words compared to target probes appearing in the 
locus of neutral words. Thus, an index of attentional bias to negative information relative to 
positive information can be computed by expressing the degree to which this relative speeding to 
discriminate probes in the locus of emotional words compared to probes appearing in the locus 
of neutral words, is greater when this word was negative, rather than positive, in emotional tone.  
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Figure 2.1. Examples of stimulus presentation locations; (a) (i) anchor proximal to emotional 
word, target distal to emotional word, (ii) anchor proximal to emotional word, target proximal to 
emotional word, (b) (i) anchor distal to emotional word, target proximal to emotional word, (ii) 
anchor distal to emotional word, target distal to emotional word. On attentional disengagement 
assessment trials the anchor appears in the location of the emotional word, whereas on 
attentional engagement assessment trials the anchor appears in the location of the neutral word.   
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Of most importance, the current task permits us to compute this negative attentional bias 
index under two conditions, in order to separately index facilitated attentional engagement with, 
and impaired attentional disengagement from, negative information. Specifically, an Engagement 
Bias Index can be computed by using the RT data from trials on which the emotional member of 
the word pair appeared distal to initial attentional focus (i.e. from trials on which the anchor 
probe appeared in the locus of the neutral word). Higher scores on this engagement bias index 
indicate that attention was captured to a greater degree by this distal information when it was 
negative rather than positive in emotional tone, and can be expressed using the following 
formula: 
Attentional Engagement Bias Index = (RT anchor distal negative word, target distal 
negative word – RT anchor distal negative word, target proximal negative word) – (RT anchor 
distal positive word, target distal positive word – RT anchor distal positive word, target proximal 
positive word). 
A Disengagement Bias Index can be computed by using the RT data from trials on which 
the emotional member of the word pair appeared proximal to initial attentional focus (i.e. from 
trials on which the anchor probe appeared in the locus of the emotional word). Higher scores on 
this disengagement bias index indicate that attention was held to a greater degree by this 
proximal emotional information when it was negative rather than positive in emotional tone, and 
can be expressed using the following formula: 
Attentional Disengagement Bias Index = (RT anchor proximal negative word, target 
distal negative word – RT anchor proximal negative word, target proximal negative word) – (RT 
anchor proximal positive word, target distal positive word – RT anchor proximal positive word, 
target proximal positive word). 
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Probe discrimination latencies can only indicate attentional distribution if the response is 
made accurately, hence only RTs from accurate responses were used, and we eliminated any 
participants with an overall accuracy score that was atypically low using a 95% confidence 
interval. Following the approach adopted in prior research (Rutherford, MacLeod, & Campbell, 
2004; Ratcliff, 1993), we used participants’ median RT under each condition in these 
computations, to minimise the influence of outlying RTs 2.  
2.4.6 Procedure 
 Prior to commencing the experimental session, participants were told that the study was 
investigating the links between personality, mood, and cognitive abilities, and were given a basic 
description of each task. Participants then completed the BDI-II and RRS questionnaire measure. 
They were then seated approximately 40cm from the computer screen, and were given written 
instructions for the attentional assessment task. Next, they completed a brief practice task 
consisting of 16 trials using only neutral stimuli. Following this, they completed the attentional 
assessment task. Participants then practiced focusing on their breathing for a one minute period, 
before completing the in-vivo assessment of ruminative disposition. 
2.5 Results 
Five participants who displayed atypically low accuracy on the attention probe task 
(using 95% confidence interval), and four who did not complete the full set of emotional 
assessment measures, were removed prior to analysis. The remaining participants displayed a 
high level of accuracy on the attention probe task, averaging less than 11% errors. There was no 
                                                          
2 Analyses were also conducted using mean RTs, rather than median RTs. Consistent with the 
argument that median RTs are more sensitive than means to the detection of RT (Ratcliff, 1993), 
there was no evidence of a relationship between our measures of ruminative brooding and 
attentional disengagement bias using this approach (all p’s > .05). 
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association between accuracy on the attentional bias assessment task and any of the measures of 
ruminative disposition (all p’s > .70). 
 
Table 2.1. Descriptive statistics of participant characteristics, attentional bias indices, and in-vivo 
mood and rumination assessments (pre- and post-failure). 
 Mean (SD) Range 
BDI-II 3.30 (3.69) 0 - 14 
RRS 42.5 (9.79) 25 - 67 
Brooding 9.47 (2.84) 5 - 15 
Reflection 10.3 (3.13) 5 - 18 
Engagement Bias Index -7.74 (109.1) -322.0 - 196.4 
Disengagement Bias Index -15.70 (109.2) -228.4 – 213.0 
Pre-Failure Assessment   
 Sadness 29.30 (12.60) 4.00 – 49.00 
 Anxiety 31.68 (14.07) 3.00 – 55.00 
 Rumination 0.98 (1.99) 0.00 – 7.00 
Post-Failure Assessment   
 Sadness 37.47 (14.88) 3.00 – 68.00 
 Anxiety 39.32 (14.75) 4.00 – 66.00 
 Rumination 4.70 (4.22) 0.00 – 15.40 
Note: Note: BDI-II = Beck Depression Inventory II, RRS = Ruminative Responses Scale 
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2.5.1 Association between RRS Questionnaire Measure of Ruminative Disposition and 
Attentional Engagement and Disengagement Bias Indices 
 To determine whether the heightened disposition to engage in ruminative brooding, in 
particular, is characterized specifically by impaired attentional disengagement from negative 
information, bivariate correlations were computed between the RRS ruminative brooding scores, 
the RRS ruminative reflection scores, and our two indices of attentional bias to negative 
information. The results of these correlational analyses are shown in Table 2.2. As can be seen, 
there was a significant positive correlation between ruminative brooding scores and 
disengagement bias scores, r (53) = .30, p = .032, reflecting the fact that higher ruminative 
brooding scores were associated with higher disengagement bias scores. This association 
remained evident, albeit at trend level, when controlling for BDI-II scores, r (50) = .25, p = .076, 
suggesting that the observed association between ruminative brooding and disengagement bias 
was independent of depression. No significant correlation was observed between ruminative 
brooding scores and engagement bias scores, r (53) = .08, p = .588. Further, the ruminative 
reflection scores were not significantly correlated with either measure of attentional bias to 
negative information (in both cases p > .30). Hence, in keeping with the disengagement 
hypothesis proposed by Koster et al. (2011), the obtained pattern of results suggest that 
heightened ruminative brooding, in particular, is characterized by impaired attentional 
disengagement from negative relative to positive information. 
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Table 2.2. Bivariate correlations between RRS and in-vivo ruminative disposition scores, and 
attentional bias indices. 
 Engagement Bias Disengagement Bias 
 r (53) p r (53) p 
RRS Brooding  .08 .588 .30 .032* 
RRS Reflection  -.13 .347 -.04 .773 
In vivo-ruminative disposition .11 .441 .33 .016* 
Note: * p < .05 
 
2.5.2 Association between In-Vivo Measure of Ruminative Disposition and Attentional 
Engagement and Disengagement Bias Indices 
The anxiety and sadness scores obtained from the analogue mood scales delivered 
immediately before and immediately after the anagram failure task are shown in Table 1. A two-
way repeated measures ANOVA that considered the within-group factors Mood Assessment 
Point (Pre-Anagram Mood Assessment vs. Post-Anagram Mood Assessment) and Mood Scale 
Type (Sadness vs. Anxiety) was used carried out on these data.  The only effect to emerge from 
the analysis was a significant main effect of Mood Assessment Point, F (1, 52) = 46.18, p < .001, 
ηp² = .47, reflecting the fact that, in general, the level of negative mood indicated by the analogue 
mood scale scores was significantly higher at post-anagram assessment (M = 76.79, SD = 28.70) 
compared to pre-anagram assessment (M = 60.98, SD = 25.35).Thus, this confirms that the 
anagram failure task did serve to elevate negative mood state, as intended. 
Next, a one-way repeated measures ANOVA that considered the within-group factor 
Rumination Assessment Point (Pre-Anagram Rumination Assessment vs. Post-Anagram 
Rumination Assessment) was carried out on the rumination scores obtained immediately before 
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and immediately after the anagram failure task. This analysis revealed a significant main effect 
of Rumination Assessment Point, F (1, 52) = 40.50, p < .001, ηp² = .44, reflecting the fact that 
participants displayed higher rumination scores at post-anagram assessment (M = 4.70, SD = 
4.22) compared to pre-anagram assessment (M = .98, SD = 1.99). Thus, this confirms that the 
anagram failure task did serve to elicit an increase in rumination, as intended.  
Of course, in the present study, our main interest was in individual differences in the 
degree to which rumination was elevated following this anagram failure experience. Hence, we 
went on to compute our in-vivo index of ruminative disposition, as described in the Method 
section. Correlation analysis revealed a significant positive association between these in-vivo 
ruminative disposition scores and RRS brooding scores, r (53) = .33, p = .016. In contrast, no 
such association was observed between these in-vivo ruminative disposition scores and RRS 
reflection scores, r (53) = .19, p = .166. Thus, this pattern of results indicates that our in-vivo 
measure of ruminative disposition reflects variation in the tendency for ruminative brooding to 
be elicited by a negative event, rather than variation in the tendency for ruminative reflection to 
be elicited by a negative event. 
To determine whether converging evidence for the hypothesis that heightened ruminative 
brooding is characterized by reduced attentional disengagement from negative information 
would be obtained when such ruminative disposition was indexed by our in-vivo assessment 
procedure, rather than by the RRS, we computed bivariate correlations between our in-vivo 
ruminative brooding scores and our two indices of attentional bias to negative information. 
Consistent with the pattern of results obtained using the RRS, the present analysis revealed that 
in-vivo ruminative brooding scores were significantly positively associated with disengagement 
bias index scores, r (53) = .33, p = .016, and there was no evidence that in-vivo ruminative 
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brooding scores were significantly associated with engagement bias index scores, r (53) = .11, p 
= .441. Thus, this pattern of findings provides powerful converging support for the hypothesis 
that heightened ruminative brooding is characterized specifically by impaired attentional 
disengagement from negative relative to positive information. 
Given that increased rumination tends to predict elevated negative mood state, we 
expected that our in-vivo ruminative brooding scores would be positively correlated with our 
negative mood reactivity scores, and this expectation was confirmed, r (53) = .69, p < .001. Also 
not surprising was our observation that disengagement bias index scores tended to predict 
variance in negative mood reactivity scores, albeit at a trend level, r (53) = .24, p = 0.08. To test 
whether this tendency for disengagement bias scores to marginally predict negative mood 
reactivity scores reflected the mediating influence of ruminative disposition scores, we employed 
the Sobel test to compute the significance of this indirect effect. The outcome confirmed that the 
observed association between disengagement bias scores and negative mood reactivity scores 
was indeed mediated by ruminative brooding scores, Sobel test = 2.28, p < .05. In contrast, the 
observed association between disengagement bias scores and ruminative brooding scores was not 
significantly mediated by negative mood reactivity scores, Sobel test = 1.71, ns. This pattern of 
findings invites the inference that variation in disengagement bias scores directly impacted on in-
vivo ruminative brooding scores, which in turn exerted an influence on negative mood reactivity 
scores.  
2.6 Discussion 
The present study sought to investigate the relationship between the disposition to engage 
in ruminative brooding and negative attentional bias, using a paradigm capable of distinguishing 
between bias in attentional engagement and disengagement. Our current results show that, when 
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assessed using the RRS questionnaire measure, heightened ruminative brooding, but not 
heightened ruminative reflection, is associated with impaired attentional disengagement from 
negative information. Of critical importance, this association between heightened ruminative 
brooding and disengagement bias was also evident when such rumination was measured using an 
in-vivo assessment approach, which mitigates the problems that otherwise compromise 
questionnaire assessment of this disposition. In contrast, there was no evidence of a significant 
association between ruminative brooding and attentional engagement bias, either when such 
rumination was assessed using the RRS questionnaire measure or our in-vivo measure of 
rumination. Of course, it is always important to exercise caution when interpreting null results. 
Nevertheless, the currently observed findings are fully consistent with the proposal that 
heightened ruminative brooding is characterized by impaired attentional disengagement from 
negative information relative to positive information. 
The present results provide support for the impaired disengagement hypothesis (Koster et 
al., 2011) by demonstrating that higher levels of dispositional ruminative brooding are associated 
specifically with impaired attentional disengagement from negative information relative to 
positive information. Of course, because the current design contrasted attentional disengagement 
from negative information against disengagement from positive information, this effect could, in 
principle, reflect either reduced attentional disengagement from negative information, increased 
attentional disengagement from positive information, or both. Future research could resolve this 
issue by deploying variants of our current attentional assessment task that present word pairs 
comprising two emotionally neutral members. Designs of this type would enable investigators to 
tease apart rumination-linked variation in speed to disengage from negative compared to neutral 
words, and to disengage from positive compared to neutral words. However, what is clear from 
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the present study is that heightened ruminative brooding involves bias in attentional 
disengagement from negative relative to positive information. To our knowledge, only one other 
study has investigated associations between rumination and attentional biases using a task that is 
capable of adequately distinguishing between engagement and disengagement bias (Grafton, 
Southworth, Watkins, & MacLeod, in press). While this study also showed that impaired 
attentional disengagement was characteristic of heightened ruminative brooding, it suffered from 
the exclusive use of questionnaire assessment of rumination. 
Indeed, a particular strength of the current study was the assessment of individual 
differences in the disposition to engage in ruminative brooding using not only the RRS 
questionnaire measure, but also an in-vivo approach, which involved exposing participants to a 
negative event in the laboratory, and assessing the degree to which such rumination was elevated 
immediately after this event, relative to before the event. Previous work investigating the 
relationship between ruminative disposition and attentional bias has relied exclusively on the 
RRS questionnaire measure to assess such disposition. As mentioned, this questionnaire 
approach to the assessment of ruminative disposition does not control for inter-individual 
variability in levels of exposure to negative events. Moreover, it requires respondents to draw 
upon their long-term memory of potentially quite distant past episodes of rumination, and so 
permit contamination by biases in the operation of long-term memory (Kihlstrom et al., 2009; 
Trull & Ebner-Priemer, 2009). The present in-vivo assessment approach mitigates these 
limitations as participants are all equally exposed to the same standardized negative event, to 
reveal individual differences in the degree to which this serves to elevate ruminative thinking. 
Participants report only the ruminative thinking they experienced in recent minutes, reducing 
distortion by biases in the operation of long-term memory. We believe this in-vivo approach may 
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be of value to future researchers wishing to move beyond exclusive reliance on questionnaire 
measures to assess individual differences in ruminative disposition. 
The present findings confirm that heightened ruminative brooding is characterised by 
attention being more firmly held in the locus of proximal negative compared to positive 
information. Future research could usefully seek to discriminate two alternative hypotheses 
concerning how this effect arises. One possibility is that this effect reflects the reduced ability of 
participants high in ruminative brooding to rapidly move attention from the locus of negative 
information when a probe distal to such information appears. But an alternative possibility is that 
this effect could reflect the reduced tendency of such participants to move attention from the 
locus of negative information prior to probe onset (thus decreasing their probability of being in 
the probe locus upon onset). Attentional probe tasks cannot distinguish between these alternative 
hypothetical accounts, as they only provide a ‘snapshot' of attentional distribution at a specific 
point following stimulus onset. Future research that employs eye-movement procedures (c.f. 
Findlay & Gilchrist, 2003) would be capable of discriminating between these two possibilities, 
however, as such measures can provide a more continuous assessment of attentional distribution 
across the entire duration of stimulus presentation. 
It has been proposed that an attentional bias to negative information may functionally 
underpin heightened ruminative brooding (Koster et al., 2011). However, because the present 
study involved a correlational design, we cannot draw any conclusions concerning the causal 
nature of the observed relationship between attentional disengagement bias and such ruminative 
disposition. To directly investigate the causal nature of observed associations, it would be of 
value to determine whether attention bias modification procedures (c.f. MacLeod & Mathews, 
2012), designed to specifically modify bias in attentional disengagement from negative 
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information, can serve to significantly alter the tendency to engage in ruminative brooding. Such 
a finding would indicate that such attentional disengagement bias makes a functional 
contribution to variation in such ruminative disposition. 
A growing body of research suggests that heightened tendency to engage in ruminative 
brooding is also associated with deficits in the ability to direct attention in accordance with task 
relevant attentional objectives (Koster et al., 2011). However, researchers have not yet 
investigated whether ruminative brooding-linked attentional control deficits, and impaired 
attentional disengagement from negative information, represent independent facets of such 
rumination, or whether these two attentional anomalies might be functionally related. If the latter 
is true, then it may be that attentional control deficits causally contribute to impaired attentional 
disengagement from negative information, or alternatively that difficulty disengaging attention 
from negative information may directly compromise attentional control. Future research could 
address this issue by examining whether one ruminative brooding-linked attentional anomaly 
mediates the other, or by seeking to determine whether the direct experimental manipulation of 
one attentional anomaly has a subsequent impact on the other, as would be the case if a causal 
relationship exists between them.  
Although it is well established that heightened ruminative brooding is associated with 
increased vulnerability to depression, the cognitive processes that underlie the elevated 
disposition to engage in ruminative brooding are only now becoming clear. Illuminating these 
underlying processes may pay dividends in terms of enhancing both the treatment and prevention 
of depression, as this understanding is translated into interventions aimed at reducing 
dispositional ruminative brooding, which itself is thought to underpin depressive vulnerability. 
For the moment, however, the present study has advanced understanding of the attentional basis 
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of heightened ruminative brooding, by showing that the heightened tendency to engage in 
ruminative brooding, whether indexed by the RRS brooding subscale or by in-vivo assessment, 
is characterized by impaired attentional disengagement from negative information.  
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2.7 Appendix A: Additional Analyses Investigating Difference in the Strengths of the 
Relationships between Ruminative Disposition, and Attentional Engagement and 
Disengagement Bias 
In addition to the analyses reported in the submitted paper, additional analyses were 
conducted for the thesis. The analysis reported in the main section of this chapter demonstrated 
that higher dispositional ruminative brooding (as measured by both the RRS and an in-vivo 
assessment) was significantly associated with biased attentional disengagement from negative 
relative to positive stimuli, but not with bias attentional engagement with such stimuli. However, 
this finding does not necessarily warrant the conclusion that dispositional ruminative brooding is 
exclusively associated with attentional disengagement bias, rather than a general attentional 
processing bias involving both biased attentional engagement and disengagement. In order to 
infer attentional bias specificity, dispositional ruminative brooding must be demonstrably more 
strongly associated with attentional disengagement bias than with attentional engagement bias. 
 In order to investigate whether the relationship between RRS brooding and attentional 
disengagement bias was significantly stronger than the relationship between RRS brooding and 
attentional engagement bias, attentional bias indices were subjected to a repeated measures 
ANCOVA that considered attentional bias type (engagement bias, disengagement bias), with 
RRS brooding scores entered as a continuous variable. There was no significant interaction 
between RRS brooding and attentional bias type, F (1, 51) = 1.62, p = .208, ηp² = .03, indicating 
that the relationship between RRS brooding and attentional bias was not significantly stronger 
for attentional disengagement bias than attentional engagement bias. 
 The same ANCOVA was conducted again, but with in-vivo ruminative disposition 
indices entered as a continuous variable instead of RRS brooding scores. There was no 
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significant interaction between in-vivo ruminative disposition and attentional bias type, F (1, 51) 
= 1.65, p = .205, ηp² = .03, indicating that the relationship between in-vivo ruminative disposition 
and attentional bias was also not significantly stronger for attentional disengagement bias than 
attentional engagement bias. 
 Thus, there was no evidence that dispositional ruminative brooding was more strongly 
associated with attentional disengagement bias than with attentional engagement bias, meaning 
that evidence of bias specificity was limited. 
  
91 
 
2.8 Appendix B: Analyses Investigating the Moderating Effects of Stimulus Domain and 
Exposure Duration 
Previous research has identified additional conditions that may determine whether 
rumination-linked attentional bias is observed. Firstly, rumination may particularly be associated 
with an attentional bias for depression-relevant negative information, rather than negative 
information more generally. Joormann et al. (2006) investigated attentional bias for negative 
images related to both depression and anxiety, and found that the rumination-linked attentional 
bias for negative stimuli was only observed for depression relevant images. Secondly, there is 
evidence that the observation of rumination-linked attentional bias may be dependent on stimulus 
presentation duration. Donaldson et al. (2007) varied the stimulus presentation duration between 
500ms and 1000ms, and only found a relationship between ruminative disposition and attentional 
bias for negative stimuli when stimuli were presented for 1000ms.  Taken together, there is 
evidence to suggest that rumination may specifically be related to attentional bias for depression-
relevant negative information, and that this bias may only be apparent under conditions allowing 
for extended stimulus processing duration. 
Thus, additional analyses were conducted to investigate whether the relationship between 
ruminative disposition and attentional bias was moderated by stimulus domain and exposure 
duration. Emotional word stimuli (negative/positive words) were rated on the basis of their 
emotional domain relevance and included a mix of both depression relevant (sad/happy) and 
anxiety relevant (anxious/relaxed) words, giving rise to a within-subjects stimulus domain factor 
(see Grafton et al., in press, Chapter Three for further details). Additionally, as noted in the main 
text, throughout the attentional bias assessment task, word pairs were displayed for either 500ms 
or 1000ms, giving rise to a within-subjects exposure duration factor. It was hypothesised that 
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higher levels of ruminative disposition would be particularly associated with attentional bias for 
depression relevant stimuli presented for 1000ms. 
2.8.1 Results and Discussion 
The disengagement bias index scores were subjected to three repeated measures 
ANCOVAs that considered the two within-subject factors stimulus domain (sad/happy words, 
anxious/relaxed words), and exposure duration (500ms, 1000ms). In each ANCOVA, one of the 
measures of ruminative disposition (i.e., RRS brooding scores, RRS reflection scores, and in-
vivo ruminative disposition indices) was entered as a continuous variable (i.e., they were each 
entered as a covariate in the SPSS repeated measures ANCOVA). There were no significant 
interactions between any of measures of ruminative disposition and the within-subjects factors 
(all p’s > .20; see Table 2.3), indicating that the relationship between ruminative disposition and 
attentional disengagement bias was not moderated by either stimulus domain or exposure 
duration.  
The engagement bias index scores were subjected to the same repeated measures 
ANCOVAs. There were no significant interactions between RRS brooding or reflection scores 
and any of the within subjects factors (all p’s > .20; see Table 2.3). However, there was a 
significant two-way interaction between in-vivo ruminative disposition indices and exposure 
duration, F (1, 51) = 4.10, p = .048, ηp² = .07, which was subsumed within a trend-level three-
way interaction between in-vivo ruminative disposition indices, exposure duration, and stimulus 
domain, F (1, 51) = 3.61, p = .063, ηp² = .07. Further analyses were conducted to investigate the 
nature of these interactions. 
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Table 2.3 Interactions between indices of ruminative disposition and within-subject factors from 
ANCOVAs with attentional engagement bias and attentional disengagement bias as dependent 
variables. 
 Stimulus Domain Exposure Duration Stimulus Domain x 
Exposure Duration 
 F (1, 51) p F (1, 51) p F (1, 51) p 
Engagement Bias       
    Brooding 0.67 .417 1.54 .220 0.48 .493 
    Reflection 0.05 .827 1.04 .312 0.57 .454 
    In-vivo ruminative      
   Disposition 
0.42 .521 4.10 .048* 3.61 .063^ 
Disengagement Bias       
    Brooding 0.10 .748 0.03 .869 0.68 .415 
    Reflection 0.62 .436 0.08 .780 0.99 .324 
    In-vivo ruminative      
   Disposition 
1.62 .209 0.19 .662 0.00 .994 
Note: ^ p < .10; * p < .05 
 The three-way interaction reflected the fact that the two-way interaction between in-vivo 
ruminative disposition indices and exposure duration was significant under the sad/happy 
stimulus domain condition, F (1, 51) = 7.52, p = .008, ηp² = .13, but not under anxious/relaxed 
stimulus domain condition, F (1, 51) = 0.01, p = .922, ηp² < .01. This two-way interaction within 
the sad/happy stimulus domain condition reflected the fact that in-vivo ruminative disposition 
indices were significantly associated with attentional engagement bias for sad/happy words 
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presented for 1000ms, such that higher levels of ruminative disposition were associated with 
greater attentional engagement with sad relative to happy words, r (53) = .33, p = .016, but not 
with attentional engagement bias for anxious/relaxed words presented for 1000ms, r (53) = -.18, 
p = .20. 
 Thus, there was some evidence that heighted levels of ruminative disposition were 
associated with facilitated attentional engagement with negative information, but only for 
depression relevant stimuli presented for 1000ms. This finding is consistent with previous 
evidence suggesting that heightened ruminative disposition is specifically associated with 
attentional bias for depression relevant stimuli presented for longer exposure durations 
(Donaldson et al., 2007; Joormann et al., 2006).  
There was no evidence that the relationship between ruminative disposition and 
attentional disengagement bias was moderated by stimulus domain or exposure duration. 
However, given the relatively small sample size of the present study (N = 53) it is possible that 
this null effect was a result of low statistical power. Power analyses conducted in G-Power 
revealed that the present study achieved a power of only .11 to detect small effect sizes (r = .10) 
at the .05 level, and a power of .61 to detect medium effect sizes (r = .30), both of which are 
below the recommended level of .80. Whilst these levels of power apply to both main effects and 
interactions, on the reasonable assumption that the predicted interactions may have smaller effect 
sizes than the main effects, then for the same sample size, the ability to detect moderation would 
be less than that for main effects. Thus, a larger sample size may be required to detect a 
moderating effect of stimulus domain and exposure duration on the relationship between 
ruminative disposition and attentional disengagement bias. 
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 In conclusion, findings from Study One supported the hypothesis that heightened levels 
of ruminative disposition are associated with impaired attentional disengagement from negative 
relative to positive information. In addition, there was some evidence that under particular 
circumstances heightened ruminative disposition may also be associated with facilitated 
attentional engagement with negative relative to positive information, specifically when stimuli 
are relevant to depression and are presented for longer exposure durations. 
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CHAPTER THREE: Study Two 
 
3.1 Preface 
 The paper reported in the main section of this chapter has been accepted for publication 
at Emotion, and is currently in press. 
The primary aim of Study Two was to investigate the relationship between ruminative 
disposition and attentional bias, using a modified dot-probe task designed to independently 
assess attentional engagement and disengagement bias (Grafton, Watkins, & MacLeod, 2012). 
The impaired disengagement hypothesis (Koster, De Lissnyder, Derakshan, & De Raedt, 2011) 
suggests that heightened levels of ruminative disposition are associated with impaired attentional 
disengagement from negative information. Consistent with this account, Study One found that 
higher levels of ruminative disposition were associated with more impaired attentional 
disengagement from negative relative to positive stimuli, and Study Two sought to replicate this 
finding.  
It is important to note, that the modified dot-probe task used in Study Two differed 
slightly from the task used in Study One. In Study One, emotional word stimuli (negative or 
positive words) were presented opposite neutral word stimuli. One limitation of this design is 
that since there are no trials where only neutral information is presented, it is not possible to 
independently assess attentional bias for negative relative to neutral information and positive 
relative to neutral information. Thus, the finding from Study One that higher levels of ruminative 
disposition are associated with impaired attentional disengagement from negative relative to 
positive stimuli could, in principle, reflect either more impaired attentional disengagement from 
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negative information, facilitated disengagement from positive information, or a combination of 
both. 
However, in Study Two word stimuli (positive, negative, or neutral words) were 
presented opposite non-word letter strings. The inclusion of trials where only neutral stimuli 
were presented meant that it was possible to separately index attentional engagement and 
disengagement bias for negative relative to neutral stimuli and positive relative to neutral stimuli. 
The paper reported in the main section of this chapter investigated the relationship between 
ruminative disposition and attentional bias for negative relative to positive stimuli, but analyses 
using separate indices of attentional bias for negative relative to neutral and positive relative to 
neutral stimuli are reported in Appendix B (Section 3.8). 
The addition of neutral word trials increased the length of the attentional assessment task, 
but the procedure and design of the tasks used in Studies One and Two were otherwise identical, 
and the same set of positive, negative, and neutral word stimuli was used. Attentional bias for 
negative relative to positive stimuli was also calculated using the same procedure, with regard to 
the locations of probe stimuli relative to positive and negative words. Thus, the indices of 
attentional bias for negative relative to positive stimuli obtained in Study Two were functionally 
identical to the attentional bias indices in Study One. 
Study Two also sought to investigate whether the relationship between ruminative 
disposition and attentional bias is dependent on stimulus domain and presentation duration. 
Joormann, Dkane, and Gotlib (2006) investigated attentional bias for negative images related to 
both depression and anxiety, and found that the rumination-linked attentional bias for negative 
stimuli was only observed for depression relevant images. Donaldson, Lam, and Mathews (2007) 
varied the stimulus presentation duration between 500ms and 1000ms, and only found a 
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relationship between ruminative disposition and attentional bias for negative stimuli when 
stimuli were presented for 1000ms.  Taken together this evidence suggests that rumination may 
specifically be related to attentional bias for depression-relevant negative information, and that 
this bias may only be apparent under conditions allowing for extended stimulus processing 
duration.  
Study One did not find evidence that that the relationship between ruminative disposition 
and attentional disengagement bias was moderated by stimulus domain and presentation 
duration. There was, however, some evidence that the relationship between ruminative 
disposition and attentional engagement bias was moderated by stimulus domain and presentation 
duration, such that heightened ruminative disposition was specifically associated with facilitated 
attentional engagement with depression relevant negative stimuli presented for 1000ms. Thus, 
although there was some support for the hypothesis that the relationship between ruminative 
disposition and attentional bias is dependent on stimulus domain and presentation duration, this 
may only be the case for attentional engagement bias, and not attentional disengagement bias. 
However, Study One was limited by a relatively small sample size (N = 53), which may have 
restricted statistical power to detect moderation effects. On the basis of power analysis conducted 
in G-Power, it was determined that Study One achieved a power of only .11 to detect small effect 
sizes (r = .10) at the .05 level, and .61 to detect medium effect sizes (r = .30), both of which are 
below the recommended level of .80. Assuming smaller effect sizes for interactions than main 
effects, this may disproportionately affect ability to detect moderation. Study Two used a larger 
sample size (N = 136), thus increasing statistical power to detect small effect sizes to .21 and 
medium effect sizes to .95. Although the achieved statistical power to detect small effects was 
still low, the power to detect medium effect sizes was adequate, including for the main effects 
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observed, thus increasing the likelihood of detecting any potential moderation effects for 
attentional disengagement bias. 
Consistent with findings from Study One, it was predicted that higher levels of 
ruminative disposition would be associated with more impaired attentional disengagement from 
negative relative to positive stimuli. Furthermore, consistent with previous findings (Donaldson 
et al., 2007; Joormann et al., 2006) it was expected that this attentional disengagement bias 
would be specifically for depression relevant stimuli presented for longer exposure durations 
(1000ms). 
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3.2 Abstract 
Previous research has demonstrated that heightened ruminative disposition is 
characterized by an attentional bias to depressogenic information at 1000ms exposure durations. 
However, it is unknown whether this attentional bias reflects facilitated attentional engagement 
with depressogenic information, or impaired attentional disengagement from such information. 
The present study was designed to address this question. In keeping with recent theoretical 
proposals, our findings demonstrate that heightened ruminative disposition is associated only 
with impaired attentional disengagement from depressogenic information, and does not involve 
facilitated attentional engagement with such information. In addition to resolving this key issue, 
the present study provided converging support for the previous claim that rumination-linked 
attentional bias is specific to depressogenic information, and also lends weight to the contention 
that rumination-linked attentional bias may be evident only when controlled attentional 
processing is readily permitted by using stimulus exposure durations of 1000ms. We discuss the 
theoretical implications of these findings, and highlight key issues for future research. 
 
Keywords: rumination, attentional bias, disengagement, engagement, attentional-probe task
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3.3 Introduction 
Rumination is a form of repetitive negative thinking that typically is focused on the 
causes and implications of distressing situations or events (Watkins, 2008). People differ in 
the degree to which rumination is elicited by negative mood state, and this variation in 
ruminative disposition most commonly has been assessed using the Ruminative Responses 
Scale (RRS; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991). Heightened ruminative disposition is 
associated with increased vulnerability to depression, as evidenced by the fact that 
individuals who score higher on the RRS have a greater probability of depressive onset (Just 
& Alloy, 1997; Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000; Nolen-Hoeksema, Parker, & Larson, 1994; 
Spasojevic & Alloy, 2001), and also tend to experience greater persistence of depressive 
symptoms (Kuehner & Weber, 1999; Nolen-Hoeksema, Morrow, & Fredrickson, 1993). 
Given that heightened ruminative disposition may play a role in the development and 
maintenance of depression, investigators have called for research to illuminate the cognitive 
factors that underpin this disposition (e.g. Koster, De Lissnyder, Derakhshan, & De Raedt, 
2011; Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco, & Lyubomirsky, 2008). One cognitive factor that has been of 
particular interest to researchers is selective attention. 
 Investigators have been motivated by the hypothesis that an attentional bias to 
negative information may underlie heightened ruminative disposition (c.f. Koster et al., 
2011). The attentional-probe task (MacLeod, Mathews, & Tata, 1986) has been used to assess 
this attentional bias. In this task, participants are briefly exposed to stimulus pairs that usually 
comprise one negative member and one non-negative member. A probe subsequently appears 
in the location where either member of the stimulus pair was just displayed, and participants 
are required to quickly make a discriminatory response to this probe. The degree to which 
discrimination responses are speeded to probes appearing in the locus of the negative member 
compared to the non-negative member of the stimulus pair is taken as an index of attentional 
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bias to negative information. To date, two studies have investigated the association between 
variability in this attentional bias and in ruminative disposition, and these are considered in 
turn below. 
Using this attentional-probe task, Donaldson, Lam, and Mathews (2007) sought to 
determine whether heightened ruminative disposition is characterized by an attentional bias 
to negative information. The investigators were also interested in the role that automatic vs. 
controlled attentional processes may play in the expression of such bias. Hence, they exposed 
stimulus pairs for either 500ms or 1000ms, reasoning that controlled attentional processes 
would exert a greater impact on attentional selectivity at the longer exposure duration 
compared to the shorter exposure duration, while automatic processes would have as great an 
influence at the shorter exposure duration as at the longer exposure duration (Kim & Cave, 
1999; Lamy & Egeth, 2003; McNally, 1995; Mogg & Bradley, 2005; Theeuwes, Atchley, & 
Kramer, 2000). It was found that participants who scored higher in ruminative disposition, as 
assessed by the RRS, were disproportionately speeded to discriminate probes in the locus of 
negative information compared to those in the locus of positive information, but only at the 
longer 1000ms exposure duration. This association between ruminative disposition and 
attentional bias remained evident when participant’s concurrent levels of depression were 
statistically accounted for. Thus, these findings are consistent with the hypothesis that 
heightened ruminative disposition is characterized by an attentional bias to negative 
information, while also suggesting that this pattern of attentional selectivity may reflect the 
operation of controlled attentional processes. 
 Joormann, Dkane, and Gotlib (2006) also employed the attentional-probe task to 
investigate the attentional basis of rumination. These researchers sought to determine whether 
rumination-linked attentional bias is specific to depression-related information, or reflects 
increased attention to negative information in general. On each trial of their assessment task, 
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participants were exposed for 1000ms to stimulus pairs that comprised one emotional 
member (either negative or positive), and one member that was devoid of emotional meaning. 
In some stimulus pairs, the emotional member was more related to depression, and in others 
it was more related to anxiety. It was found that participants who reported heightened 
ruminative disposition on the RRS showed greater attentional bias to negative information, 
but only when this negative information was specifically related to depression. Again, this 
association between ruminative disposition and attentional bias remained evident when 
participant’s concurrent levels of depression were statistically controlled for. In addition, 
unlike Donaldson et al. (2007), these researchers also examined the association between this 
attentional bias and two subscales of the RRS, the ruminative brooding subscale and the 
ruminative reflection subscale, originally distinguished by Treynor, Gonzalez, & Nolen-
Hoeksema (2003). The results showed that the observed attentional bias effect was more a 
function of the former subscale than the latter. Taken together, these findings are consistent 
with the hypothesis that heightened ruminative disposition is characterized by an attentional 
bias that operates to specifically favor the processing of depressogenic information, and also 
invite speculation that this bias might differentially implicate ruminative brooding and 
ruminative reflection. 
However, as has recently been pointed out by LeMoult, Arditte, D’Avanzato, and 
Joormann (2013), these studies cannot illuminate whether this rumination-linked attentional 
bias reflects enhanced attentional engagement with this negative information, or impaired 
attentional disengagement from such information. The present study was designed to resolve 
this issue. Specifically, we sought to determine whether this rumination-linked attentional 
bias involves increased attentional engagement with negative information, reflecting a 
disproportionate tendency for attention to be captured by attentionally distal information that 
is emotionally negative in content, or whether it involves reduced attentional disengagement 
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from negative information, reflecting a disproportionate tendency for attention to be more 
firmly held by attentionally proximal information that is negative in content. Some 
researchers have argued, on theoretical grounds, that the attentional bias associated with 
heightened ruminative disposition may specifically involve only impaired attentional 
disengagement from negative information (Koster et al., 2011). As others have pointed out, 
however, existing findings could equally well reflect facilitated attentional engagement with 
negative information, meaning that investigators must directly evaluate the validity of these 
alternative possibilities (Grafton & MacLeod, 2013). Determining the attentional 
characteristics of heightened ruminative disposition is of particular importance given the key 
role that rumination appears to play in increasing susceptibility to depression. 
To determine which facet of attentional selectivity characterizes heightened 
ruminative disposition requires a task that can yield separate measures of selective attentional 
engagement with, and selective attentional disengagement from, negative information. It is 
generally accepted that the conventional attentional-probe task cannot provide independent 
measures of these two facets of attentional selectivity (Mogg, Holmes, Gardner, & Bradley, 
2008; Yiend, 2010). Hence, a number of investigators have sought to develop tasks capable 
of independently measuring engagement bias and disengagement bias (e.g. Fox, Russo, 
Bowles, & Dutton, 2001; Koster, Crombez, Verschuere, Van Damme, & Wiersema, 2006; 
Yiend & Mathews, 2001). Unfortunately, as pointed out in recent critiques, the attentional 
assessment tasks used in most previous attempts to differentiate engagement bias and 
disengagement bias cannot fully satisfy the methodological criteria that must be met to yield 
discrete measures of these two facets of attentional selectivity (Clarke, MacLeod, & 
Guastella, 2013; Grafton & MacLeod, 2014; Mogg et al., 2008; Rudaizky, Basanovic, & 
MacLeod, 2014). As noted in these critiques, because selective attentional engagement 
reflects a disproportionate tendency for attention to become focused on initially distal 
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negative information, assessment tasks designed to specifically index bias in attentional 
engagement with negative compared to non-negative information must present this 
differentially valenced information distal from the location in which participants’ attentional 
focus is initially secured. In contrast, because selective attentional disengagement reflects a 
disproportionate tendency for attention to remain focused on initially proximal negative 
information, assessment tasks designed to specifically index bias in attentional 
disengagement from negative compared to non-negative information must present this 
differentially valenced information in the location where participants’ attentional focus is 
initially secured. Selective attention to alternative categories of emotional information can 
then be assessed in the usual manner, by comparing relative latencies to respond to target 
probes appearing in either the same or opposite locus of this emotional information. The 
degree to which attention moves towards negative compared to positive information 
presented distally from initial attentional focus indexes the capacity of negative information 
to capture attention more readily than positive information, and so provides a measure of 
heightened attention to negative information as a result of engagement bias. The degree to 
which attention remains in the locus of negative compared to positive information presented 
proximally to initial attentional focus indexes the capacity of negative information to hold 
attention more firmly than positive information, and so provides an index of heightened 
attention to negative information as a result of disengagement bias. 
Grafton, Watkins, and MacLeod (2012) introduced a variant of the attentional-probe 
task that fulfils these methodological criteria, and so yields separate measures of selective 
attentional engagement with, and selective attentional disengagement from, negative 
information. Each trial of this task begins with the presentation of an anchor probe, and ends 
with the presentation of a target probe. Participants are required to respond only to the target 
probe, by indicating whether its identity matches that of the anchor probe. Intervening 
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between these two probe presentations, a pair of letter strings is displayed, one of which is an 
emotionally toned word. By configuring the position of the anchor probe, the word member 
of the letter string pair, and the final target probe, this task permits the discrete assessment of 
variability in selective engagement with emotional information distal to initial attentional 
focus, and in selective disengagement from emotional information proximal to initial 
attentional focus. Specifically, because the participant must apprehend the orientation of the 
briefly presented anchor probe, this secures their initial attentional focus in a predetermined 
screen location. The pair of letter strings that then appears, for either 500ms or 1000ms, 
contains an emotionally toned word of either negative or positive valence, and a length 
matched non-word, devoid of emotional meaning. Thus, the emotional word can be shown in 
the opposite screen location to the anchor probe, meaning that this emotional information 
appears distally from initial attentional focus, or in the same location as the anchor probe, 
meaning that this emotional information appears proximally to initial attentional focus. The 
target probe is then presented in either screen location, with equal frequency, with relative 
discrimination latencies for the target probes shown in each location serving to index the 
distribution of attention following letter string offset. The degree to which speeding to target 
probes in the locus of the words compared to non-words is greater when these words are 
negative compared to positive in emotional tone, provides an index of heightened attentional 
bias to negative information. The tendency for attention to become captured by distal 
negative information (i.e. engagement bias) is revealed by this measure of heightened 
attention to negative, relative to positive, emotional words, when these words were presented 
distally from initial attentional focus. In contrast, the tendency for attention to remain held by 
proximal negative information (i.e. disengagement bias) is revealed by this measure of 
heightened attention to negative, relative to positive, emotional words, when these words 
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were presented proximally to initial attentional focus. Examples of these trials are shown in 
Figure 3.1. 
Grafton et al. (2012) and others have validated the capacity of this task to separately 
assess bias in attentional engagement with, and attentional disengagement from, negative 
information (Grafton & MacLeod, 2014; Rudaizky et al., 2014). Using this task, it has been 
demonstrated that elevated anxiety vulnerability is characterized both by facilitated 
attentional engagement with, and impaired attentional disengagement from, anxiety-related 
negative information, and that these two attentional biases are quite unrelated to one another. 
However, as yet, this methodological approach has not been employed to shed light on the 
present question, concerning whether the attentional bias to negative information that 
characterizes heightened ruminative disposition reflects facilitated attentional engagement 
with, or impaired attentional disengagement from, negative information3. 
Hence, in the present study, we delivered a variant of the attentional-probe task, 
closely based on the approach introduced by Grafton et al. (2012), to participants who varied 
widely in their ruminative disposition, as assessed by the RRS, to determine whether 
heightened ruminative disposition is characterized by facilitated attentional engagement with 
negative information, or by impaired attentional disengagement from negative information. 
We followed the approach of Donaldson et al. (2007) by employing both a 500ms and a 
1000ms exposure duration, which enabled us to investigate whether observed patterns of 
attentional selectivity were more evident at the longer exposure duration, suggesting the 
involvement of controlled attentional processes in rumination-linked attentional bias. We 
followed the lead of Joormann et al. (2006) by employing both depression- and anxiety-
related emotional information, which enabled us to investigate whether observed rumination- 
                                                          
3 Note that the paper reported in this chapter had been accepted for publication before Study 
One (Chapter Two), hence the claim that this methodological approach has not yet been used 
to investigate the relationship between ruminative disposition and attentional bias. 
109 
 
  
Figure 3.1. Illustrative examples of sequence of events on attentional engagement bias 
assessment trial (panel a), and on attentional disengagement bias assessment trial (panel b).
110 
 
linked bias in attentional engagement or disengagement is specific to depression-related 
material, or instead reflects biased attentional responding to negative information more 
generally. Also, like Joormann et al., we investigated whether any pattern of attentional bias 
associated with heightened ruminative disposition, as assessed by the total RRS score, 
differentially implicated ruminative brooding vs. ruminative reflection, as assessed by their 
respective RRS subscales. Finally, like Donaldson et al. and Joormann et al., we assessed 
participant’s levels of depression to determine whether any observed association between 
ruminative disposition and attentional bias remains evident when controlling for concurrent 
variation in depression. 
3.4 Method 
3.4.1 Participants 
 Participants were 144 (24 male) undergraduate psychology students from the 
University of Western Australia, and from the University of Exeter, ranging in age from 17 to 
47 years (M =18.85, SD = 2.75). At recruitment, the mean score of these participants on the 
Ruminative Response Scale (RRS) was M = 42.92 (SD = 12.87; Min = 23; Max = 76; 
Interquartile Range = 17.75).  
3.4.2 Questionnaire Measures 
Ruminative Responses Scale. Ruminative disposition was assessed using the 
Ruminative Responses Scale (RRS; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991), which requires 
participants to rate their tendency to experience each of 22 particular ruminative symptoms 
when in a negative mood. The RRS has both high internal reliability and validity (c.f. 
Luminet, 2004). Investigators also have distinguished two RRS subscales: ruminative 
brooding and ruminative reflection. Both of these subscales show acceptable reliability and 
consistency (Treynor et al., 2003). 
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Beck Depression Inventory – II. Depression was assessed using the Beck 
Depression Inventory-II (BDI-II; Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996), which requires participants to 
respond to 21 statements describing various depressive symptoms, on a scale ranging from 0 
– 3. The BDI-II has good reliability (Wiebe & Penley, 2005) and validity (Storch, Roberti, & 
Roth, 2004). 
3.4.3 Experimental Stimuli 
In the present study, we required 64 letter string pairs each comprising an emotional 
word, either negative or positive in emotional tone, and a length matched non-word devoid of 
emotional meaning. The words were selected from a larger initial pool of 400 candidate 
words, on the basis of ratings obtained from six clinical psychologists, who rated the 
candidate words on two dimensions. One rating concerned the emotional valence of the word, 
which was judged on a 7 point scale ranging from -3 (extremely negative) to +3 (extremely 
positive). The other rating concerned the degree to which the candidate words were related 
either to the emotional domain associated with variation in depression (ranging from sad to 
happy experiences), or to the emotional domain associated with variation in anxiety (ranging 
from anxious to relaxed experiences), and was judged on a 7 point scale ranging from 3x 
(extremely associated to sad/happy domain) to 3y (extremely associated to anxious/relaxed 
domain).  
 Half of the experimental words (32 words) were chosen on the basis of receiving 
highly negative ratings, while half were chosen because they had received highly positive 
ratings. This gave rise to a Stimulus Valence factor (Negative Words vs. Positive Words). 
Half of the negative words and half of the positive had been judged more closely related to 
the sad/happy domain, and half had been judged to more closely related to the latter anxious 
/relaxed domain. This gave rise to a Stimulus Domain factor (Sad/Happy Words vs. 
Anxious/Relaxed Words). 
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A two-way ANOVA, which considered the factors Stimulus Valence (Negative 
Words vs. Positive Words) and Stimulus Domain (Sad/Happy Words vs. Anxious/Relaxed 
Words), was carried out on the valence ratings. This analysis confirmed a significant main 
effect of Stimulus Valence, F (1, 60) = 3357.61, p < .001, partial η2 = .98. Neither the main 
effect of Stimulus Domain, F (1, 60) = 1.88, p = .18, partial η2 = .03, nor the interaction 
between the two factors, F (1, 60) = 1.60, p = .21, partial η2 = .03, was significant. Hence, 
stimulus valence differed as required as a function of the Stimulus Valence factor, and was 
not confounded with the domain distinction. An equivalent two-way ANOVA carried out on 
the domain ratings confirmed a significant main effect of Stimulus Domain, F (1, 60) = 
642.80, p < .001, partial η2 = .92. Neither the main effect of Stimulus Valence, F (1, 60) = 
.49, p = .49, partial η2 = .01, nor the interaction between the two factors, F (1, 60) = .91, p = 
.34, partial η2 = .02, was significant. Thus, stimulus domain rating differed as a function of 
the Stimulus Domain factor as required, and was not confounded with the valence distinction. 
Additional ANOVAs carried out on word frequency (according to Kucera & Francis, 1967) 
and on word length (expressed in terms of letters) revealed no significant differences as a 
function of Stimulus Valence, Stimulus Domain, or their interaction. The full set of 
experimental words is provided in the Appendix Two. 
3.4.4 Attentional Assessment Task 
Each trial commenced with the 1000ms presentation of an upper and lower string of 
asterisks that demarcated the two critical screen regions. These asterisk strings were 
centralized horizontally on the screen, and separated vertically by a distance of 3cm. Between 
them was an arrow display pointing either towards the upper or the lower region with equal 
frequency. Participants were required to direct their attention to the screen region 
(demarcated by the row of asterisks) indicated by the arrow direction. The screen was then 
cleared, and an anchor probe was briefly exposed (150ms) in this attended region. The anchor 
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probe was a small (2 mm) red line, sloping upwards 45 degrees to either the left or right, with 
equal probability. A letter string pair was then presented, one member appearing in each of 
the two screen regions. On half of the trials, the word member of this pair appeared in the 
locus distal to that where the participant was already attending (Attentional Engagement Bias 
Assessment Trials), and on the remaining half of trials, the word appeared in the locus where 
the participant was already attending (Attentional Disengagement Bias Assessment Trials). 
This letter string pair was exposed for either 500ms or 1000ms with equal frequency. The 
screen was then cleared, and a target probe appeared in either of the two screen regions with 
equal probability. This target probe also was a small (2 mm) red line, sloping upwards 45 
degrees to either the left or to the right. Participants were required to quickly indicate whether 
the slope direction of the target probe matched that of the anchor probe, which was the case 
on 50% of trials. They registered their response by pressing either the right or left mouse 
button, to respectively indicate that the slope of the target probe either did or did not match 
that of the anchor probe. The latency to make this discrimination response to the target probe 
was recorded, as was its accuracy. Following detection of the response, the screen was 
cleared for 1000ms, before the next trial began. This sequence of events is summarized in the 
example trials illustrated in Figure 3.1. 
The attentional assessment task delivered 256 trials. Across these trials, each of the 64 
letter string pairs were presented, in a random order, once before any were presented a second 
time, and each was repeated once before any were exposed for a third time, and so on. Hence, 
over the task, each letter string pair was presented a total of 4 times. On two of these 
occasions, the word member of the letter string pair was presented proximal to initial 
attentional focus, and on the other two of these occasions the word member was presented 
distal to initial attentional focus. In each case, the target probe appeared once in the locus of 
the word member, and once in the locus of the non-word member, of the letter string pair. 
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3.4.5 Procedure 
Participants were tested individually. Each participant was seated approximately 60 
cm from the computer screen, and given instructions for the attentional assessment task. 
These instructions emphasised that the participant should ensure accurate identification of 
whether the target probe matched the slope of the anchor probe, but should respond as 
quickly as possible without compromising accuracy. A short practice comprising 20 trials 
that employed only neutral stimuli was given. Then the participant completed the attentional 
assessment task, before being thanked and debriefed. 
3.5 Results and Discussion 
3.5.1 Computation of Engagement and Disengagement Bias Index Scores 
Probe discrimination latencies can only indicate attentional distribution when probe 
discrimination responses are accurate, thus we eliminated participants whose overall accuracy 
was atypically low using a 95% confidence interval. Eight participants displayed high error 
rates meeting the exclusion criteria. The remaining 136 participants averaged less than 12% 
errors. There was no association between accuracy and RRS rumination scores, r (134) = .02, 
p = .83. 
To compute the Engagement Bias Index scores, and the Disengagement Bias Index 
scores, we first calculated participants’ latencies to correctly discriminate probes under each 
experimental condition, following the recommendations of Leys, Ley, Klein, Bernard, and 
Licata (2013). Specifically, we eliminated probe discrimination latencies that fell further than 
2.5 times the median absolute deviation from the participant’s median RT under each 
experimental condition, then calculated each participant’s median probe discrimination 
latencies for each condition. These latency data were then used to compute an index of 
engagement bias and disengagement bias, as follows. 
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The Engagement Bias Index, reflecting degree to which attention selectively moved to 
the locus of negative information compared to positive information that was presented 
distally from the initial locus of attentional focus, was calculated using probe discrimination 
latency data from those trials on which the emotional words were presented distally from 
initial attentional focus, following the equation: 
Engagement Bias Index = (Anchor probe distal to negative word in letter string pair: 
RT for target probe distal to negative word – RT for target probe proximal to negative word) 
– (Anchor probe distal to positive word in letter string pair: RT for target probe distal to 
positive word – RT for target probe proximal to positive word). 
The Disengagement Bias Index, reflecting degree to which attention was selectively 
held by negative information compared to positive information that was presented in the 
same locus as initial attentional focus, was calculated using probe discrimination latency data 
from those trials on which the emotional words were presented proximally to initial 
attentional focus, following the equation: 
Disengagement Bias Index = (Anchor probe proximal to negative word in letter string 
pair: RT for target probe distal to negative word – RT for target probe proximal to negative 
word) – (Anchor probe proximal to positive word in letter string pair: RT for target probe 
distal to positive word – RT for target probe proximal to positive word). 
The indices of engagement bias and disengagement bias are shown in Table 3.1. 
Scores on these two bias indices will be higher to the extent that participants display 
relatively greater attention to the negative words compared to the positive words, with the 
two indices respectively reflecting the specific involvement of engagement bias and 
disengagement bias in such attentional selectivity. 
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3.5.2 Analysis of Engagement Bias Index Scores 
The Engagement Bias Index scores were subjected to a repeated measures ANCOVA 
that considered the two within-subject factors Stimulus Domain (Sad/Happy Words vs. 
Anxious/Relaxed Words), and Exposure Duration (500ms Exposure vs. 1000ms Exposure). 
The RRS rumination scores were entered as a continuous variable (i.e., they were entered as a 
covariate in the SPSS repeated measures ANCOVA). This analysis did not reveal evidence of 
any significant effects (all p’s > .09). Of most relevance, the main effect of RRS Score, F (1, 
134) = .01, p =.92, partial η2 = 0, the two-way interaction of Stimulus Domain x RRS Score, 
F (1, 134) = .01, p =.92, partial η2 = 0, the two-way interaction of Exposure Duration x RRS 
Score, F (1, 134) = 1.96, p =.16, partial η2 = .01, and the three-way interaction of Stimulus 
Domain x Exposure Duration x RRS Score, F (1, 134) = 2.83, p =.10, partial η2 = .02, all 
failed to reach statistical significance. Hence, there was no evidence to suggest that 
heightened ruminative disposition is characterized by facilitated attentional engagement with 
negative information.  
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Table 3.1. Mean (and SD) of Engagement and Disengagement Bias Indices obtained under 
each experimental condition. 
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3.5.3 Analysis of Disengagement Bias Index Scores 
The Disengagement Bias Index scores were subjected to the same repeated measures 
ANCOVA. This analysis revealed a significant main effect of Stimulus Domain, F (1, 134) = 
5.28, p = .02, partial η2 = .04, that was subsumed within a significant two-way interaction of 
Stimulus Domain x RRS Score, F (1, 134) = 4.33, p = .04, partial η2 = .03. This two-way 
interaction was itself subsumed within a three-way interaction involving Stimulus Domain x 
Exposure Duration x RRS Score, F (1, 134) = 4.76, p = .03, partial η2 = .03, which was the 
only other significant effect to emerge from the analysis. Hence, it is necessary to examine 
the nature of this higher-order interaction to reveal the pattern of biased attentional 
disengagement from negative information that characterizes heightened ruminative 
disposition. 
This three-way interaction reflected the fact that the simple two-way interaction of 
Stimulus Domain x RRS Score was significant under the 1000ms exposure condition, F (1, 
134) = 8.45, p = .01, partial η2 = .06, but not under the 500ms exposure condition, F (1, 134) 
= .002, p = .97, partial η2 = 0. This supports the idea that rumination-linked attentional bias 
may involve relatively controlled, rather than automatic, attentional processes. Given existing 
evidence that rumination-linked attentional bias may be particularly evident on depressogenic 
material, it would be expected that the rumination-linked attentional bias, evident under the 
1000ms exposure condition, would be more evident on stimuli from the Sad/Happy domain, 
rather than the Anxious/Relaxed domain. Consistent with such expectation, RRS scores 
showed a significant positive association with Disengagement Bias Index scores, obtained 
under this exposure condition, only for stimuli from the Sad/Happy domain, r (134) = .21, p 
= .01 4, as shown in Figure 3.2, with no such positive association being evident for stimuli 
                                                          
4 Two outlying bias scores, identified in Figure 2 by the square outlines, were detected using 
box-and-whisker plots. The correlation between these two variables remained positive and 
significant when these outliers were excluded, r (134) = .18, p = .04. 
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from the Anxious/Relaxed domain, r (134) = -.14, p = .10. Hence, this pattern of findings 
indicates that heightened ruminative disposition is characterized by impaired attentional 
disengagement only from negative relative to positive information on the sadness-happiness 
dimension, and only at the longer 1000ms exposure duration. 
 
 
Figure 3.2. Scatterplot showing the association between RRS scores and Disengagement Bias 
Index scores when stimuli came from the Sad/Happy domain at the 1000ms exposure 
duration. 
 
To determine whether ruminative brooding and ruminative reflection, as assessed by 
their respective RRS subscales, were differentially implicated in the observed attentional 
disengagement bias, we separately computed the association between scores from the RRS 
brooding and RRS reflection subscales, and the Disengagement Bias scores on stimuli from 
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the Sad/Happy domain at the 1000ms exposure duration. These Disengagement Bias Index 
scores had a significant positive association with both RRS brooding scores, r (134) = .17, p 
= .05, and with RRS reflection scores, r (134) = .16, p = .05. The magnitude of these two 
correlations did not significantly differ from one another, Z = .06, p = .95. Hence, there was 
no evidence to suggest that ruminative brooding and ruminative reflection were differentially 
implicated in the observed disengagement bias effect. 
As previously noted, heightened ruminative disposition is often accompanied by 
heightened depression and indeed, in our present sample, RRS scores were positively 
correlated with BDI-II scores, r (133) = .46, p < .001. Thus, it was important to determine 
whether the observed impairment in disengaging attention from depressogenic information at 
the 1000ms exposure duration was a specific characteristic of heightened ruminative 
disposition, rather than a characteristic of the elevated depression that accompanied this 
ruminative disposition. We entered both RRS scores and BDI-II scores simultaneously into a 
multiple regression in which the Disengagement Bias scores on stimuli from the Sad/Happy 
domain, at the 1000ms exposure duration, was the dependent variable. The regression model 
was significant, F (2, 132) = 3.28, p = .04 and, of most importance to the issue under 
consideration, the RRS rumination scores predicted independent variance in the 
disengagement bias scores, β = .24; t (132) = 2.50, p = .01, while the BDI-II depression 
scores did not, β = -.06; t (132) = -.62, p = .54. Thus, these results indicate that there was a 
direct association between heightened ruminative disposition and the observed impairment in 
attentional disengagement from depressogenic information. 
3.6 General Discussion 
Previous research has demonstrated that heightened ruminative disposition is 
characterized by an attentional bias to negative information. The purpose of the present study 
was to determine whether this rumination-linked attentional bias to negative information 
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reflects facilitated attentional engagement with, or impaired attentional disengagement from, 
negative information. Our findings show that heightened ruminative disposition is associated 
with impaired attentional disengagement from negative information, and there was no 
evidence to suggest that such ruminative disposition is associated with facilitated attentional 
engagement with negative information. Of course, appropriate caution should always be 
exercised when interpreting null results, and it will be important for future researchers to 
replicate the current findings. Nevertheless, our results are fully consistent with the 
hypothesis that heightened ruminative disposition is characterized specifically by impaired 
attentional disengagement from negative information. 
In addition to resolving this key issue, the present study provided converging support 
for the previous claim that rumination-linked attentional bias is specific to depressogenic 
information (Joormann et al., 2006), by showing that heightened ruminative disposition was 
associated with impaired attentional disengagement from negative information only when this 
was depression-relevant. Our results also lend weight to the contention that rumination-linked 
attentional bias may be evident only when controlled attentional processing is readily 
permitted (Donaldson et al., 2007), as we found that heightened ruminative disposition was 
associated with impaired attentional disengagement from negative information only when 
stimuli were exposed for 1000ms, and not when they were exposed for 500ms. It is common 
to assume that attentional effects observed only at longer stimulus exposure intervals reflect 
the operation of controlled processing (McNally, 1995; Mogg & Bradley, 2005), inviting the 
inference that controlled attentional processes may play an important role in the attentional 
disengagement bias associated with heightened ruminative disposition. However, it should be 
acknowledged that 500ms exposure durations do permit sufficient time to enable the 
operation of controlled attentional processes, albeit to a lesser extent that would be possible at 
longer exposures (Holender, 1986; Mogg, Bradley, & Williams, 1995). It could be that 
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evidence of biased disengagement from negative information was more evident 1000ms after 
stimulus onset, compared to 500ms after stimulus onset, only because attentional 
disengagement from these stimuli necessarily must temporally follow engagement, and 
differences in disengagement bias, as a function of ruminative disposition and stimulus 
valence, could be detected only when sufficient time was permitted for such disengagement 
to occur. Future researchers could seek to determine the relative involvement of automatic 
and controlled processes in the presently observed rumination-linked disengagement bias by 
using a secondary load to disrupt controlled attentional processing (Sternberg, 1966; van 
Dillen, Papies, & Hofmann, 2012). If the restriction of rumination-linked biased attentional 
disengagement to the 1000ms exposure duration, in the present study, does reflect the fact 
that this bias results from patterns of controlled attentional processing, then it would be 
expected that this bias would be attenuated under secondary load conditions. 
The current findings also indicate that the observed disengagement bias effect was a 
function of ruminative disposition in general, as there was no evidence to suggest that this 
effect differentially implicated ruminative brooding and ruminative reflection. Further, 
although ruminative disposition was correlated with depression, as expected, this pattern of 
biased attentional disengagement was found to be a direct function of ruminative disposition, 
rather than an indirect function of accompanying heightened depression. 
The pattern of results obtained in our current study are in keeping with the theory 
recently put forward by Koster et al. (2011), according to which heightened ruminative 
disposition is caused in part by specific difficulty disengaging attention from depressogenic 
information. The current study cannot shed light on the causal nature of the observed 
association between such disengagement bias and heightened ruminative disposition. Using 
an attentional-probe task variant configured to systematically modify attentional response to 
negative information, Yang, Ding, Dai, Peng, and Zhang (2015) have recently shown that 
123 
 
experimentally induced change in attentional bias can serve to influence subsequent 
rumination, consistent with the possibility that such attentional selectivity causally 
contributes to rumination. It will be now be important for researchers to directly interrogate 
the causal role of impaired attentional disengagement from depressogenic information in 
heightened ruminative disposition, using training variants of the conventional attentional-
probe task specifically configured to directly modify attentional disengagement from 
depressogenic information. Of course, the finding that impaired attentional disengagement 
from depressogenic information makes a causal contribution to ruminative disposition would 
not preclude the possibility that such disposition also may causally influence this attentional 
bias in a reciprocal manner. Future research addressing this issue could make a valuable 
contribution to the literature. 
Attentional bias is not the only information processing anomaly that has been found to 
be associated with heightened ruminative disposition. There is evidence that such ruminative 
disposition is characterized by enhanced recall of negative information (McFarland & 
Buehler, 1998), an increased tendency to impose negative interpretations on situations 
(Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1995), and a reduced expectancy for positive future 
events (Pyszczynski, Holt, & Greenberg, 1987). Moreover, within the domain of attentional 
processing there is growing evidence that heightened ruminative disposition may be 
characterized by deficient attentional control (Koster et al., 2011). The pattern of biased 
attentional disengagement observed in the present study, and such a deficit in attentional 
control, may represent two quite independent characteristics of rumination. However, a more 
intriguing possibility is that this impaired attentional disengagement from depressogenic 
information may result from deficient attentional control. The nature of the relationship 
between each attentional anomaly and variation in ruminative disposition should now be 
investigated by measuring disengagement bias, using the current attentional assessment task, 
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while also including an established measure of attentional control such as the anti-saccade 
task (e.g. Derakhshan, Ansari, Hansard, Shoker, & Eysenck, 2009), within the same studies. 
This would reveal whether the presently observed association between disengagement bias 
and ruminative disposition is direct, or is mediated by rumination-linked variation in 
attentional control.  
There are, of course, some limitations associated with the current study. For one 
thing, our participants were not selected on the basis of displaying the excessively high 
ruminative disposition characteristic of pathological ruminators. Hence, it remains to be seen 
whether clinical patients exhibiting such pathological rumination would exhibit only impaired 
attentional disengagement from depressogenic information, as observed in the present 
participants. One intriguing possibility worthy of future consideration is that the attentional 
characteristics of pathological rumination might differ from the pattern of attentional 
selectivity presently found to be associated with high ruminative disposition in a non-clinical 
sample. Specifically, while the latter individuals only showed evidence of impaired 
attentional disengagement from negative information, it may be the case that the former 
individuals could show both impaired attentional disengagement from, and facilitated 
attentional engagement with, depressogenic information.  
For the moment, we can conclude that heightened ruminative disposition, as assessed 
by the RRS, is characterized by impaired attentional disengagement from negative 
information, relative to positive information, that this attentional bias appears to specifically 
favour the processing of depression-relevant information, and that it is only evident when 
stimuli are exposed for 1000ms, rather than 500ms, exposure durations. We hope that this 
work, and the suggestions we have made concerning how future research can build upon this 
foundation, will be of value to investigators seeking to better understand the attentional basis 
of rumination. 
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3.7 Appendix A: Additional Analyses Investigating Whether the Relationship between 
Ruminative Disposition and Attentional Bias was Moderated by Attentional Bias Type 
In addition to the analyses reported in the submitted paper, additional analyses were 
conducted for the thesis. The analyses reported in the main section of this chapter 
demonstrated that higher levels of ruminative disposition were associated with impaired 
attentional disengagement from negative relative to positive stimuli, specifically for 
depression relevant stimuli presented for 1000ms. There was no evidence of a significant 
relationship between ruminative disposition and attentional engagement bias, regardless of 
stimulus domain or exposure duration.  However, this finding does not necessarily warrant 
the conclusion that ruminative disposition is exclusively associated with attentional 
disengagement bias, rather than a general attentional processing bias involving both biased 
attentional engagement and disengagement. In order to infer attentional bias specificity, there 
must be evidence that the relationship between ruminative disposition and attentional bias is 
moderated by attentional bias type. 
The attentional bias index scores were subjected to a repeated measures ANCOVA 
that considered the three within-subject factors attentional bias type (engagement bias, 
disengagement bias), stimulus domain (sad/happy words, anxious/relaxed words), and 
exposure duration (500ms, 1000ms), with RRS scores entered as a continuous variable. There 
were no significant interactions between RRS scores and attentional bias type (all p’s > .10), 
indicating that the relationship between RRS scores and attentional bias was not moderated 
by attentional bias type. 
Since the analyses reported in the main section of this chapter found that RRS scores 
were particularly associated with attention disengagement bias for depression relevant words 
presented for 1000ms, analyses were also conducted to investigate whether the relationship 
between RRS scores and attentional bias for depression relevant stimuli presented for 1000ms 
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was moderated by attentional bias type. Attentional bias indices for depression relevant 
stimuli presented for 1000ms were subjected to a repeated measures ANCOVA that 
considered attentional bias type (engagement bias, disengagement bias), with RRS scores 
entered as a continuous variable. There was no significant interaction between RRS scores 
and attentional bias type, F (134) = 2.59, p = .110, ηp² = .02, indicating that the relationship 
between RRS scores and attentional bias for depressive stimuli presented for 1000ms was not 
significantly stronger for attention disengagement bias than for attentional engagement bias (r 
(136) = .01, p = .892 for attentional engagement bias; r (136) = .21, p = .014 for attentional 
disengagement bias). 
Thus, there was no evidence to suggest that the relationship between ruminative 
disposition and attentional bias was moderated by attentional bias type, meaning that 
evidence that rumination was exclusively associated with attentional disengagement bias was 
limited. 
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3.8 Appendix B: Analyses Investigating the Relationships between Ruminative 
Disposition, and Attentional Disengagement Bias for Both Negative Relative to Neutral 
and Positive Relative to Neutral Stimuli 
The index of attentional disengagement bias employed in the main section of this 
chapter compared attentional disengagement from negative relative to positive stimuli. Thus, 
the finding that heightened levels of ruminative disposition were associated with more 
impaired attentional disengagement from negative relative to positive stimuli could, in 
principal, reflect more impaired attentional disengagement from negative relative to neutral 
stimuli (i.e., increased negative attentional bias), facilitated attentional disengagement from 
positive relative to neutral stimuli (i.e., reduced positive attentional bias), or a combination of 
both. In order to distinguish between these possible interpretations, further analyses were 
conducted investigating the relationships between ruminative disposition, and attentional 
disengagement bias for both negative and positive stimuli relative to neutral stimuli 
separately. 
The procedure for calculating attentional disengagement bias indices for emotional 
relative to neutral stimuli was similar to the procedure for calculating attentional 
disengagement bias indices for negative relative to positive stimuli, and can be expressed 
using the following equation: 
Disengagement Bias Index = (Anchor probe proximal to emotional word in letter 
string pair: RT for target probe distal to emotional word – RT for target probe proximal to 
emotional word) – (Anchor probe proximal to neutral word in letter string pair: RT for target 
probe distal to neutral word – RT for target probe proximal to neutral word). 
The analyses conducted in the main section of this chapter indicated that ruminative 
disposition was specifically associated with attentional disengagement bias for depression 
relevant stimuli (i.e., sad relative to happy words) presented for 1000ms.Thus, bivariate 
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correlations investigated the relationship between RRS scores, and attentional disengagement 
bias for sad relative to neutral words (negative attentional bias) and happy relative to neutral 
words (positive attentional bias) presented for 1000ms. There was a significant correlation 
between RRS scores and negative attentional disengagement bias, such that higher levels of 
ruminative disposition were associated with more impaired attentional disengagement from 
sad relative to neutral stimuli, r (136) = .22, p = .010. In contrast, there was no significant 
relationship between ruminative disposition and positive attentional disengagement bias, r 
(136) = -.04, p = .640. Thus, these findings indicate that heightened levels of ruminative 
disposition are associated with more impaired attentional disengagement from negative 
relative to neutral information.  
In conclusion, the findings from Study Two indicate that heightened levels of 
ruminative disposition are associated with biased attentional disengagement from depression 
relevant stimuli presented for 1000ms, and that this attentional disengagement bias is 
characterized by impaired attentional disengagement from sad relative to neutral information. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: Study Three 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Many investigators contend that biases in the selective attentional processing of 
negative relative to non-negative information underpin individual differences in ruminative 
brooding (Joormann, 2010; Siegle, Steinhauer, & Thase, 2004). Studies have found that 
heightened levels of ruminative disposition are associated with greater attentional bias for 
negative relative to non-negative information (Donaldson, Lam, & Mathews, 2007; 
Joormann, Dkane, & Gotlib, 2006; Pe, Vandekerckhove, & Kuppens, 2013). Furthermore, 
researchers have distinguished two facets of attentional selectivity that may be important in 
this regard (LeMoult, Arditte, D’Avanzato, & Joormann, 2013). The first is increased 
attentional engagement with negative information, reflecting a disproportionate tendency for 
attention to become more readily focused on negative information. The second is impaired 
attentional disengagement from negative information, reflecting a disproportionate tendency 
for attention to be more firmly held by negative information. Since the phenomenological 
experience of ruminative brooding suggests that it is characterised by persistent negative 
thinking, it has been hypothesized that individual differences in ruminative brooding may 
specifically be underpinned by impaired attentional disengagement from negative 
information, rather than by increased attentional engagement with negative information 
(Koster, De Lissnyder, Derakshan, & De Raedt, 2011). 
Studies One and Two supported the impaired disengagement account of ruminative 
brooding by providing evidence that heightened ruminative disposition is associated with 
greater relative impairment in disengaging attention from negative compared to non-negative 
stimuli. These studies used variants of the dot-probe task developed by Grafton, Watkins, and 
MacLeod (2012) that enables the discrete assessment of selective attentional engagement 
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with, and selective attentional disengagement from, negative information. In this task, the 
participant’s attention is initially fixed in either an upper or lower screen location using an 
anchor probe. Immediately thereafter, a stimulus pair comprising an emotional letter string, 
and a non-emotional letter string, is briefly displayed. A target probe then appears in the 
location of either one of the two screen loci, and the participant is required to determine 
whether the identity of the target probe matches that of the anchor probe. The degree to 
which speeding to target probes in the locus of the emotional letter strings compared to non-
emotional letter strings is greater when the emotional letter string is negative, relative to 
positive in emotional tone, provides an index of attentional bias to negative information. On 
trials where the emotional letter string appears distal to initial attentional focus, this index of 
attentional bias to negative information reveals increased attentional engagement with 
negative compared to positive information. In contrast, on trials where the emotional letter 
string appears proximal to initial attentional focus, this index of attentional bias to negative 
information reveals reduced attentional disengagement from negative compared to positive 
information. Using this attentional assessment task, Study One found that heightened 
disposition for ruminative brooding, as measured by both a retrospective questionnaire and an 
in-vivo assessment, was associated with slower attentional disengagement from negative 
relative to positive stimuli. Study Two extended this finding by indicating that this 
rumination-linked bias in attention disengagement was specific to depression relevant stimuli, 
and not anxiety relevant stimuli.  
However, evidence that ruminative disposition was exclusively associated with 
attentional disengagement bias was limited. Study One found that in-vivo ruminative 
disposition indices were associated with attentional engagement bias, although only for 
depression relevant stimuli presented for longer durations. Furthermore, neither study found 
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any evidence that ruminative disposition was more significantly associated with attentional 
disengagement bias than attentional engagement bias.  
One limitation of response probe assessments of attentional bias, which may have 
contributed to unclear findings, is that they can only provide a ‘snapshot’ of attention at the 
time of probe presentation, meaning that we cannot know the patterns of attentional 
distribution before or after probing (Mogg & Bradley, 2005; Yiend, 2010). This potentially 
has implications for the sensitivity of attentional bias assessments, as any biases in selective 
attention that occur either before or after probe presentation will be missed. In addition, there 
may be multiple shifts in the allocation of attention before probe presentation, particularly at 
longer stimulus presentation durations (Yiend, 2010). This may be particularly problematic 
for assessment tasks seeking to distinguish between biases in the engagement and 
disengagement of attention, as there could potentially be some degree of cross-contamination 
between these separate measures. For example, if on trials intended to assess attentional 
engagement with emotional stimuli, there is sufficient time for participants to engage with 
and then disengage attention from initially distal stimuli, biases detected by this measure 
could in part reflect attentional disengagement as well as attentional engagement. Such 
limitations to sensitivity and opportunity for cross-contamination could potentially explain 
the lack of a significant difference in the strength of the relationship between rumination and 
biases in attentional engagement and disengagement in Studies One and Two. 
Furthermore, response probe assessments are unable to fully delineate the nature of 
the attentional mechanisms that underpin any observed biases in attentional disengagement. 
A bias in attentional disengagement as assessed by the modified dot-probe task could reflect 
either a reduced ability to disengage attention from negative information, a reduced tendency 
to disengage attention from negative information, or a combination of both these 
mechanisms. It is possible that the task constraints imposed by the response probe task might 
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lead to strategic differences in the distribution of attention, which determine whether an 
attentional bias is expressed. For example, participants may have pre-emptively disengaged 
attention from its initial location prior to probe onset, in order to facilitate rapid responding to 
the probe, in which case a deficit in the ability to disengage attention from negative stimuli 
would result in an attentional disengagement bias, which might not otherwise have been 
apparent. Alternatively, it is possible that participants with high levels of ruminative 
disposition may have an increased tendency to maintain attention for negative stimuli, such 
that they preferentially sustain attentional focus on negative information even in the absence 
of explicit demands upon attention. In this case, an attentional bias for negative stimuli would 
be apparent regardless of the presence of a response probe. Response probe assessments of 
attentional bias are unable to distinguish between these two accounts, as it is unclear whether 
an attentional bias would still be expressed in the absence of the task demands imposed by 
the response probe. 
An alternative methodology that can overcome these limitations is the measurement 
of attentional distribution via eye-movements. Eye-movements are closely linked to attention, 
as individuals typically direct their gaze towards stimuli that attract their attention (Jonides, 
1981), and there is a mandatory shift in attention prior to every eye-movement (Kowler, 
Anderson, Dosher, & Blaser, 1995). Eye-tracking technology allows for the continuous 
assessment of attention allocation throughout the entire stimulus presentation duration, thus 
allowing for any biases in selective attention to be detected regardless of when during 
stimulus presentation that they occur. Also, attentional assessment via eye-tracking is not 
necessarily reliant on the presence of a response probe, or any other task constraints. By 
presenting material without a response probe, which may require some ability to shift 
attention in order to execute a response, eye tracking can assess spontaneous patterns of 
attentional distribution, which are assumed to be more likely to reflect tendencies in 
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attentional distribution, rather than ability to distribute attention. Thus, eye-tracking can 
assess tendencies in biased attentional allocation that are less influenced by abilities to shift 
attention in response to task constraints. 
Various previous studies have used eye-tracking to investigate attentional biases in 
depression. The majority of these studies have employed free-viewing tasks, in which 
participants’ attention is initially secured on a central fixation point, before viewing an array 
of stimuli of differing emotional valence, without any restrictions on gaze behaviour. Such 
studies have typically found evidence of a dwell bias for dysphoric stimuli, such that 
depressed individuals spent more time viewing dysphoric stimuli relative to non-depressed 
individuals, and less time viewing positive stimuli (Eizenman et al., 2003; Kellough, Beevers, 
Ellis, & Wells, 2008; Leyman, De Raedt, Vaeyens, & Philippaerts, 2011; see Armstrong & 
Olatunji, 2012 for meta-analysis). Investigators have suggested that this dwell bias may 
reflect greater elaborative processing of dysphoric information, consistent with higher levels 
of rumination (Armstrong & Olatunji, 2012). However, it is important to note that although 
such dwell biases are consistent with the possibility of impaired attentional disengagement in 
depression, free-viewing tasks which initially secure attention in a location distal to 
emotional stimuli cannot specifically assess biases in attentional disengagement. In order to 
adequately assess attentional disengagement using eye-movements, attention must initially be 
secured in the locus of an emotional or neutral stimulus, in order to assess how the valence of 
this attentionally proximal information influences latency to shift eye-gaze away from it 
(Clarke, MacLeod, & Guastella, 2013). 
A couple of studies have, however, employed eye-tracking assessments, which 
adequately assessed biases in attentional disengagement, indicating that depression is 
associated with impairments disengaging attention from dysphoric information (Sanchez, 
Vazquez, Marker, LeMoult, & Joormann, 2013; Sears, Thomas, LeHuquet, & Johnson, 
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2010). Sears et al. (2010) utilised a task where participants were occasionally required to 
direct their attention away from sequentially presented emotional images, towards the 
direction of an arrow probe, as quickly as possible. It was found that dysphoric participants 
were slower than non-dysphoric participants to direct their attention towards the required 
location when the probed image was depression-related, indicating impaired disengagement 
from depression-related information. Sanchez et al. (2010) employed a ‘wait for fixation’ 
design, which would initially involve free-viewing of an emotional and neutral face pair. 
After a period of time, participants would be prompted to shift their attention towards the 
opposing stimulus only once their attention was fixated on a designated location. On trials 
assessing attentional disengagement, a shift in attention was prompted once participants had 
fixated on the emotional face, whereas on trials assessing attentional engagement, a shift in 
attention was prompted once participants had fixated on the neutral face. Attentional 
engagement and disengagement were both indexed by latency of the first shift in gaze 
towards the opposite stimulus following this prompt.  Sanchez et al. (2010) found that 
depressed participants were slower than control participants to disengage their attention from 
sad faces relative to neutral faces, but did not differ in latencies of attentional engagement 
with sad faces relative to neutral faces. Furthermore, individual differences in attentional 
disengagement from sad faces in the depressed group predicted lower recovery from sad 
mood in response to a stress induction. 
Although eye-tracking assessments have found evidence of impaired attentional 
disengagement from negative stimuli in depression, research has yet to use eye-tracking to 
investigate the relationship with ruminative disposition. In the present study, we developed an 
eye-tracking task designed to measure biases in attentional engagement with and 
disengagement from negative information. We adapted the Grafton et al. (2012) attentional 
assessment task used in Studies One and Two, where attention is initially secured in a 
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designated location prior to the presentation of an emotional and non-emotional letter string 
pair. However, since we were interested in determining whether rumination-linked attentional 
disengagement bias involves tendency to maintain attention for negative information, the 
response probe appearing after stimulus presentation was removed, in order to assess the 
spontaneous allocation of attention between stimuli. Instead, in order to secure attention in 
the designated location, participants were required to respond to an anchor stimulus presented 
prior to an emotional and non-emotional letter-string pair. Subsequently, attentional 
distribution was assessed by measuring eye-movement during free-viewing of the letter-string 
pair. On trials assessing attentional engagement with emotional stimuli, attention was initially 
secured in the location of the non-emotional letter string, and attentional engagement was 
indexed using latency to fixate on the emotional letter string. On trials assessing attentional 
disengagement from emotional stimuli, attention was initially secured in the location of the 
emotional letter string, and attentional disengagement was indexed using latency to saccade 
away from the emotional letter string. In addition, we also assessed maintenance of attention 
on emotional stimuli on all trials, using the total fixation duration on the emotional letter 
string throughout the entire duration of stimulus presentation.  
Lastly, in the majority of prior studies investigating the attentional bias of rumination, 
variation in ruminative disposition has only been assessed using the RRS questionnaire 
measure. There are two problems with exclusive reliance on such an assessment approach. 
The first problem is that this questionnaire measure does not control for variability in the 
levels of exposure to negative events that respondents may have experienced. Thus, it is 
possible that a high score on the RRS could reflect more frequent, extended or intense 
exposure to negative events capable of evoking rumination, rather than an increased tendency 
for rumination to be evoked by such negative events. The second problem is that the RRS 
requires participants to draw on their long-term memory of past ruminative experience, 
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across an extended period of time, and it is well known that retrieval from long-term memory 
can be highly susceptible to biases, such as mood-congruency and recency effects (Kihlstrom, 
Eich, Sandbrand, & Tobias, 2009; Trull & Ebner-Priemer, 2009). Such memory biases may 
influence participant’s RRS responses in ways that compromise sensitive assessment of 
variability in ruminative disposition, thereby obscuring the association between individual 
differences in ruminative disposition and attentional bias to negative information.  
 In Study One, we addressed this issue by developing an in-vivo assessment of the 
tendency to engage in rumination in response to negative mood. Specifically, this involved 
exposing participants to a standardised negative event in the laboratory, and assessing their 
levels of rumination immediately before and immediately after this event. An index of 
ruminative disposition, reflecting the degree to which this controlled event served to evoke 
rumination, was obtained by computing the degree to which rumination was elevated post- 
compared to pre- this negative event. Higher levels of ruminative disposition were revealed 
by greater increases in rumination following exposure to this negative event, relative to 
before such exposure. By ensuring that participants received equivalent exposure to the same 
negative event, under tightly controlled laboratory conditions, and minimising reliance on 
long-term memory by assessing levels of rumination in very close temporal proximity to this 
event, we were able to reduce the problems associated with the RRS questionnaire measure 
of ruminative disposition. This alternative measure of ruminative disposition provided 
converging support for the relationship between rumination and impaired attentional 
disengagement from negative information, as both the RRS brooding subscale and this new 
in-vivo measure of ruminative disposition were found to be associated with slower 
disengagement from negative relative to positive stimuli.  
The purpose of the current study was to further test the impaired disengagement 
account of rumination, in particular whether heightened ruminative disposition is associated 
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with reduced tendency to disengage attention from negative information, rather than impaired 
ability to disengage attention from negative information. To do this, we delivered an eye-
tracking assessment of bias in attentional engagement and disengagement, to participants who 
differed widely in terms of their disposition to engage in ruminative brooding. The eye-
tracking assessment of attentional bias involved unconstrained, free-viewing of emotional 
stimuli, in order to assess bias is the spontaneous distribution of attention, thereby reducing 
the likelihood that any observed attentional disengagement bias can be attributed to impaired 
ability to disengage attention from negative stimuli. To assess ruminative disposition, we 
employed both the conventional RRS questionnaire measure, which requires retrospective 
report concerning the degree to which past experience of negative mood have served to elicit 
rumination, and an in-vivo assessment of variation in the degree to which a standardized 
stressor serves to elicit rumination. It was hypothesised that higher levels of dispositional 
ruminative brooding would be associated with slower disengagement from negative relative 
to positive stimuli (attentional disengagement bias), but would not be associated with a bias 
in attentional engagement with negative relative to positive stimuli. The association between 
dispositional ruminative brooding and dwell bias (i.e., total time spent viewing stimuli) was 
also investigated. It was predicted that higher levels of dispositional ruminative brooding 
would be associated with greater dwell bias for negative relative to positive stimuli. 
4.2 Method 
4.2.1 Participants 
Participants were 60 students (17 male, 43 female; mean age = 19.9, SD = 1.40) from 
the University of Exeter, recruited via the university participant recruitment system. 
Participants with glasses, contact lenses, or other eye-problems (e.g., astigmatism) were 
excluded from the study. All participants spoke English as a first language. 
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4.2.2 Materials and Measures 
Beck Depression Inventory (BDI-II; Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996). The BDI-II is a 
21-item self-report measure designed to assess the severity of depressive symptoms. 
Participants indicate on a 4-point scale how much they have experienced depressive 
symptoms over the past two weeks. We used a 20-item version of the BDI-II, with the item 
about suicidal feelings or ideation removed at the request of our institutional review board. 
Higher scores represent greater severity of depressive symptoms. This measure has shown 
good reliability and validity (Beck et al., 1996). 
Ruminative disposition assessment: Questionnaire measure. The Ruminative 
Responses Scale (RRS; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991) was employed as our 
questionnaire instrument of ruminative disposition. The RRS is a 22-item self-report 
measure, which requires participants to indicate the degree to which they engage in particular 
ruminative responses when in a negative mood on a 4-point Likert scale (1 = Almost Never, 4 
= Almost Always). This questionnaire yields two subscales: ruminative brooding and 
ruminative reflection. Both of these subscales show acceptable reliability and consistency 
(Treynor et al., 2003). In each case, a higher score indicates a greater tendency to engage in 
rumination in response to negative mood. 
 Ruminative disposition assessment: In-vivo measure. Ruminative disposition was 
also measured using an in-vivo approach, identical to the procedure used in Study One (see 
section 2.4.2), that involved assessing levels of ruminative thinking immediately before, and 
immediately after, exposure to a controlled negative event in the laboratory. As described in 
detail below, this negative event was an anagram failure task. To assess levels of ruminative 
thinking at each of these two assessment points, we adapted the breathing focus task 
originally developed by Hirsch, Hayes, and Mathews (2009). In this task, participants were 
asked to try and focus on their breathing for 5 minutes. Throughout this 5 minute period, a 
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tone sounded 12 times at random intervals of between 20 and 30 seconds. Whenever the tone 
sounded, participants were required to report whether they were currently focused on their 
breathing or were focused on a thought. If they were focused on a thought, they were required 
to give this thought a one or two word label, and classify it as negative, positive, or neutral in 
emotional tone. 
At the end of the 5 minute breathing period, the participant rated each recorded 
negative thought on five key dimensions relevant to rumination. Specifically, each negative 
thought was rated from 0 to 4 in terms of frequency (i.e., how often the thought came to 
mind), duration (i.e., how long they were thinking about the subject of the thought), 
repetitiveness (i.e., how much thoughts kept coming back to the same idea), severity (i.e., 
how upsetting or distressing the thought was), and control (i.e., how difficult it was to stop or 
move on to other thoughts; see Appendix One for full rating questions and response options). 
The ratings for each negative thought reported during the 5 minute breathing period were 
averaged across the total number of negative thoughts to yield a rumination score for that 
period. Using this rumination score data, an in-vivo index of ruminative disposition was 
obtained by computing the residuals from a simple linear regression predicting rumination 
scores post-anagram task from rumination scores pre-anagram task. A higher score on this 
index reflected a greater tendency to respond to the negative event by increasing ruminative 
thinking, and so indicated heightened ruminative disposition.  
 Mood assessment. During the breathing focus tasks, for each tone, participants also 
completed two visual analogue mood rating scales, each 100mm in length, that assessed 
momentary levels of sadness (scale labelled “sad and “happy” at each extreme) and anxiety 
(scale labelled “anxious” and “confident” at each extreme), each scored on scales from 0 to 
10, with higher scores indicating more negative mood.  
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Anagram failure task. In this anagram task, participants were given three minutes to 
solve 30 supposed anagrams. They were told that the anagram task predicted academic 
success, and that they should expect to solve five or six anagrams. Fifteen of the anagrams 
were soluble in that their letters could be rearranged to form a legitimate English word, 
though these anagrams had been rated as very difficult to solve even for a university 
population. The remaining 15 anagrams were insoluble, as the letters of these anagrams could 
not be rearranged to form a legitimate English word. Most participants were only able to 
solve one or two anagrams (mean correct = 1.19, SD = 1.21), and no participants solved more 
than four. At the end of the 3 minutes, participants were given their score, together with the 
feedback that this score was below average. 
4.2.3 Attentional Bias Assessment  
Apparatus. Eye movements were recorded by an Eyelink 2000 eye-tracking system, 
which uses infrared video-based tracking technology. Head location was fixed using a chin 
rest 57cm from the display monitor, and a camera on the desk tracked the position of the 
pupils as they moved. The stimulus display was presented on a 17 inch 1024 x 768 monitor, 
and 1 cm on the stimulus display corresponded to 1° visual angle. Both stimulus presentation 
and eye-movements recording were controlled by E-prime 2.0 software, with the eye-tracking 
system automatically synchronised to the program at the beginning of each trial. Only eye-
movements from the right eye were recorded, which were tracked continuously throughout 
each trial. The EyeLink 2000 system automatically parsed eye-movement data into fixations 
and saccades. The parser computed instantaneous velocity and acceleration, and compared 
these to pre-determined thresholds. Fixations were defined as time periods where both 
velocity and acceleration were under these thresholds. Start latency, end latency, and average 
position for each fixation were recorded. 
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The eye-tracker was calibrated before the start of each assessment block in order to 
ensure accurate measurement of gaze direction. The calibration procedure involved the 
sequential presentation of nine targets (5mm white circles) in pre-determined locations on the 
screen, which the participants were instructed to direct their gaze towards. During the first 
presentation sequence, gaze direction was determined by matching pupil position to the 
location of each target. The presentation sequence was then repeated a second time, and the 
difference in visual angle between the estimated fixation position and actual target position 
was recorded for each target. The calibration was accepted if average discrepancy was below 
0.7° and maximum discrepancy was below 1.5°, otherwise the calibration procedure was 
repeated until an acceptable level of accuracy was obtained. 
Experimental stimuli. In the present study, we required 96 word pairs each 
comprising a word (negative, positive, or neutral), and a length matched non-word (see 
Appendix Two for list of word stimuli). The word stimuli were taken from Grafton et al. 
(2012). These words had been selected from a pool of 400 candidate words on the basis of 
emotional tone ratings provided by clinical psychologists. The sets of negative, positive and 
neutral words, did not differ in terms of word length, frequency, or arousal ratings (all p’s > 
.05). Emotional words (negative/positive words) were also rated on the basis of their 
emotional domain relevance, such that half of the words were depression relevant 
(sad/happy) and half were anxiety relevant (anxious/relaxed), giving rise to the stimulus 
domain factor. Emotional tones ratings did not significantly differ between depression and 
anxiety relevant stimuli, confirming that stimulus emotionality was not confounded by 
stimulus domain (see Study Two, section 3.4.3 for further details).  
Attentional bias assessment task. Each trial began with the appearance of an upper 
and lower string of asterisks for 1000ms, centralised horizontally on the screen, demarcating 
the two critical screen regions. The critical regions were separated vertically by a distance of 
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4.3 cm, which corresponded to a visual angle of 4.32° to ensure the elicitation of eye 
movements5. Immediately afterwards, a cue stimulus appeared in one of the two critical 
regions, with equal frequency. The cue stimulus was a small red line, sloping upwards either 
the left or to the right, with equal frequency. Participants were required to indicate the 
direction of the cue stimulus, by pressing either the left or right mouse button. Immediately 
after the response was executed, a word/non-word stimulus pair was presented for 2000ms, 
one member appearing in each of the critical screen regions. Thus, the word appeared in the 
region either proximal or distal to the initial focus of attention, with equal frequency. This 
sequence of events is summarized in the example trials shown in Figure 4.1. 
The task consisted of a total of 384 trials, split into 4 blocks, with a 30 second break 
in between each block. The eye-tracker was calibrated before the start of each block in order 
to ensure accurate measurement of gaze direction. Each of the 96 stimulus pairs was 
presented 4 times; twice with the word in the locus of initial attention, and twice with the 
word distal to the focus of initial attention, and in each case with the word appearing once in 
the upper region and once in the lower region. Presentation of stimuli was balanced across the 
blocks, such that each word pair was presented once per block, and that an equal number of 
each word type was presented in each of the four location conditions. 
Data preparation. For the purpose of analysis, the upper and lower screen regions 
were defined as two areas each measuring 8cm horizontally, by 3cm vertically. Both were 
centralised horizontally, and the centre of each was distanced 2.15cm vertically from the 
screen centre. 
 
                                                          
5 4.32° visual angle falls within the parafoveal field of vision (between 2 and 5° visual angle; 
Rayner, 1998). Word stimuli appearing within the parafoveal field of vision will receive some 
semantic processing, but it will be necessary to make an eye-movement to achieve full sematic 
processing (Liversedge & Findlay, 2000). 
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Figure 4.1. Examples of stimulus presentation on engagement and disengagement trials. On 
disengagement trials the cue appears in the location of the word stimulus, and latency to 
saccade away from the word stimulus is assessed. On engagement trials the cue appears in the 
location of the non-word, and latency to fixate on the word stimulus is assessed. 
 
Trials were categorised as valid and included for analysis if (a) participants were 
fixated on the region containing the cue stimulus immediately prior to the onset of the 
stimulus pair, and (b) they remained fixated on this region for at least 100ms after stimulus 
onset, indicating that they were attending to the cue as intended.  
The percentage of valid trials for each block was calculated, and blocks with less than 
75% valid trials were excluded from analysis, as a high percentage of invalid trials can 
indicate poor calibration of the eye-tracker. Participants with less than 2 valid blocks were 
excluded from analysis. 
Following the approach adopted in prior research (Rutherford, MacLeod, & 
Campbell, 2004; Ratcliff, 1993) to minimise the influence of outliers, we used median 
latencies under each condition per person to calculate each of the bias indices. 
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Engagement bias. Trials where attention was initially fixated on the non-word 
stimulus were used to calculate engagement bias. Engagement speed was defined as latency 
to fixate on the word stimulus following onset (i.e., start latency of the first fixation within 
the region of the word stimulus). Engagement bias was calculated by subtracting engagement 
speed for negative words from engagement speed for positive words, so that a larger bias 
index indicated faster engagement with negative relative to positive words.  
Disengagement bias. Trials where attention was initially fixated on the word stimulus 
were used to calculate disengagement bias. Disengagement speed was defined as latency to 
saccade away from the word stimulus following onset (i.e., end latency of the fixation prior to 
the first fixation outside the region of the word stimulus). Disengagement bias was calculated 
by subtracting disengagement speed for positive words from disengagement speed for 
negative words, so that a larger bias index indicated slower disengagement from negative 
relative to positive words. 
Dwell bias. Total fixation durations to the region of the word stimuli for the entire 
presentation duration were summed, in order to measure dwell time for the word stimuli. 
Dwell bias was calculated by subtracting dwell time for positive words from dwell time for 
negative words, so that a larger bias index indicated longer dwell time for negative relative to 
positive words.  
4.2.4 Procedure 
 Prior to commencing the experimental session, participants were told that the study 
was investigating links between personality, and variations in attention and cognitive 
abilities, and were given a basic description of each task. After being given the opportunity to 
ask questions, participants signed the study consent form. Participants then completed the 
BDI-II and RRS questionnaire measures. They were then seated approximately 57cm from 
the display monitor, and completed a brief practice of the attentional assessment task 
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consisting of 16 trials utilising only neutral stimuli. Following this, they completed the 
attentional assessment task. Participants then practiced focusing on their breathing for a one 
minute period, before completing the in-vivo assessment of ruminative disposition. Finally, 
participants were fully debriefed and completed a final mood assessment to check for any 
persisting signs of distress. 
4.3 Results 
 Nine participants who had less than two valid blocks in the attentional assessment 
task, and three who did not complete the full set of emotional assessment measures, were 
removed prior to analysis. The remaining participants displayed a high level of accuracy on 
the attentional assessment task, averaging 85% valid trials. There was no association between 
percentage of valid trials and any of the measures of ruminative disposition (all p’s > .20). 
In order to check that the anagram failure task had the intended effect on mood and 
state rumination, repeated measures ANOVAs were used to investigate the effect of the 
anagram failure task on mood and rumination. Both sadness and anxiety ratings were higher 
during the post-failure assessment than during the pre-failure assessment (F (1, 47) = 42.10, p 
< .001, ηp² = .472 for sadness; F (1, 47) = 33.38, p < .001, ηp² = .415 for anxiety; see Table 
4.1 for means), confirming that the anagram failure experience was effective at eliciting 
negative mood. Participants also obtained higher state rumination scores during the post-
failure assessment than during the pre-failure assessment, F (1, 47) = 17.43, p < .001, ηp² = 
.271 (see Table 4.1 for means), confirming that the anagram failure task was effective at 
eliciting rumination, as intended.  
In-vivo ruminative disposition scores were not significantly correlated with RRS 
scores, r (48) = .23, p = .116, or with either the brooding or reflection subscales (r (48) = .21, 
p = .157 for brooding; r (48) = .08, p = .589 for reflection). However, this in-vivo measure 
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has previously been found to be positively associated with ruminative brooding scores (Study 
One). 
 
Table 4.1. Descriptive statistics of participant characteristics, and in-vivo mood and 
rumination assessments (pre- and post-failure). 
 Mean (SD) Range 
BDI-II 6.00 (5.16) 0 - 20 
RRS 46.29 (10.94) 25 - 69 
Brooding 10.10 (3.43) 5 - 18 
Reflection 11.52 (3.41) 5 - 20 
Pre-Failure Assessment   
 Sadness 28.27 (15.64) 0.00 - 62.60 
 Anxiety 34.31 (16.43) 4.20 – 62.40 
 Rumination 3.96 (5.03) 0.00 – 16.00 
Post-Failure Assessment   
 Sadness 39.14 (17.01) 8.30 – 85.40 
 Anxiety 44.27 (16.81) 10.20 – 84.70 
 Rumination 7.17 (5.69) 0.00 – 20.00 
Note: BDI-II = Beck Depression Inventory II, RRS = Ruminative Responses Scale 
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Table 4.2. Mean attentional engagement and disengagement latencies, and total dwell times 
for positive and negative stimuli, along with mean bias indices (SDs in parentheses). 
 Latency/dwell time (ms)  
 Negative words Positive words Bias index 
Attentional engagement latency 965.8 (374.9) 956.3 (440.5) -9.50 (276.2) 
Attentional disengagement latency 555.1 (214.9) 528.0 (235.2) 27.16 (138.5) 
Total dwell time 700.6 (128.2) 732.6 (162.8) -32.06 (146.6) 
 
 
4.3.1 Association between Ruminative Disposition Questionnaire Assessment Scores and 
Attentional Bias Indices 
 Bivariate correlations were computed between RRS scores, the brooding and 
reflection subscales, and our indices of attentional bias to negative information (engagement, 
disengagement, and dwell bias). The results of these correlations are shown in Table 4.3. 
There were no significant correlations between any of the questionnaires measures of 
ruminative disposition and the indices of attentional bias (all p’s > .30). 
We went on to investigate whether any of the relationships between questionnaire 
measures of ruminative disposition and attentional biases were moderated by stimulus 
domain. Each of the attentional bias indices were subjected to repeated measures ANCOVAs 
with stimulus domain as the within-subjects factor (depression vs. anxiety relevant words), 
and questionnaire measures of ruminative disposition as the covariates (separate analyses 
conducted for each questionnaire measure). There were no significant interactions between 
stimulus domain and ruminative disposition for any of the attentional bias indices (all p’s > 
.10). Thus, there was no evidence that any of the relationships between ruminative disposition 
and attentional biases differed depending on stimulus domain. 
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Table 4.3. Bivariate correlations between RRS and in-vivo ruminative brooding scores and 
attentional bias indices. 
 Engagement 
Bias 
Disengagement 
Bias 
Dwell Bias 
 r (48) p r (48) p r (48) P 
RRS .03 .819 -.13 .375 -.02 .882 
Brooding  .15 .322 .00 .990 .14 .349 
Reflection  -.05 .737 -.07 .629 -.00 .984 
In-vivo ruminative brooding -.24 .097 .10 .510 .00 .981 
Note: RRS = Ruminative Responses Scale 
 
4.3.2 Association between In-Vivo Ruminative Disposition Scores and Attentional Bias 
Indices 
We went on to investigate the association between our in-vivo measure of ruminative 
disposition, and the attentional bias index scores using bivariate correlations. There were no 
significant correlations between in-vivo ruminative disposition scores and any of the indices 
of attentional bias (all p’s > .05; see Table 4.3). We also investigated whether the relationship 
between in-vivo ruminative disposition scores and each of the attentional bias indices was 
moderated by stimulus domain. Each of the attentional bias indices were subjected to a 
repeated measures ANCOVA with stimulus domain as the within-subjects factor (depression 
vs. anxiety relevant words), and in-vivo ruminative disposition scores as the covariate. There 
were no significant interactions between stimulus domain and in-vivo ruminative disposition 
for any of the attentional bias indices (all p’s > .50). Thus, there was no evidence that the 
relationship between in-vivo ruminative disposition and any of the indices of attentional 
biases differed depending on stimulus domain. 
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4.4 Discussion 
The aim of the present study was to empirically test the impaired disengagement 
account of ruminative brooding, using an eye-tracking assessment of attentional bias to assess 
spontaneous allocation of attention to emotional stimuli. Response probe assessments of 
attentional disengagement bias used in previous studies could involve either ability or 
tendency to disengage attention from negative stimuli. By employing an eye-tracking 
assessment of attentional bias involving free-viewing of emotional stimuli, the present study 
was able to investigate whether ruminative disposition is associated with individual 
differences in the spontaneous tendency to disengage attention from negative stimuli. It was 
hypothesised that higher levels of dispositional ruminative brooding, as measured by both the 
RRS and an in-vivo measure, would be associated with slower attentional disengagement 
from negative relative to positive stimuli. However, there was no evidence of a relationship 
between ruminative disposition and attentional disengagement bias. Neither the RRS nor the 
in-vivo assessment of ruminative disposition were correlated with biases in attentional 
disengagement from negative relative to positive stimuli. There was also no evidence of a 
relationship between ruminative disposition and biases in either engagement or maintenance 
of attention.  
The lack of any evidence for a relationship between ruminative disposition and 
attentional bias contrasts with previous studies using response probe assessments of 
attentional bias, which have demonstrated that higher levels of ruminative disposition are 
associated with greater attentional bias for negative information (Donaldson et al., 2007; 
Joormann et al., 2006) and more specifically with impaired attentional disengagement from 
negative information (Studies One & Two). One possible explanation for this discrepancy is 
that rumination-linked attentional bias is only apparent under conditions that explicitly 
require a shift in the direction of attention allocation. In the present study, attentional 
150 
 
distribution was assessed via eye-movements during free-viewing of emotional stimuli. Such 
attentional assessment tasks arguably reflect biases in tendency to allocate attention to 
emotional stimuli, whereas response probe assessments of attentional bias could reflect biases 
in either attentional tendency or ability. In response probe assessments of attentional bias, 
participants will be required to disengage their attention from the location of emotional 
stimuli on trials where the probe appears distal to this location. The task demands imposed by 
the response probe may have influenced the allocation of attention during stimulus 
presentation to facilitate rapid responding to the target probe, such that participants pre-
emptively disengaged attention from its initial location prior to probe onset. If rumination-
linked attentional biases involve reduced ability to disengage attention from negative 
information, then such biases might only be apparent when participants are explicitly 
required to disengage their attention from the location of emotional stimuli, as is the case in 
response probe tasks. Hence, it is possible that rumination-linked impairments in 
disengagement of attention from negative information could particularly involve a reduced 
ability to disengage attention when required, but not a reduced tendency to spontaneously 
disengage attention. 
Another possible explanation for the present findings may involve the fact that eye-
movements can only detect overt shifts in attention (i.e., attentional selection performed via 
eye-movements; Armstrong & Olatunji, 2012). In between eye-movements, covert shifts in 
attention allocation can occur without redirecting gaze. If the rumination-linked attentional 
biases observed in previous studies do not translate into shifts in overt attention, but instead 
only involve shifts in covert attention, then eye-tracking assessments of attentional bias 
would be incapable of detecting this. This explanation seems unlikely, as in naturalistic 
viewing, eye-movements are the primary method of attentional selection, with covert 
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attention generally guiding eye-movements (Findlay & Gilhchrist, 2003; Hayhoe & Ballard, 
2005), but cannot be completely ruled out by the present methodology. 
There are also other methodological differences worth noting between the eye-
tracking and response probe attentional assessment task, which could potentially have 
influenced the present findings. Firstly, the distance between the critical screen regions was 
increased from 3cm in the response probe assessment to 4.3cm in the eye-tracking 
assessment, in order to ensure that the distance between the critical regions was sufficient to 
necessitate eye-movements when shifting attention between critical regions. Secondly, 
whereas stimulus presentation duration in the response probe assessment varied between 
500ms and 1000ms, stimulus presentation duration was increased to 2000ms in the eye-
tracking assessment. Whereas the ‘snapshot’ nature of response probe assessments of 
attentional bias means that longer stimulus presentations durations risk missing any early bias 
in selective attention, the continuous nature of eye-tracking assessments means that biases in 
attentional distribution can be detected regardless of when they occur. Thus increasing the 
stimulus presentation duration maximises the opportunity to detect bias in attentional 
distribution at multiple stages. Since both these methodological changes were adopted in 
order to maximise eye-tracking sensitivity, it seems unlikely that either of these differences 
can account for the null findings within the present paradigm. 
In addition, the null findings in this study could simply be a result of low statistical 
power, due to small sample size (N = 48). Power analyses conducted in G-Power revealed 
that the present study achieved a power of only .10 to detect small effect sizes (r = .10) at the 
.05 level, and a power of .57 to detect medium effect sizes (r = .30), both of which are below 
the recommended level of .80. However, the observed effect sizes for the relationship 
between ruminative brooding and attentional disengagement bias were very small (r = .00 for 
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the RRS brooding subscale; r = .10 for the in-vivo measure of ruminative disposition), 
indicating that any genuine relationship is likely to be weak. 
In order to better understand the reasons for the discrepancy between the present 
study and previous research investigating the link between ruminative disposition and 
attentional biases for emotional stimuli, future research could combine the use of eye-
tracking assessments of selective attention with attentional response probe tasks. If this 
combined approach were to produce evidence of a relationship between ruminative 
disposition and attentional disengagement bias on the response probe measure, but without a 
simultaneous bias in disengagement of attention via eye-movements, then this would indicate 
that the discrepant results can be accounted for by differences in the ability to detect covert 
shifts in attention. However, if simultaneous biases in attentional disengagement were found 
using both measures, then the role of the response probe in eliciting this bias could be further 
investigated. A mixture of assessment trials both with and without the response probe would 
enable the determination of whether the task constraints imposed by the response probe are 
necessary for rumination-linked biased in attentional disengagement to become apparent. 
Such research would have theoretical implications for the nature of the rumination-linked 
attentional disengagement bias, particularly the distinction between biases in ability and 
spontaneous tendency to disengage attention. Specifically, if a an attentional bias for negative 
information performed via eye-movements was observed in the presence of the response 
probe, but not during free-viewing of stimuli in the absence of a response probe, this would 
indicate that this rumination-linked attentional bias principally involved impaired ability to 
inhibit attentional processing of negative information, rather than a spontaneous tendency to 
preferentially direct attention towards negative information. 
If rumination-linked attentional disengagement bias does involve a reduced ability to 
disengage attention from negative information, then this would emphasise the role of 
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attentional control deficits in contributing to this attentional bias. According to the impaired 
disengagement hypothesis, deficits in attentional control may underpin impaired 
disengagement of attention from negative thoughts in rumination (Koster et al., 2011), and 
previous studies have already demonstrated a relationship between ruminative disposition and 
impaired attentional control (De Lissnyder, Derakshan, De Raedt, & Koster, 2011; De 
Lissnyder, Koster, Derakshan, & De Raedt, 2010; Whitmer & Banich, 2007). It is possible 
that deficits in attentional control could specifically be associated with impaired ability to 
disengage attention from negative information, and not biases in tendencies to spontaneously 
disengage attention from negative information. Further research assessing ruminative 
disposition, attentional bias and attentional control will also be required to determine whether 
such attentional disengagement bias and attentional control deficits are functionally related, 
or represent separate facets of ruminative disposition.  
In summary, the present study did not find any evidence of a relationship between 
ruminative disposition and attentional bias for negative information, in contrast to previous 
research demonstrating that higher levels of rumination are associated with impaired 
attentional disengagement from negative information. Further research will be necessary to 
illuminate the potential explanations for these discrepant findings, particularly the possible 
distinction between bias in the tendency and ability to disengage attention from negative 
information. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: Study Four 
 
5.1 Introduction 
According to the impaired disengagement hypothesis put forward by Koster and 
colleagues (Koster, De Lissnyder, Derakshan, & De Raedt, 2011), high levels of rumination 
are caused by difficulties disengaging attention away from negative information. The 
disengagement hypothesis suggests that when an individual experiences maladaptive negative 
thoughts, this will generally lead to cognitive conflict followed by the recruitment of 
attentional control resources to disengage from these thoughts. However, if the 
disengagement of attention from negative information is disrupted (either through impaired 
conflict signalling or impaired attentional control) then negative thoughts will be maintained 
resulting in persistent rumination. Thus, rumination occurs because of a failure to disengage 
attention from negative thoughts.  
Previous research has supported the impaired disengagement hypothesis by 
demonstrating that higher levels of ruminative disposition are associated with an attentional 
bias for negative relative to non-negative stimuli (Donaldson, Lam, & Mathews, 2007; 
Joormann, Dkane, & Gotlib, 2006; Pe, Vandekerckhove, & Kuppens, 2013). Studies One and 
Two extended this evidence using a modified dot-probe task to distinguish between bias in 
attentional engagement and disengagement of attention, demonstrating that this rumination-
linked attentional bias involved impaired attentional disengagement from negative stimuli. 
However, evidence that ruminative disposition was exclusively associated with attentional 
disengagement bias was limited, as neither study found any evidence that ruminative 
disposition was more strongly associated with attentional disengagement bias than attentional 
engagement bias.  
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Previous research has also identified additional conditions that may determine 
whether rumination-linked attentional bias is observed. Firstly, rumination may specifically 
be associated with an attentional bias for depression-relevant negative information, rather 
than negative information more generally. Joormann et al. (2006) investigated attentional bias 
for negative images related to both depression and anxiety, and found that the rumination-
linked attentional bias for negative stimuli was only observed for depression relevant images. 
Study Two supported this finding, demonstrating that rumination was associated with 
impaired disengagement from depression-relevant, but not anxiety-relevant negative words. 
Secondly, there is evidence that the observation of rumination-linked attentional bias may be 
dependent on stimulus presentation duration. Donaldson et al. (2007) varied the stimulus 
presentation duration between 500ms and 1000ms, and only found a relationship between 
ruminative disposition and attentional bias for negative stimuli when stimuli were presented 
for 1000ms.  Similarly, Study Two found that the rumination-link bias in attentional 
disengagement was specific to stimuli presented for 1000ms, and not 500ms. Such evidence 
that rumination-linked attentional bias is only expressed under conditions where processing 
time is less restricted, may indicate that rumination-linked attentional bias may be a result of 
strategic (or controlled), as opposed to automatic processes (McNally, 1995; Mogg & 
Bradley, 2005). Strategic processing is considered controlled and effortful, as opposed to 
automatic processing, which is effortless, unconscious, and involuntary. Therefore, 
heightened ruminative disposition may be specifically associated with individual differences 
in the operation of controlled attentional processing bias. 
Taken together, there is evidence to suggest that rumination may specifically be 
related to attentional bias for depression-relevant negative information, and that this bias may 
only be apparent under conditions allowing for extended stimulus processing duration. 
Interestingly, Study One also found evidence that ruminative disposition was associated with 
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an attentional engagement bias for negative information, but only for depression-relevant 
stimuli presented for 1000ms. However, it is important to note that Study One did not find 
evidence that the relationship between ruminative disposition and attentional disengagement 
differed depending on either stimulus domain relevance or presentation duration.  
One limitation of previous studies, which may have contributed to unclear findings 
regarding the specificity of rumination-linked attentional bias, is that ruminative disposition 
was measured continuously using unselected non-clinical samples. In such non-clinical 
samples, variation in ruminative disposition may be relatively restricted, meaning that 
sensitivity in the measurement of the relationship with selective attention may be low. 
Another more sensitive approach would be to selectively recruit participants with high and 
low levels of ruminative disposition, to increase the potential ability to detect differences in 
selective attention. Furthermore, research comparing individuals with high and low levels of 
ruminative disposition would be more relevant and generalizable to the more extreme 
patterns of ruminative responding observed in clinical populations (e.g., patients with major 
depression). 
In addition to investigating the link between rumination and biased attentional 
processing of emotional information, another key aspect of the impaired disengagement 
hypothesis is the role of individual differences in general attentional control. The impaired 
disengagement hypothesis suggests that difficulties disengaging attention from negative 
information may be caused by deficits in attentional control (Koster et al., 2011). If 
attentional control is impaired, then strategic attempts to disengage attention from negative 
information may be compromised, resulting in slower attentional disengagement from 
negative information. Consistent with this theory, whereas studies using response probe 
assessments of attentional bias have typically found that heightened ruminative disposition is 
associated with an attentional bias for negative information, Study Three found no evidence 
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of a relationship between ruminative disposition and attentional bias assessed via eye-
movements during free-viewing of emotional stimuli. These findings raise the possibility that 
heightened ruminative disposition may particularly be associated with a reduced ability to 
disengage attention from negative information, such that attentional disengagement bias is 
only expressed under conditions that explicitly require the disengagement of attention from 
negative information. If rumination-linked attentional disengagement bias does involve 
reduced ability to disengage attention from negative information when required, this would 
strengthen the case that impaired attentional control might contribute to this attentional bias. 
Previous research has provided empirical support for the relationship between 
rumination and attentional control deficits in the processing of non-emotional information, 
using a variety of paradigms to assess attentional control. Davis and Nolen-Hoeksema (2000) 
found that participants with high compared to low levels of ruminative disposition were more 
likely to persist in performing a task according to a prior rule, despite being given feedback 
that their responses were incorrect. Similarly, heightened ruminative disposition has been 
found to be related to impaired inhibition of previous task settings (De Lissnyder, Koster, 
Derakshan, & De Raedt, 2010; Whitmer & Banich, 2007), impaired switching between 
different task settings (De Lissnyder et al., 2010; De Lissnyder, et al., 2012b; Demeyer, De 
Lissnyder, Koster, & De Raedt, 2012), and greater difficulty inhibiting orienting responses on 
the antisaccade task (De Lissnyder, Derakshan, De Raedt, & Koster, 2011).  
However, although research has demonstrated a relationship between ruminative 
disposition and both impaired attentional control and attentional bias for negative 
information, all three have yet to be investigated within the same study. As a result, it is not 
clear whether rumination-linked attentional biases and attentional control deficits are 
functionally associated with each other, or whether impaired attentional control and biased 
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attentional processing of negative information represent separate cognitive characteristics 
contributing to higher levels of ruminative disposition.  
One well established method for assessing individual differences in attentional control 
is the antisaccade task, which assesses the ability to control the allocation of visual-spatial 
attention. The antisaccade task involves the abrupt presentation of a peripheral stimulus, 
which participants are instructed either to direct their attention towards (prosaccade trials) or 
away from (antisaccade). The sudden appearance of a peripheral stimulus triggers a reflexive 
saccade in the direction of the stimulus, meaning that on antisaccade trials participants must 
inhibit this automatic response in order to direct attention away from the stimulus (Hutton & 
Ettinger, 2006; Munoz & Everling, 2004). Accordingly, participants are typically faster to 
direct their attention towards the stimulus on prosaccade than on antisaccade trials (Munoz & 
Everling, 2004). Furthermore, the difference between prosaccade and antisaccade latencies 
(i.e., antisaccade cost) is thought to reflect the degree of inhibitory attentional control.  
Studies assessing attentional control using the antisaccade task have typically 
measured antisaccade and prosaccade latencies directly via the tracking of eye-movements 
(e.g, Chen, Clarke, Watson, MacLeod, & Guastella, 2015; De Lissnyder et al., 2011). 
However, it is also possible to assess antisaccade cost indirectly via response probes located 
either proximally (prosaccade trials) or distally (antisaccade trials) to the stimulus. Since 
participants will be required to direct their attention towards the location of the target in order 
to execute a correct response, response latencies will partly reflect latencies to direct attention 
towards the location of the target. It is also possible to control for any non-attentional 
influences on response latencies, by comparing response latencies on prosaccade and 
antisaccade trials to response latencies for centrally presented targets. As such, a prosaccade 
index can be calculated by subtracting response latencies for central targets presented 
simultaneously with a central stimulus from response latencies on prosaccade trials, whereas 
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an antisaccade index can be calculated by subtracting response latencies for central targets 
presented without a stimulus from response latencies on antisaccade trials. Antisaccade cost 
can then be indexed by the difference between prosaccade and antisaccade indices. This 
approach has the advantage of being more time and resource efficient than eye-tracking 
assessments, and has been successfully used in previous research investigating the role of 
attentional control in anxiety, which demonstrated that heightened levels of anxiety were 
associated with deficits in attentional control (Basanovic & Grafton, in prep). 
The purpose of the present study was to attempt to replicate and extend findings from 
Study Two, where it was found that higher levels of ruminative disposition were associated 
with greater attentional disengagement bias for depressive stimuli presented for 1000ms. The 
attentional bias assessment task delivered to participants was identical to that used in Study 
Two, but in order to maximise sensitivity, participants with high and low levels of ruminative 
disposition were selectively recruited for this study. It was hypothesised that participants in 
the high rumination group would demonstrate greater attentional bias for negative relative to 
positive stimuli than participants in the low rumination group. Furthermore, it was 
hypothesised that this bias would involve slower attentional disengagement from negative 
relative to positive words, and that there would be no between group differences in 
attentional engagement bias. It was also hypothesised that this attentional bias would be 
specific to depression relevant stimuli presented for 1000ms.  
The present study also investigated the relationship between ruminative disposition 
and attentional control using a response probe version of the antisaccade task to assess 
attentional control. The anti-saccade task was selected to assess attentional control, as like the 
modified dot-probe task used to assess attentional bias, this task involves the assessment of 
visual spatial attention. The present antisaccade task was also designed to be visually 
consistent with the attentional bias assessment task, in that since the stimuli in the attentional 
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bias assessment task consisted of word and non-word stimuli, stimuli in the present 
antisaccade task consisted of letter strings (i.e., strings of either X’s or O’s). Consistent with 
well-established patterns of attentional distribution during the antisaccade task, it was 
expected that participants would generally be slower to direct their attention towards target 
probes on antisaccade compared to pro saccade trials (i.e., antisaccade cost). Furthermore, 
consistent with previous findings demonstrating that heightened ruminative disposition is 
associated with deficits in attentional control (e.g., De Lissnyder et al., 2011; De Lissnyder et 
al., 2010; Whitmer & Banich, 2007), it was hypothesized that participants in the high 
rumination group would demonstrate greater antisaccade cost relative to participants in the 
low rumination group, reflecting greater impairments in attentional control. If, as expected, 
both rumination-linked differences in attentional bias and attentional control were observed, 
further analyses would be conducted to determine whether these represented related or 
independent factors associated with levels of ruminative disposition. 
5.2 Method 
5.2.1 Participants 
745 students from the University of Western Australia were screened using a 
shortened 10-item version of the Ruminative Response Scale (RRS; Nolen-Hoeksema & 
Morrow, 1991; see below), which measures disposition to ruminate in response to negative 
mood. Participants scoring in the top and bottom tertiles were invited to participate in the 
study, giving rise to high and low rumination groups. 43 participants allocated to the low 
rumination group and 45 allocated to the high rumination group completed the experimental 
session. All participants spoke English as a first language. 
Participants also completed the full 22-item RRS during the experimental session. 
Participants were again grouped into high and low ruminators, based on a median-split 
performed on these in-session RRS scores. In order to ensure reliability and consistency of 
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ruminative disposition, participants with a discrepancy between screening and in-session 
rumination group allocation (i.e., allocated to the low rumination group based on screening 
scores, and the high rumination group based on in-session scores, and vice versa) were 
excluded from data analysis. Eighteen participants (8 initial low rumination, 10 initial high 
rumination) were excluded from analysis on this basis. A further six participants were 
excluded from analysis because they did not complete the full set of attentional assessment 
tasks (2 low rumination, 4 high rumination), and five because they displayed low accuracy on 
the attentional bias assessment task (1 low rumination, 4 high rumination; see Results 
section). 
There was no significant difference between the rumination groups in either age or 
gender (both p’s > .80), but there was a significant difference in BDI-II and in-session RRS 
scores, such that the high rumination group displayed higher levels of depressive symptoms 
and ruminative disposition (both p’s < .001; see Table 5.1 for descriptive and test statistics). 
5.2.2 Materials and Measures 
 Beck Depression Inventory (BDI-II; Beck et al., 1996). The BDI-II is a 21-item 
self-report measure designed to assess the severity of depressive symptoms. Participants 
indicate on a 4-point scale how much they have experienced depressive symptoms over the 
past two weeks. We used a 20-item version of the BDI-II, with the item about suicidal 
feelings or ideation removed at the request of our institutional review board. Higher scores 
represent greater severity of depressive symptoms. This measure has shown good reliability 
and validity (Beck et al., 1996). 
  
  
162 
 
Table 5.1. Gender frequencies and mean participant age, BDI-II and in-session RRS scores in 
the high and low rumination groups (SDs in parentheses), along with tests of between-group 
differences. 
 Low Rumination 
 (N = 32) 
High Rumination  
(N = 27) 
Statistics 
Gender 9 male, 23 female 8 male, 19 female χ² = 0.02, p = .899 
Age 19.88 (6.36) 19.96 (6.67) t (57) = 0.06, p = .956 
BDI-II 5.69 (4.42) 16.96 (9.96) t (57) = 5.77, p < .001 
RRS 35.03 (5.88) 59.00 (7.94) t (57) = 13.30, p < .001 
Note: BDI-II = Beck Depression Inventory II, RRS = Ruminative Responses Scale 
 
Ruminative Responses Scale (RRS; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991).  The 
RRS is a 22-item self-report measure, which requires participants to indicate the degree to 
which they engage in particular ruminative responses when in a negative mood on a 4-point 
Likert scale (1 = Almost Never, 4 = Almost Always). A higher score indicates a greater 
tendency to engage in rumination in response to negative mood. The RRS has been shown to 
have both high internal reliability and validity (Luminet, 2004). The shortened 10-item 
version of the RRS used in screening consisted of items from the brooding and reflection 
subscales (Treynor et al., 2003), which also show acceptable reliability and consistency. 
 Apparatus. A 22-inch computer monitor and a standard two-button mouse were used 
to present stimuli and record participant responses for both the attentional bias and attentional 
control assessment tasks. 
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5.2.3 Attentional Bias Assessment 
 The attentional bias assessment task was identical to that used in Study Two. 
Experimental stimuli. In the present study, we required 96 word pairs each 
comprising a word (negative, positive, or neutral), and a length matched non-word (see 
Appendix Two for list of word stimuli).The emotional word stimuli were taken from Grafton 
et al. (2012). These words had been selected from a pool of 400 candidate words on the basis 
of emotional valence ratings provided by clinical psychologists. The sets of negative, positive 
and neutral words did not differ in terms of word length, frequency, or arousal ratings (all p’s 
> .05).  Emotional words (negative/positive words) were also rated on the basis of their 
emotional domain relevance and included a mix of both depression relevant (sad/happy) and 
anxiety relevant (anxious/relaxed) words, giving rise to the within-subjects stimulus domain 
factor. Emotional valence ratings did not significantly differ between depression and anxiety 
relevant stimuli, confirming that stimulus emotionality was not confounded by stimulus 
domain (see Study Two, section 3.4.3 for further details).  
Attentional bias assessment task. Each trial began with the appearance of an upper 
and lower string of asterisks, indicating the two critical screen regions, centralised 
horizontally on the computer screen and separated by a distance of 3cm. Between the 
asterisks was a row of arrows, all pointing to the upper string, or all pointing to the lower 
string, with equal frequency. The arrows directed the participant which of the two screen 
regions to initially fixate attention upon. After one second, the screen was cleared, and an 
anchor probe was briefly presented (150ms) in this attended region. This anchor probe was a 
small (2mm) red line sloping upwards 45° to either the left or right, with equal frequency. 
Immediately thereafter, a letter string pair was presented, with one letter string appearing in 
each of the two critical screen regions. On half the trials the word member of the letter string 
pair appeared distal to the initially attended region (permitting the assessment of the biased 
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attentional engagement with negative information), and on the remaining half of the trials the 
word member of the letter string pair appeared proximal to the initially attended region 
(permitting the assessment of biased attentional disengagement with negative information). 
The letter string pair was displayed for either 500ms or 1000ms, with equal frequency, giving 
rise to the within-subjects exposure duration factor. A target probe stimulus then appeared in 
either of the two critical regions, with equal frequency. The target probe stimulus was again a 
small (2mm) red line sloping upwards 45° to either the left or right. Participants were 
required to indicate whether the slope direction of this target probe stimulus matched that of 
the anchor probe, which was the case on 50% of trials. Participants responded by pressing 
either the right or left mouse buttons, to indicate a match and a non-match, respectively. The 
latency, and accuracy, to make this discrimination response was recorded. Upon detection of 
the participant’s response the screen was cleared, and the next trial began after a 1000ms 
inter-trial interval.  
The task consisted of 384 trials in total, split into four equal blocks of 96 trials, with a 
30 second break in between. Across the task, each of the 96 letter string pairs was presented 
four times in a random order, with the constraint that each pair was presented once before any 
were presented a second  time, and each was repeated once before any were displayed for a 
third time, and so on. 
Calculating bias indices. In this task, selective attention to the word members of the 
letter string pairs is revealed by relative speeding to make discrimination responses to target 
probes appearing in the locus of words compared to target probes appearing in the locus of 
non-words. Thus, an index of attentional bias to negative information relative to positive 
information can be computed by expressing the degree to which this relative speeding to 
discriminate probes in the locus of words compared to probes appearing in the locus of non-
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words, is greater when this word was negative, rather than positive, in emotional tone. This 
index of negative attentional bias can be expressed as follows: 
Negative Attentional Bias Index = (RT to target probes opposite negative word loci - 
RT to target probes in negative word loci) - (RT to target probes opposite positive word loci - 
RT to target probes in positive word loci) 
Of most importance, the current task permits us to compute this negative attentional 
bias index under two conditions, in order to separately index facilitated attentional 
engagement with, and impaired attentional disengagement from, negative information. 
Specifically, an Engagement Bias Index can be computed by using the RT data from trials on 
which the word member of the letter string pair appeared distal to initial attentional focus (i.e. 
from trials on the anchor probe appeared in the locus of the non-word). Higher scores on this 
engagement bias index indicate that attention was captured to a greater degree by this distal 
information when it was negative rather than positive in emotional tone. A Disengagement 
Bias Index can be computed by using the RT data from trials on which the word member of 
the letter string pair appeared proximal to initial attentional focus (i.e. from trials on the 
anchor probe appeared in the locus of the word). Higher scores on this disengagement bias 
index indicate that attention was held to a greater degree by this proximal emotional 
information when it was negative rather than positive in emotional tone.  
Probe discrimination latencies can only indicate attentional distribution if the response 
is made accurately, hence only RTs from accurate responses were used, and we eliminated 
any participant with an overall accuracy score that was atypically low using a 95% 
confidence interval. Following the approach adopted in prior research (Rutherford, MacLeod, 
& Campbell, 2004; Ratcliff, 1993), we used participants’ median RT under each condition in 
these computations, to minimise the influence of outlying RTs. 
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5.2.4 Attentional Control Assessment 
 The attentional control assessment was a response probe variant of the antisaccade 
task. Antisaccade and prosaccade trials involved the presentation of peripheral letter strings 
(either X’s or O’s), along with a target probe presented either proximally (prosaccade trials) 
or distally (antisaccade trials) to the letter string. The abrupt presentation of the letter string is 
assumed to trigger a reflexive saccade in the direction of the letter string, which participants 
will be required to inhibit on antisaccade trials. Relative speed to direct attention towards 
target probes on antisaccade compared to prosaccade trials, as reflected by response latencies, 
is assumed to represent degree of attentional control. In order to control for non-attentional 
influences on response latencies, control trials involving the presentation of centrally located 
target probes and letter strings were also included. The present task also included ‘dual 
string’ trials, designed to assess general abilities to direct attention towards a desired location, 
but these trials were not used to index attentional control in the present study. The stimulus 
display presentation for antisaccade, prosaccade, and control trials are illustrated in Figure 
5.1. 
  Stimulus presentation sequence. Each trial began with the appearance of a fixation 
cross in the centre of the screen. Participants were instructed to look directly at the fixation 
cross, and then press the ‘spacebar’. Immediately after this, a stimulus display was presented, 
which included a target probe appearing in different locations relative to letter string stimuli 
(see ‘stimulus display conditions’ section below). There were three critical screen regions (an 
upper, a lower, and a central region), within which the letter strings and target probes would 
appear. All screen regions were centralised horizontally on the computer screen, and the 
upper and lower regions were each separated vertically from the centre by a distance of 
1.5cm. The target probe was a small grey arrow (2mm), pointing to either the left or the right, 
with equal frequency. Participants were required to indicate the direction of this arrow, using 
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the left and right mouse buttons. The latency, and accuracy, to make this discrimination 
response was recorded. Upon detection of the participant’s response the screen was cleared, 
and the next trial began after a 1000ms inter-trial interval. 
 
Figure 5.1. Attentional control assessment task stimulus displays for (a) antisaccade trials, (b) 
centre empty trials (antisaccade control), (c) prosaccade trials, and (d) centre string trials 
(prosaccade control).  
 
Stimulus display conditions. The stimulus display containing the target probe and 
letter strings varied depending on seven different conditions. These different stimulus display 
conditions were presented in blocks of eight trials. At the beginning of each block 
participants were given instructions telling them where the probe would appear relative to the 
letter strings. The stimulus display and instructions for each condition were as follows: 
- Prosaccade. A string of either X’s or O’s appeared in either the upper or lower 
region. The target probe was located amongst the letter string. Participants were 
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instructed to attend to the location of the letter string, consistent with the direction 
of reflexive saccades towards the letter string. 
- Antisaccade. A string of either X’s or O’s appeared in either the upper or lower 
region. The target probe was located in the region distal to the letter string. 
Participants were instructed to attend to the location distal to the letter string, 
which required the inhibition of reflexive saccades in the direction of the letter 
string. 
- Centre string (attend X).A string of X’s appeared in the centre of the screen. The 
target probe was located amongst the letter string. Participants were instructed to 
attend to the centre of the screen. 
- Centre string (attend O). A string of O’s appeared in the centre of the screen. The 
target probe was located amongst the letter string. Participants were instructed to 
attend to the centre of the screen. 
- Centre empty. No letter string was presented. The target probe was located on its 
own, in the centre of the screen. Participants were instructed to attend to the centre 
of the screen. 
- Dual string (attend ‘X’). A string of X’s and a string of O’s both appeared, one in 
the upper and one in the lower region. The target probe was located amongst the 
string of X’s. Participants were instructed to attend to the location of the string of 
X’s. 
- Dual string (attend O). A string of X’s and a string of O’s both appeared, one in 
the upper and one in the lower region. The target probe was located amongst the 
string of O’s. Participants were instructed to attend to the location of the string of 
O’s. 
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Each stimulus display block was presented four times, with each presented once 
before being repeated. Every seven blocks, participants were given an opportunity to take a 
short break. 
Calculating attentional control indices. Response latencies on prosaccade and 
antisaccade trials were used to assess attentional control. In order to control for non-
attentional effects on response latencies, RTs from relevant centre trials were subtracted. The 
prosaccade index was calculated by subtracting RTs for ‘centre string’ trials from RTs for 
prosaccade trials. The antisaccade index was calculated by subtracting RTs for ‘centre empty’ 
trials from RTs for antisaccade trials. Antisaccade cost was then calculated by subtracting 
prosaccade indices from antisaccade indices, with higher antisaccade cost representing more 
impaired attentional control.   
Probe discrimination latencies can only indicate attentional distribution if the response 
is made accurately, hence only RTs from accurate responses were used. Following the 
approach adopted in prior research (Rutherford et al., 2004; Ratcliff, 1993), we used 
participants’ median RT under each condition in these computations, to minimise the 
influence of outlying RTs. 
5.2.5 Procedure 
 Prior to starting the experiment participants were given the rationale that the study 
was investigating individual differences in verbal and visual information processing, and 
given basic descriptions of the tasks they would be completing. Participants then completed 
the BDI-II and RRS self-report measures. They were then given written instructions for the 
attentional bias assessment task, and completed a practice task consisting of 16 trials using 
only neutral stimuli. Following this, they completed the attentional assessment task. 
Participants were then given written instructions for the attentional control assessment task, 
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and completed 14 demonstration trials, outlining the different instructions for each of the 
seven block types. Finally, participants completed the attentional control assessment task. 
5.3 Results 
Five participants who displayed atypically low accuracy on the attentional bias 
assessment task (using 95% confidence interval) were removed prior to analysis. The 
remaining participants displayed a high level of accuracy on the attentional bias assessment 
task, averaging less than 6% errors. Participants also displayed a high level of accuracy on 
the attentional control assessment task, averaging less than 3% errors. There was no 
significant difference between the rumination groups in accuracy on either attentional 
assessment task (both p’s > .50).  
5.3.1 Between Group Differences in Attentional Bias  
Omnibus analysis. A four-way  mixed design ANOVA was conducted, with 
attentional bias as the dependent variable, rumination group (high rumination, low 
rumination), as the between-subjects factor, and bias type (attentional engagement bias, 
attentional disengagement bias), stimulus domain (depression relevant, anxiety relevant), and 
exposure duration (500ms, 1000ms) as within-subject factors. There was a significant two-
way interaction between rumination group and stimulus domain, F (1, 57) = 4.92, p = .031, 
ηp² = .08, which was subsumed within a significant three-way interaction between rumination 
group, stimulus domain, and exposure duration, F (1, 57) = 7.37, p = .009, ηp² = .11, 
indicating that the main-effect of rumination group differed depending on stimulus domain 
and exposure duration. There were no significant interactions involving both rumination 
group and bias type (all p’s > .80), indicating that the main-effect of rumination group did not 
differ depending on attentional bias type.  
Further analyses were conducted to investigate the nature of the interaction between 
rumination group, stimulus domain and exposure duration. This three-way interaction 
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reflected the fact that the two-way interaction between rumination group and stimulus domain 
was significant under the 1000ms exposure condition, F (1, 57) = 12.96, p = .001, ηp² = .19, 
but not under the 500ms exposure condition, F (1, 57) = 0.16, p = .687, ηp² < .01. Consistent 
with previous findings, there was a significant main-effect of rumination group for depressive 
stimuli presented for 1000ms, F (1, 57) = 5.17, p = .027, ηp² = .08, such that participants in 
the high rumination group were more biased towards negative relative to positive stimuli than 
the participants in the low rumination group (see Table 5.2 and Figure 5.2a for descriptive 
statistics). There was no significant interaction between rumination group and bias type, F (1, 
57) = 0.09, p = .765, ηp² < .01, indicating that the main-effect of rumination group on 
attentional bias for depressive stimuli presented for 1000ms did not differ depending on bias 
type. There was also a significant main-effect of rumination group for anxiety relevant 
stimuli presented for 1000ms, F (1, 57) = 5.03, p = .029, ηp² = .08, such that participants in 
the low rumination group were more biased towards negative relative to positive stimuli than 
participants in the high rumination group (see Table 5.2 and Figure 5.2b for descriptive 
statistics). There was no significant interaction between rumination group and bias type, F (1, 
57) = 0.00, p = .960, ηp² = .00, indicating that the main-effect of rumination group on 
attentional bias for anxiety relevant stimuli presented for 1000ms did not differ depending on 
bias type. There was no significant main-effect of rumination group on either depression or 
anxiety relevant stimuli presented for 500ms (both p’s > .30). 
Attentional disengagement bias. An a priori three-way mixed design ANOVA was 
conducted, with attentional disengagement bias as the dependent variable, rumination group 
(high rumination, low rumination), as the between-subjects factor, and stimulus domain 
(depression relevant, anxiety relevant) and exposure duration (500ms, 1000ms) as within-
subject factors. There was no significant main-effect of rumination group on disengagement 
172 
 
bias, F (1, 57) = 0.55, p = .462, ηp² = .01, or significant interactions between rumination 
group and the within-subjects factors (all p’s > .10).  
 
Table 5.2. Attentional bias indices in the high and low rumination groups.  
Bias Type 
   
Stimulus 
domain 
Exposure 
Duration 
(ms) 
Low Rumination High Rumination 
M (SD) M (SD) 
Attentional 
Engagement 
Depression 500 -20.34 (184.39) -65.33 (249.99) 
 1000 -23.09 (125.96) 70.54 (241.38) 
 Anxiety 500 -33.01 (182.11) -47.93 (191.66) 
  1000 92.13 (230.88) -10.94 (149.64) 
Attentional 
Disengagement 
Depression 500 -11.92 (164.44) -51.30 (266.53) 
 1000 -42.19 (239.61) 25.04 (243.25) 
 Anxiety 500 37.59 (217.97) 12.37 (210.43) 
  1000 68.64 (225.76) -38.41 (306.31) 
  
 
Since previous research has found that ruminative disposition is particularly 
associated with attentional bias for depressive stimuli presented for 1000ms, a one-way 
between-subjects ANOVA was also conducted with attentional disengagement bias for 
depressive stimuli at 1000ms as the dependent variable. There was no significant main-effect 
of rumination group on attentional disengagement bias for depressive stimuli at 1000ms, F 
(1, 57) = 1.14, p = .291, ηp² = .02.  
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(a)  
(b)  
Figure 5.2. Mean and SE attentional engagement and disengagement bias indices in each 
rumination group for (a) depression relevant stimuli presented for 1000ms and (b) anxiety 
relevant stimuli presented for 1000ms.   
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Attentional engagement bias. A three-way mixed design ANOVA was conducted, 
with attentional engagement bias as the dependent variable, rumination group (high 
rumination, low rumination), as the between-subjects factor, and stimulus domain (depression 
relevant, anxiety relevant) and exposure duration (500ms, 1000ms) as within-subject factors. 
There was no significant main-effect of rumination group on engagement bias, F (1, 57) = 
0.69, p = .410, ηp² = .01. There was also no significant two-way interaction between 
rumination group and either stimulus domain or exposure duration (both p’s > .10). There 
was, however, a trend towards a significant three-way interaction between rumination group, 
stimulus domain, and exposure duration, F (1, 57) = 3.04, p = .087, ηp² = .05. 
To further investigate this interaction, separate two-way mixed design ANOVAs were 
conducted on attentional engagement bias for stimuli presented for 500ms and 1000ms. There 
was a significant interaction between rumination group and stimulus domain under the 
1000ms exposure condition, F (1, 57) = 5.98, p = .018, ηp² = .10, but this same interaction 
was not significant under the 500ms exposure condition, F (1, 57) = 0.12, p = .726, ηp² = .00. 
Separate one-way between-subjects ANOVAs were then conducted on attentional 
engagement bias for anxiety and depression relevant stimuli presented for 1000ms. There was 
a trend towards a significant main-effect of rumination group on attentional engagement bias 
for depression relevant stimuli at 1000ms, F (1, 57) = 3.65, p = .061, ηp² = .06, such that 
participants in the high rumination group were more biased towards negative relative to 
positive stimuli than the low rumination group (see Table 5.2 for means). There was also a 
marginally significant main-effect of rumination group on attentional engagement bias for 
anxiety relevant stimuli at 1000ms, F (1, 57) = 3.97, p = .051, ηp² = .07, such that participants 
in the low rumination group were more biased towards negative relative to positive stimuli 
than the high rumination group (see Table 5.2 for means). There was no significant main-
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effect of rumination group on attentional engagement bias for either depression or anxiety 
relevant stimuli presented for 500ms (both p’s > .40). 
5.3.2 Between Group Differences in Attentional Control 
 A central assumption of the antisaccade task is that the abrupt presentation of a 
peripheral stimulus will trigger a reflexive saccade in the direction of the stimuli, which 
participants must inhibit on antisaccade trials, resulting in increased latency to direct attention 
towards the target. Thus, in order to validate the attentional control task, within-subjects 
differences between prosaccade and antisaccade indices were investigated. A paired samples 
t-test found a highly significant difference between prosaccade and antisaccade indices, t (58) 
= 13.3, p < .001. However, contrary to hypotheses, prosaccade indices were larger than 
antisaccade indices (M = 190.0, SD = 61.3 for prosaccade index; M = 88.3, SD = 51.0 for 
antisaccade index). Thus, participants were slower to direct their attention towards the target 
probe on prosaccade trials than on antisaccade trials, violating a central assumption of the 
antisaccade task, and calling into question the validity of the attentional control task. 
 Regardless, we went on to investigate between-subjects differences in attentional 
control. A one-way between subjects ANOVA was conducted, with rumination group (high 
rumination, low rumination) as the between subjects variable, and antisaccade cost as the 
dependent variable. There was no significant difference in antisaccade cost between 
rumination groups, F (1, 57) = 0.43, p = .513, ηp² = .01 (see Table 5.3 for means). In addition, 
a one-way between subjects MANOVA was conducted, with rumination group (high 
rumination, low rumination) as the between-subjects variable, and prosaccade and 
antisaccade indices as dependent variables. There was no significant overall main-effect of 
rumination group, F (2, 56) = 0.54, p = .586, ηp² = .02, and no significant main-effect on 
either prosaccade index, F (1, 57) = 1.10, p = .299, ηp² = .02, or antisaccade index, F (1, 57) = 
0.24, p = .625, ηp² = .00 (see Table 5.3 for means). Thus, there was no evidence of differences 
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in attentional control between high and low ruminators, subject to the proviso made earlier re 
the antisaccade task.  
 
Table 5.3. Attentional control indices in the high and low rumination groups. 
Attentional Control Index 
   
Low Rumination High Rumination 
M (SD) M (SD) 
Prosaccade index 182.3 (61.2) 199.1 (61.3) 
Antisaccade index 85.2 (53.0) 91.8 (49.4) 
Antisaccade cost -97.1 (60.5) -107.3 (57.5) 
 
5.4 Discussion 
The first aim of the present study was to attempt to replicate and extend findings from 
Study Two (Grafton, Southworth et al., in press), where it was found that higher levels of 
ruminative disposition were associated with greater attentional disengagement bias for 
depressive stimuli presented for 1000ms. It was hypothesised that participants in the high 
rumination group would demonstrate greater attentional bias for negative relative to positive 
stimuli in comparison to participants in the low rumination group. Consistent with the 
impaired disengagement account of rumination (Koster et al., 2011), it was also hypothesised 
that this attentional bias would involve more impaired attentional disengagement from 
negative stimuli, rather than facilitated attentional engagement with negative stimuli. 
Furthermore, it was hypothesised that this attentional bias would be specific to depression 
relevant stimuli presented for 1000ms.  
Consistent with previous findings (Donaldson et al., 2007; Joormann et al., 2006; 
Study Two), higher levels of ruminative disposition were found to be associated with greater 
attentional bias for negative relative to positive stimuli, specifically for depression relevant 
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stimuli presented for 1000ms. However, in contrast to the findings of Studies One and Two, 
there was no significant difference between rumination groups in attentional disengagement 
bias, either for negative stimuli in general or specifically for depression relevant stimuli 
presented for 1000ms. Instead, this rumination-linked difference in attentional bias was only 
significant for a composite attentional bias consisting of both attentional engagement and 
disengagement bias, although there was also a trend towards a significant between-group 
difference in attentional engagement bias for depression relevant stimuli presented for 
1000ms.  There was also no significant interaction between attentional bias type (i.e., 
engagement vs. disengagement bias) and rumination group for attentional bias for depressive 
stimuli presented for 1000ms. Thus, the rumination-linked attentional bias for depression-
relevant stimuli presented for 1000ms appears to reflect a composite of both facilitated 
engagement with and impaired disengagement from negative stimuli.  
Indeed, although previous research found a significant relationship between 
ruminative disposition and attentional disengagement bias (Studies One & Two), these 
studies also failed to find evidence that the relationship between ruminative disposition and 
attentional bias differed on the basis of attentional engagement or disengagement. Thus, taken 
together these findings begin to suggest that higher levels of ruminative disposition may be 
associated with an attentional bias that involves a combination of both facilitated engagement 
with and impaired disengagement from negative information. 
One limitation which may potentially account for these inconsistencies between 
different studies is the previously observed low reliability of attention probe tasks. Reliability 
refers to the extent to which a measure’s variance reflects true score variance, as opposed to 
measurement error. Low reliability is thus associated with increased error variance and 
reduced statistical power (Kopriva & Shaw, 1991; Waechter & Stolz, 2015), and has been 
demonstrated to result in lower levels of replicability (LeBel & Paunonen, 2011). Previous 
178 
 
studies have consistently reported low internal reliability of multiple different commonly 
used versions of the attention probe task (Schmukle, 2005; Staugaard, 2009; Waechter, 
Nelson, Wright, Hyatt, & Oakman, 2014; Waechter & Stolz, 2015), therefore it is likely that 
this low reliability will also extend to the modified attention probe task used in the present 
studies. As such, this low reliability may account for some effects not being replicated in all 
studies, such that genuine effects are statistically significant in some studies but not others. 
In addition, it is also possible that the findings not replicated in the present study are a 
result of low statistical power, due to small sample size (N = 59). Power analyses conducted 
in G-Power revealed that the present study achieved a power of only .12 to detect small effect 
sizes (ηp² = .01) at the .05 level, and a power of .48 to detect medium effect sizes (ηp² = .06), 
both of which are below the recommended level of .80. The study did, however, achieve a 
power of .86 to detect large effect sizes (ηp² = .14). As a result, larger sample sizes may be 
required to detect all genuine effects, particularly considering the potential low reliability of 
the dot-probe task, although the study was adequately powered to detect larger effect sizes 
such as the consistent relationship observed between rumination and attentional bias at longer 
stimulus presentation.  
Another limitation of response probe assessments of attentional bias is that they can 
only provide a ‘snapshot’ of attention at the time of probe presentation, meaning that we 
cannot know the patterns of attentional distribution before or after probing (Mogg & Bradley, 
2005; Yiend, 2010). This potentially has implications for the sensitivity of attentional bias 
assessments, as any biases in selective attention that occur either before or after probe 
presentation will be missed. In addition, there may be multiple shifts in the allocation of 
attention before probe presentation, particularly at longer stimulus presentation durations 
(Yiend, 2010). This may be particularly problematic for assessment tasks seeking to 
distinguish between biases in the engagement and disengagement of attention, as there could 
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potentially be some degree of cross-contamination between these separate measures. For 
example, if on trials intended to assess attentional engagement with emotional stimuli, there 
is sufficient time for participants to engage with and then disengage attention from initially 
distal stimuli, biases detected by this measure could in part reflect attentional disengagement 
as well as attentional engagement. Such limitations to sensitivity and opportunity for cross-
contamination could potentially explain the lack of a clear difference in the relationship 
between rumination and bias in attentional engagement and disengagement. Further research 
applying eye-tracking to the present attentional bias assessment task may help clarify these 
findings, as the continuous assessment of attention allocation throughout the entire stimulus 
presentation duration can rule out cross-contamination between measures of attentional 
engagement and disengagement, and may increase sensitivity by allowing for any biases in 
selective attention to be detected regardless of when during stimulus presentation that they 
occur. Although Study Three did not find evidence of a relationship between ruminative 
disposition and attentional bias assessed via eye-tracking, methodological differences in the 
attentional bias assessment task (i.e., free-viewing, as opposed to response probe assessment) 
may have accounted for these null findings. 
The present findings do, however, appear to suggest a reliable relationship between 
ruminative disposition and attentional bias specifically for depression relevant stimuli 
presented for 1000ms. Previous research has already suggested that heightened ruminative 
disposition is specifically associated with attentional bias favouring depression relevant, but 
not anxiety relevant negative stimuli (Joormann et al., 2006; Study Two), and for stimuli 
presented for 1000ms, but not 500ms (Donaldson et al., 2007; Study Two), and these findings 
were replicated in the present study.  
One unexpected finding in the present study was that higher levels of ruminative 
disposition were also found to be associated with reduced attentional bias for anxiety relevant 
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negative stimuli presented for 1000ms, as previous research has typically found that 
heightened ruminative disposition is associated with greater attentional bias for negative 
information. However, similar findings have also been observed in research investigating 
attentional bias in anxiety. Although anxious individuals exhibit an attentional bias towards 
threat at shorter stimulus presentation durations, they also demonstrate a reduced attentional 
bias for threat stimuli at longer presentation durations (e.g., Koster, Crombez, Verschuere, 
Van Damme, & Wiersema, 2006; Koster, Verschuere, Crombez, & Van Damme, 2005; 
Mogg, Bradley, Miles, & Dixon, 2004), suggesting that heightened anxiety is associated with 
initial vigilance for threatening stimuli, followed by subsequent avoidance. It has been 
suggested that emotion regulation strategies may underlie this attentional avoidance of 
threatening information in anxiety (Cisler & Koster, 2010). Thus, one possible explanation 
for the present findings may be that individuals with high levels of ruminative disposition 
demonstrate strategic avoidance of threatening information, similar to individuals with 
elevated anxiety.  
Some researchers have suggested that evidence of attentional biases specifically at 
longer stimulus exposure durations may indicate more strategic rather than automatic 
processing, as strategic processes are more likely to be evident when processing time is 
extended (McNally, 1995; Mogg & Bradley, 2005).  Thus, the present findings are consistent 
with the proposal that heightened ruminative disposition is associated with a bias in the 
operation of controlled attentional processing. However, it is important to note that 500ms 
exposure duration is sufficient to enable the operation of strategic processes, although to a 
lesser extent than would be possible at longer durations (Holender, 1986; Mogg, Bradley, & 
Williams, 1995). It is possible that the restriction of rumination-linked attentional biases to 
1000ms stimulus exposure duration could simply be attributed to the time taken for 
attentional engagement or disengagement to take place, rather than to the strategic nature of 
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this bias. Thus, further research will be required to determine whether rumination-linked 
attentional biases involve strategic or automatic processes. One possibility for future research 
may involve participants completing a variant of the current attentional bias assessment task, 
in which some trials will require participants to process a secondary load in order to disrupt 
strategic processing (Sternberg, 1966; van Dillen, Papies, & Hofmann, 2012). If rumination-
linked attentional biases for negative information do reflect strategic processing, then 
evidence of this bias would be attenuated under secondary load conditions. 
The present study also investigated rumination-linked deficits in attentional control. 
Previous research has already demonstrated a relationship between ruminative disposition 
and attentional control (e.g., De Lissnyder et al., 2011; De Lissnyder et al., 2010; Whitmer & 
Banich, 2007), but not addressed whether this is causally associated with rumination-linked 
attentional biases for negative information, or contributes separately to higher levels of 
ruminative disposition. In the present study we assessed attentional control using a response-
probe version of the antisaccade task, which was designed to closely match our attentional 
bias assessment task. Contrary to previous findings, there were no differences between 
rumination groups in attentional control. However, unusual response latencies cast some 
doubt over the validity the present antisaccade task as a method of measuring attentional 
control. It is well established that participants are typically slower to direct attention towards 
stimuli on antisaccade than on prosaccade trials, assumedly because on antisaccade trials they 
must inhibit the automatic saccade in the direction of the stimulus (Hutton & Ettinger, 2006; 
Munoz & Everling, 2004). However, in the present study, participants were slower to identify 
probes on prosaccade than on antisaccade trials. This response pattern was highly reliable 
within the present study, which strongly contradicts previous research on the antisaccade 
task. The precise explanation for this result is unclear, although previous research has 
successfully used a response probe version of the antisaccade task to investigate attentional 
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control in anxiety (Basanovic & Grafton, in prep), suggesting that the problem is not inherent 
to response probe variants of the antisaccade task. Instead, whereas the antisaccade task in the 
present study used letter string stimuli, the antisaccade task used by Basanovic and Grafton 
(in prep) used pictorial shape stimuli, indicating that the problem may be related to the use of 
letter strings. In the absence of a clear explanation, the atypical pattern of response latencies 
means that we cannot be sure of the validity of the present antisaccade task as a measure of 
attentional control. As such, further research using a more clearly valid measure of attentional 
control will be necessary to adequately investigate the relationship between rumination-
linked deficits in attentional control and biased attentional processing of negative 
information. 
 In summary, the present findings provide reliable support for the relationship 
between higher levels of ruminative disposition and greater attentional bias for negative 
relative to positive information, specifically for depression relevant stimuli presented for 
1000ms. The present findings also suggest that this rumination-linked attentional bias may 
involve facilitated engagement with negative information as well as impaired disengagement 
from negative information. However, due to the limitations of response probe assessments of 
attentional bias, further research assessing attentional bias using both response latencies and 
more direct measures of attentional distribution, such as eye-tracking, will be necessary to 
better clarify the potential distinction between bias in attentional engagement and 
disengagement. In addition, higher levels of ruminative disposition were found to be 
associated with reduced attentional bias for anxiety relevant stimuli presented for 1000ms, 
indicating that heightened levels of rumination may also be associated with strategic 
avoidance of threat. The nature of the relationship between rumination-linked attentional 
biases and deficits in attentional control also requires further investigation. 
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CHAPTER SIX: Study Five 
 
6.1 Introduction 
Previous research has indicated that higher levels of ruminative disposition are 
associated with an attentional bias for negative relative to non-negative stimuli (Donaldson, 
Lam, & Mathews, 2007; Joormann, Dkane, & Gotlib, 2006; Pe, Vandekerckhove, & 
Kuppens, 2013). According to the impaired disengagement hypothesis put forward by Koster, 
De Lissnyder, Derakshan, and De Raedt (2011), higher levels of ruminative disposition may 
particularly be associated with impaired disengagement of attention from negative 
information. Studies One, Two, and Four addressed this hypothesis, by using a modified dot-
probe task to distinguish between biases in attentional engagement and disengagement of 
attention. Findings from Studies One and Two supported the impaired disengagement 
hypothesis by demonstrating that higher levels of ruminative disposition were associated with 
slower disengagement from negative relative to positive stimuli. However, the strength of the 
relationships between ruminative disposition and both engagement and disengagement bias 
did not significantly differ from each other. Furthermore, Study Four did not find a 
significant relationship between ruminative disposition and attentional disengagement bias, 
but did find that ruminative disposition was associated with a composite index of both 
attentional engagement and disengagement bias. Thus, ruminative tendencies may be 
associated with both greater engagement with and impaired disengagement from negative 
information.  
So far research investigating the relationship between rumination and selective 
attention has primarily involved correlational studies. Thus, it is not yet possible to draw firm 
conclusions about the causal relationship. Koster et al’s (2011) disengagement hypothesis 
suggests that impaired disengagement of attention from negative information is an underlying 
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process contributing to greater tendency to ruminate. However, an equally persuasive case 
has been made that rumination may causally influence biased attentional processing of 
negative information. According to Nolen-Hoeksema’s (1991) response style theory, 
rumination exacerbates the effects of negative mood on information processing biases, as 
focusing on negative feelings heightens the accessibility of negative information (Nolen-
Hoeksema, 1991; Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco, & Lyubomirsky, 2008). If individuals habitually 
ruminate during negative mood states, as would be the case for those with high levels of 
ruminative disposition, such information processing biases could become increasingly 
ingrained and pervasive. Thus, the previously observed relationship between ruminative 
disposition and attentional bias for negative information could be at least partly explained by 
the effects of rumination on cognitive processing biases. 
Previous research has supported the causal influence of rumination on negative biases 
in a number of aspects of cognition. Typically, rumination has been induced by instructing 
participants to focus on current feelings during negative mood states (Nolen-Hoeksema & 
Morrow, 1993). Using this rumination induction, induced ruminative self-focus on negative 
mood relative to distraction has been found to be associated with more negative 
interpretations (Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1995), increased negative future thinking 
and pessimism about future events (Lavender & Watkins 2004; Lyubomirsky & Nolen-
Hoeksema, 1995), and greater negative autobiographical memory recall (Lyubomirsky, 
Caldwell, & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1998). Thus, rumination does appear to have a causal 
influence on some aspects of cognitive processing biases in favour of negative information. 
A couple of studies have also investigated the effects of induced rumination on 
attentional bias for negative information, but findings have been inconsistent. In a sample of 
healthy participants, Morrison and O’Connor (2008) utilised Nolen-Hoeksema and Morrow’s 
(1993) rumination induction procedure combined with a negative mood induction, followed 
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by assessment of attentional bias using a standard dot-probe task. Participants who ruminated 
on negative mood demonstrated an increase in attentional bias for negative relative to 
positive word stimuli, whereas participants who were distracted from negative mood showed 
a decrease in attentional bias for negative relative to positive word stimuli. In contrast, 
Donaldson et al. (2007) used the same rumination induction procedure in currently depressed 
participants, followed by assessment of attentional bias using a similar dot-probe task, but did 
not find any effect of either induced rumination or distraction on attentional bias for negative 
word stimuli. Thus, further investigation of the causal effects of rumination on attentional 
biases for negative information is required. 
One limitation of rumination inductions used in previous studies, which may have 
contributed to inconsistent results, is that they specifically involve instructing participants to 
focus on existing mood states. Thus, these inductions require voluntary and deliberate 
attempts at rumination, which may not be a particularly ecologically valid representation of 
real-world rumination, which often occurs involuntarily. In addition, since such induced 
rumination requires deliberate focus on negative mood, rumination may not persist once 
participants are given another task, which may act as a form of distraction, such as the 
response probe paradigms commonly used to assess attentional bias. Furthermore, in non-
depressed samples, negative mood must be separately induced prior to rumination, which 
may vary in effectiveness and persistence, thus increasing the risk that rumination will not 
persevere throughout any subsequent attentional assessment tasks.  
An alternative approach to inducing rumination, which may be more robust to 
distraction from attentional assessment tasks, is the unresolved goal cueing paradigm 
(Roberts, Watkins, & Wills, 2013). According to control theory, rumination is triggered by 
and primarily involves thoughts revolving around ideal-actual goal-discrepancies (Martin & 
Tesser, 1996; Watkins, 2008). That is, when individuals detect a discrepancy between ideal 
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levels of progress towards a valued goal and actual progress made, this will instigate 
rumination focused around this discrepancy. Consistent with this account, cuing of an 
unresolved goal by instructing participants to identify a problem or difficulty that had 
recently be causing them to feel stressed has been found to result in persistent rumination 
about this identified problem (Roberts et al., 2013), relative to cueing of a resolved goal. 
Such rumination occurs involuntarily, and appears to be persistent even throughout prolonged 
cognitive tasks (Roberts et al., 2013). In contrast, cueing of a resolved goal by instructing 
participants to identify a recent success or achievement does not result in persistent 
rumination, and thus provides a robust experimental control. This goal-cueing approach can 
be combined with Nolen-Hoeksema and Morrow’s (1993) instructed rumination procedure, 
by specifically instructing participants to spend a period of time focusing on their feelings in 
relation to their identified goal. In this study, the manipulation of goal-cueing (resolved 
versus unresolved) was paired with instructions to repetitively focus on the failure versus on 
the success, so as to maximise the difference between the experimental conditions, i.e., to 
compare a positive rumination condition versus a negative rumination condition, rather than a 
ruminative condition versus a non-ruminative condition. It was hypothesised that the two 
ruminative conditions would have contrasting effects on attentional bias. 
Another interesting question yet to be investigated is whether the effects of 
rumination on attentional biases might interact with ruminative disposition. According to the 
attentional scope model of rumination (Whitmer & Gotlib, 2013), individuals with 
heightened levels of ruminative disposition demonstrate a more narrowed attentional scope, 
such that attentional processing is generally more constricted and less flexible. Individuals 
with a more narrowed attentional scope will find it more difficult to direct their attention 
away from mood-congruent information, thus exacerbating mood-congruent effects of 
negative mood on attentional bias in individuals with heightened ruminative disposition. 
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Similarly, to the extent that rumination results in valence-congruent attentional bias, it 
follows that this narrowed attentional scope may also exacerbate the effects of rumination on 
attentional bias in individuals with heightened levels of ruminative disposition relative to 
individuals with lower levels of ruminative disposition. Thus, individuals with higher levels 
of ruminative disposition may also demonstrate greater attentional bias for negative relative 
to positive stimuli in response to negative rumination triggered by focus on unresolved goals, 
relative to resolved goals. 
The aim of the present study was to investigate the causal effect of rumination on 
attentional bias. Rumination was induced using an unresolved goal cueing paradigm known 
to produce robust and durable rumination (Roberts et al., 2013), which involved instructing 
participants to focus on their feelings in relation to either a problem/difficulty (i.e., 
unresolved goal; negative rumination condition) or success/achievement (i.e., resolved goal; 
positive basking condition). Attentional bias was then assessed using a version of the 
modified dot-probe task introduced by Grafton, Watkins, and MacLeod (2012) to assess 
attentional engagement and disengagement bias. It was hypothesised that the rumination 
inductions would have valence-congruent effects on attentional bias, such that attention 
would be more biased towards negative relative to positive stimuli in the negative rumination 
condition, in comparison to the positive basking condition. 
 The hypothesis that the effects of the rumination inductions on attentional bias would 
be moderated by ruminative disposition was also investigated. One possibility was that higher 
levels of ruminative disposition would be more strongly associated with greater valence-
congruency bias, reflected in greater attentional bias for negative relative to positive stimuli 
in the negative compared to the positive rumination condition. Alternatively, effects of the 
rumination inductions on attentional bias would not differ depending on ruminative 
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disposition, meaning that the relationship between ruminative disposition and attentional bias 
would not differ between rumination induction conditions. 
Consistent with previous studies, the possibility that effects were moderated by bias 
type (engagement vs. disengagement), stimulus domain (depression relevant vs. anxiety 
relevant) or exposure duration (500ms vs. 1000ms) was also investigated.  
6.2 Method 
6.2.1 Participants 
Participants were 78 students (16 male, 62 female; mean age = 18.9) from the 
University of Exeter, recruited from the psychology department or via a database of 
individuals who wished to be informed of opportunities to participate in research in the 
department. All participants spoke English as a first language. Participants received either 
course credits (first year psychology undergraduates) or payment for their time.  
Participants were screened for depressive symptoms at the beginning of the study 
using the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI-II; Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996). Given that the 
study employed a rumination induction expected to induce a negative mood state, for ethical 
reasons, individuals who scored 20 or above on the BDI, reflecting the standard cut-off for 
moderate levels of depression (Beck et al., 1996), were required to be excluded from 
participation in the study by our institutional review board. One participant (BDI-II = 24) was 
excluded on this basis, and did not complete the remainder of the experiment. 
 Participants were randomly allocated to either the positive or negative rumination 
condition (39 positive basking, 39 negative rumination). 
6.2.2 Questionnaire Measures 
BDI-II (Beck et al., 1996). The BDI-II is a 21-item self-report measure designed to 
assess the severity of depressive symptoms. Participants indicate on a 4-point scale how 
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much they have experienced depressive symptoms over the past two weeks. We used a 20-
item version of the BDI-II, with the item about suicidal feelings or ideation removed at the 
request of our institutional review board. Higher scores represent greater severity of 
depressive symptoms. This measure has shown good reliability and validity (Beck et al., 
1996). 
 RRS (Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991). The Ruminative Responses Scale (RRS; 
Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991) was employed as our measure of ruminative disposition. 
The RRS is a 22-item self-report measure, which requires participants to indicate the degree 
to which they engage in particular ruminative responses when in a negative mood on a 4-
point Likert scale (1 = Almost Never, 4 = Almost Always). This questionnaire yields two 
subscales: ruminative brooding and ruminative reflection. Both of these subscales show 
acceptable reliability and consistency (Treynor et al., 2003). In each case, a higher score 
indicates a greater tendency to engage in rumination in response to negative mood. 
 Mood ratings. Two visual analogue mood rating scales, each 100mm in length, were 
used to assess momentary levels of sadness and anxiety. The scale for measuring sadness was 
labelled ‘sad’ at one end and ‘happy’ at the other, whilst the scale for anxiety was labelled 
‘anxious’ at one end and ‘confident’ at the other. Participants indicated their current mood by 
placing a cross (x) on each scale. Mood was measured with a millimetre ruler according to 
the position of the cross placed on each scale, with scores ranging from 0 (happy or 
confident) to 100 (sad or anxious), with higher scores indicating more negative mood. 
6.2.3 Rumination Induction 
 Consistent with theories suggesting that rumination is triggered by and involves 
thoughts focused on goal discrepancies (Martin & Tesser, 1996), rumination was induced 
using a modified goal cuing paradigm (Roberts et al., 2013). The modified goal cuing 
paradigm consistent of two parts; first a goal identification procedure, then a period of 
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ruminative thought. For the goal identification procedure, participants were instructed to 
identify an ongoing personally relevant goal. In the negative rumination condition, 
participants were instructed to identify a problem or difficulty (i.e., unresolved goal), whereas 
in the positive basking condition participants were instructed to identify a success or 
achievement (i.e., resolved goal). The period of ruminative thought was based on Nolen-
Hoeksema and Morrow’s (1993) rumination induction, where participants are instructed to 
focus on current feelings using a list of ruminative statements. However, in the present study 
participants used the same ruminative statements to focus on their feelings in relation to their 
previously identified goal.  
Goal identification. All participants were asked to identify a recent or ongoing goal 
that was personally important to them. Participants in the negative rumination condition were 
instructed that this should be a goal that they had recently failed to accomplish or relating to 
an area of their life that they did not feel was going well (i.e., a problem or difficulty), and 
that had been causing them to feel negative, sad, down or stressed over the past week. In 
contrast, participants in the positive basking condition were instructed that this should be a 
goal that they had recently accomplished or relating to an area of their life that they felt was 
going well (i.e., a success or achievement), and that had been causing them to feel positive, 
happy or fulfilled over the past week. Participants were also given some examples of suitable 
goals.  
Once participants confirmed that they had thought of a suitable goal, they were asked 
to write down a brief outline of goal. They were also asked to rate their identified goal on 10-
point Likert scales; how much they had been thinking about the goal over the past week (1 = 
‘Not at all, 10 = ‘Very often’), how important the goal was to them (1 = ‘Not at all’, 10 = 
‘Very’), how negative they had been feeling about the goal over the past week (1 = ‘Not at all 
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negative’, 10 = ‘Extremely negative’), and how positive they had been feeling about the goal 
over the past week (1 = ‘Not at all positive’, 10 = ‘Extremely positive’). 
Ruminative thought. Participants were instructed to spend 8-minutes focusing on the 
previously identified goal, how it made them feel, and on the meanings and implications of 
the goal. Participants were given a list of items from Nolen-Hoeksema and Morrow’s (1993) 
rumination induction procedure, which focus attention on emotions and self (e.g., ‘Think 
about why you react the way you do’), and asked to focus on each of the items in relation to 
their identified goal. Nolen-Hoeksema and Morrow’s original induction contains 45 items, 
but 15 items were removed for the current study, as it was deemed that they would not be 
appropriate in the context of focusing on goals rather than current feelings, such as items 
involving physical sensations (e.g., possible explanation for your physical sensations) or 
which might only relate to specific goals (e.g. how you feel about your friendships). They 
were instructed to read each item slowly and silently to themselves, and spend a few 
moments concentrating on each of the ideas in relation to the goal. The researcher explained 
the instructions for the rumination task verbally, then left the room for 8-minutes whilst the 
participants completed the task. 
Manipulation checks. Following the rumination task, participants were asked to rate 
their thoughts about their identified goal during the 8-mintues on 10-point Likert scales; how 
much they were thinking about the goal (1 = ‘Not at all’, 10 = ‘The whole time’), how 
negative their thoughts about the goal were (1 = ‘Not at all negative’, 10 = ‘Extremely 
negative’), and how positive their thoughts about the goal were (1 = ‘Not at all positive’, 10 = 
‘Extremely positive’). Then, following the attentional bias assessment task (see below) 
participants were asked to rate their thoughts an mood during the attention task on further 10-
point Likert scales; the extent to which they continued thinking about their identified goal (1 
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= ‘Not at all’, 10 = ‘The whole time’), and the extent to which thinking about the identified 
goal continued to influence their mood (1 = ‘Not at all’, 10 = ‘The whole time). 
6.2.4 Attentional Bias Assessment 
Apparatus. A 22-inch computer monitor and a standard two-button mouse were used 
to present stimuli and record participant responses. 
Experimental stimuli. In the present study, we required 64 word pairs each 
comprising an emotional word, either negative or positive in emotional tone, and a length 
matched neutral word (see Appendix Two). The emotional word stimuli were taken from 
Grafton et al. (2012). These words had been selected from a pool of 400 candidate words on 
the basis of emotional tone ratings provided by clinical psychologists. Emotional words were 
also rated on the basis of their emotional domain relevance and included a mix of both 
depression relevant (sad/happy) and anxiety relevant (anxious/relaxed) words, giving rise to 
the within-subjects stimulus domain factor. The set of negative words, and the set of positive 
words, did not differ in terms of word length, frequency, or arousal (all p’s > .05). Each 
emotional word was paired with a neutral word that was matched for word length and 
frequency. 
Attentional bias assessment task. Each trial began with the appearance of an upper 
and lower string of asterisks, indicating the two critical screen regions, centralised 
horizontally on the computer screen and separated by a distance of 3cm. Between the 
asterisks was a row of arrows, all pointing to the upper string, or all pointing to the lower 
string, with equal frequency. The arrows directed the participant which of the two screen 
regions to initially fixate attention upon. After one second, the screen was cleared, and an 
anchor probe was briefly presented (150ms) in this attended region. This anchor probe was a 
small (2mm) red line sloping upwards 45° to either the left or right, with equal frequency. 
Immediately thereafter, a word pair was presented, with one word appearing in each of the 
193 
 
two critical screen regions. On half the trials the emotional member of the word pair appeared 
distal to the initially attended region (permitting the assessment of the biased attentional 
engagement with negative information), and on the remaining half of the trials the emotional 
member of the word pair appeared proximal to the initially attended region (permitting the 
assessment of biased attentional disengagement with negative information). The word pair 
was displayed for either 500ms or 1000ms, with equal frequency, giving rise to the within-
subjects exposure duration factor. A target probe stimulus then appeared in either of the two 
critical regions, with equal frequency. The target probe stimulus was again a small (2mm) red 
line sloping upwards 45° to either the left or right. Participants were required to indicate 
whether the slope direction of this target probe stimulus matched that of the anchor probe, 
which was the case on 50% of trials. Participants responded by pressing either the right or left 
mouse buttons, to indicate a match and a non-match, respectively. The latency, and accuracy, 
to make this discrimination response was recorded. Upon detection of the participant’s 
response the screen was cleared, and the next trial began after a 1000ms inter-trial interval. 
This sequence of events is summarized in the example trials shown in Figure 2.1 (see Chapter 
Two). 
The task consisted of 256 trials in total, split into two equal blocks of 128 trials, with 
a 30 second break in between. Across the task, each of the 64 word pairs was presented four 
times in a random order, with the constraint that each pair was presented once before any 
were presented a second  time, and each was repeated once before any were displayed for a 
third time, and so on. 
Calculating bias indices. In this task, selective attention to the emotional word 
members of the word pairs is revealed by relative speeding to make discrimination responses 
to target probes appearing in the locus of emotional words compared to target probes 
appearing in the locus of neutral words. Thus, an index of attentional bias to negative 
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information relative to positive information can be computed by expressing the degree to 
which this relative speeding to discriminate probes in the locus of emotional words compared 
to probes appearing in the locus of neutral words, is greater when this word was negative, 
rather than positive, in emotional tone. This index of negative attentional bias can be 
expressed as follows: 
Negative Attentional Bias Index = (RT to target probes opposite negative word loci - 
RT to target probes in negative word loci) - (RT to target probes opposite positive word loci - 
RT to target probes in positive word loci) 
Of most importance, the current task permits us to compute this negative attentional 
bias index under two conditions, in order to separately index facilitated attentional 
engagement with, and impaired attentional disengagement from, negative information. 
Specifically, an Engagement Bias Index can be computed by using the RT data from trials on 
which the emotional member of the word pair appeared distal to initial attentional focus (i.e. 
from trials on the anchor probe appeared in the locus of the neutral word). Higher scores on 
this engagement bias index indicate that attention was captured to a greater degree by this 
distal information when it was negative rather than positive in emotional tone. A 
Disengagement Bias Index can be computed by using the RT data from trials on which the 
emotional member of the word pair appeared proximal to initial attentional focus (i.e. from 
trials on the anchor probe appeared in the locus of the emotional word). Higher scores on this 
disengagement bias index indicate that attention was held to a greater degree by this proximal 
emotional information when it was negative rather than positive in emotional tone.  
Probe discrimination latencies can only indicate attentional distribution if the response 
is made accurately, hence only RTs from accurate responses were used, and we eliminated 
any participant with an overall accuracy score that was atypically low using a 95% 
confidence interval. Following the approach adopted in prior research (Rutherford, MacLeod, 
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& Campbell, 2004; Ratcliff, 1993), we used participants’ median RT under each condition in 
these computations, to minimise the influence of outlying RTs.  
6.2.5 Procedure 
Prior to starting the experiment, participants were given the rationale that the study 
was investigating the links between personality, goals, and cognitive abilities, and given basic 
descriptions of the tasks they would be completing. Participants then completed the BDI-II 
and RRS self-report measures. They were then given written instructions for the attentional 
bias assessment task, and completed a practice task consisting of 16 trials using only neutral 
stimuli. Participants then completed their first mood ratings using visual analogue scales, to 
provide a baseline measure of mood prior to the rumination induction. They then completed 
the goal identification procedure, immediately followed by further mood ratings. They then 
completed the rumination task, followed by another set of mood ratings and the first set of 
manipulation checks. Participants then immediately completed the full attentional bias 
assessment task, followed by the final set of manipulation checks.  
6.3 Results 
Two participants who displayed atypically low accuracy on the attention probe task 
(using 95% confidence interval) were removed prior to analysis. The remaining participants 
displayed a high level of accuracy on the attention probe task, averaging less than 10% errors. 
There was no association between accuracy on the attentional bias assessment task and 
ruminative disposition (full RRS, brooding, and reflection; all p’s > .10), or difference in 
accuracy between rumination conditions, t (74) = 0.22, p = .824. There were also no 
differences between rumination conditions in gender, age, depressive symptoms or 
ruminative disposition (all p’s > .30; see Table 6.1 for descriptive and test statistics). 
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Table 6.1. Gender frequencies and mean participant age, BDI-II, RRS, brooding and 
reflection in each rumination condition (SDs in parentheses), along with tests of between-
group differences. 
 Positive Basking 
(N = 38) 
Negative Rumination 
(N = 38) 
Statistics 
Gender 9 male, 29 female 7 male, 31 female χ² = 0.32, p = .574 
Age 18.92 (1.82) 18.84 (1.13) t ( 74) = 0.23, p = .821 
BDI-II 5.87 (4.50) 5.16 (4.16) t (74) = 0.72, p = .477 
RRS 45.08 (13.17) 43.42 (9.24) t (74) = 0.64, p = .527 
Brooding 10.84 (4.03) 10.11 (2.92) t (74) = 0.91, p = .364 
Reflection 10.97 (3.69) 10.16 (3.30) t (74) = 1.02, p = .313 
Note: BDI-II = Beck Depression Inventory II, RRS = Ruminative Responses Scale 
 
6.3.1 Between Group Differences in Goal Characteristics, Goal Thoughts, and Mood 
Self-report ratings of goal characteristics and thoughts during the inductions were 
used as manipulation checks to assess the suitability of the rumination inductions. There were 
no differences between the rumination conditions in self-reported thought about the goal 
during the past week, goal importance, thought about the goal during the induction, thought 
about the goal during the attention probe task, or influence of the goal on mood during the 
attention task (all p’s > .30; see Table 6.2 for descriptive and test statistics). Thus, the 
rumination conditions were not confounded by differences in goal characteristics or extent of 
prior rumination about the goal.  Yet, as intended, there were highly significant differences 
between the rumination conditions in negative feelings about the goal over the past week, 
positive feelings about the goal over the past week, thought negativity during the induction, 
and thought positivity during the induction (all p’s < .001; see Table 6.2 for descriptive and 
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test statistics). Thus, the rumination conditions differed sufficiently in both goal and thought 
valence in the intended direction. 
 
Table 6.2. Mean goal characteristics and thought ratings in each rumination condition (SDs in 
parentheses), along with tests of between-group differences. 
 Positive Basking 
(N = 38) 
Negative Rumination 
(N = 38) 
Statistics 
Thought past week 7.58 (1.59) 7.34 (1.36) t (74) = 0.70, p = .487 
Importance 8.55 (1.16) 8.26 (1.70) t (74) = 0.87, p = .389 
Negative feelings 
past week 
2.74 (1.48) 6.58 (1.29) t (74) = 12.06, p < .001 
Positive feelings past 
week 
7.74 (1.31) 3.53 (1.37) t (74) = 13.70, p < .001 
Thought during 
induction 
7.26 (1.70) 7.50 (1.31) t (74) = 0.68, p = .499 
Thought negativity   
during induction 
3.47 (1.83) 6.29 (1.77) t (74) = 6.83, p < .001 
Thought positivity 
during induction 
7.66 (1.24) 4.24 (1.85) t (74) = 9.47, p < .001 
Thought during 
attention probe 
2.76 (1.97) 2.68 (1.61) t (74) = 0.19, p = .849 
Influence on mood 
during attention 
probe 
3.58 (2.38) 3.26 (2.00) t (74) = 0.63, p = .533 
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Effects of the rumination induction procedures on self-reported mood were also 
analysed. Two-way mixed-design ANOVAs were conducted with rumination condition 
(positive basking, negative rumination) as the between-subjects factor, time (baseline, post-
goal identification,  post-rumination induction, post-attention probe task) as the within-
subjects factor, and sadness and anxiety as the dependent variables in each analysis. There 
was a highly significant rumination condition by time interaction for both sadness and 
anxiety (F (3, 222) = 27.36, p < .001, ηp² = .27 for sadness; F (3, 222) = 17.45, p < .001, ηp² = 
.19 for anxiety), indicating that the rumination conditions differentially influenced mood 
throughout the experimental session. Pair-wise contrasts comparing mood ratings at baseline 
with each subsequent time point individually all found significant rumination condition by 
time interactions (all p’s < .05). Subsequent between-subjects t-tests comparing mood ratings 
at each time point confirmed that there were highly significant differences between 
conditions in both sadness and anxiety at all time points except baseline (see Table 6.3 for 
descriptive and test statistics), such that participants in the negative rumination condition 
reported higher levels of sadness and anxiety post-baseline than participants in the positive 
rumination condition. Thus, there is evidence of discrepant effects of the rumination 
inductions on self-reported mood, which were maintained throughout the attention task, 
confirming that the inductions were successful. 
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Table 6.3. Mean sadness and anxiety ratings at different time points in each rumination 
condition (SDs in parentheses), along with tests of between-group differences. 
 Positive 
Basking 
(N = 38) 
Negative 
Rumination 
 (N = 38) 
Statistics 
Baseline    
     Sadness 26.74 (17.08) 31.00 (15.58) t (74) = 1.14, p = .259 
     Anxiety 35.76 (14.76) 39.54 (14.50) t (74) = 1.07, p = .290 
Post-goal identification    
     Sadness 21.95 (13.84) 46.47 (14.93) t (74) = 7.43, p < .001 
     Anxiety 28.42 (15.54) 50.47 (17.26) t (74) = 5.86, p < .001 
Post-rumination induction    
     Sadness 25.34 (16.55) 51.02 (17.45) t (74) = 6.58, p < .001 
     Anxiety 30.34 (15.68) 52.45 (18.01) t (74) = 5.71, p < .001 
Post-attention probe    
     Sadness 30.24 (15.43) 40.74 (12.72) t (74) = 3.24, p = .002 
     Anxiety 32.21 (12.52) 43.37 (12.31) t (74) = 3.92, p < .001 
 
 
6.3.2 Between Group Differences in Attentional Bias 
 In order to investigate between group differences in attentional bias, a four-way 
mixed-design ANOVA was conducted with rumination condition (positive basking, negative 
rumination) as the between-subjects factor, bias type (engagement bias, disengagement bias), 
stimulus domain (depression relevant words, anxiety relevant words), and exposure duration 
(500ms, 1000ms) as within-subjects factors, and attentional bias as the dependent variable. 
There was no significant main-effect of rumination condition, F (1, 74) = 0.53, p = .468, ηp² = 
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.01, indicating that there was no difference between rumination conditions in overall 
attentional bias (see Table 6.4 for means). There was also no significant interaction between 
rumination condition and bias type, F (1, 74) = 0.23, p = .634, ηp² = .00, and subsequent one-
way between-subjects ANOVAs confirmed that there were no significant differences between 
rumination conditions in either engagement or disengagement bias (F (1, 74) = 0.87, p = 
.355, ηp² = .01, for engagement bias; F (1, 74) = 0.01, p = .939, ηp² = .00 for disengagement 
bias; see Table 6.4 for means). There were also no other higher-order interactions between 
rumination condition and any of the within-subjects factors (all p’s > .20), indicating that the 
main-effect of rumination condition did not differ depending on bias type, stimulus domain or 
exposure duration. Thus, there was no evidence of any general effects of the rumination 
inductions on attentional bias. 
 
Table 6.4. Mean engagement bias, disengagement bias, and overall attentional bias in each 
rumination condition (SDs in parentheses). 
 Positive Basking (N = 38) Negative Rumination (N = 38) 
Overall Attentional Bias -1.14 (71.0) -14.24 (84.8) 
Engagement Bias -0.73 (122.4) -24.51 (98.8) 
Disengagement Bias -1.56 (135.4) -3.97 (138.8) 
 
6.3.3 Moderating Effect of Ruminative Disposition 
 In order to investigate whether the effect of the rumination inductions was moderated 
by ruminative disposition, ruminative disposition (RRS scores) was added as a covariate to 
the four-way ANOVA used to investigate between-group differences in attentional bias (see 
above). The interaction between ruminative disposition and rumination condition was 
included as an additional between-subjects factor. There was a trend towards a significant 
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interaction between ruminative disposition and rumination condition, F (1, 72) = 3.56, p = 
.063, ηp² = .05, indicating that the effects of the rumination inductions on attentional bias 
might be moderated by ruminative disposition.  Examining Figure 6.1, contrary to 
hypotheses, individuals with low levels of ruminative disposition demonstrated a bias 
towards valence-incongruent stimuli, such that individuals in the positive basking condition 
demonstrated greater bias for negative relative to positive stimuli compared to individuals in 
the negative rumination condition. In contrast, as levels of ruminative disposition increased to 
high levels, there was a shift to a bias towards valence-congruent stimuli, such that 
individuals in the positive basking condition demonstrated greater bias for positive relative to 
negative stimuli compared to individuals in the negative rumination condition.   
 
Figure 6.1 Mean attentional negativity bias in each rumination condition for high compared 
to low ruminators (+/- 1 SD). 
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Bivariate correlations were then conducted to investigate the relationship between 
ruminative disposition and attentional bias in each rumination condition separately. There 
was a highly significant correlation between ruminative disposition and attentional bias in the 
positive basking condition, with higher ruminative disposition associated with reduced bias 
for negative relative to positive stimuli, r (38) = -.43, p = .007, but no significant relationship 
between ruminative disposition and attentional bias in the negative rumination condition, r 
(38) = .09, p = .608 (see Figure 6.2 for plots). 
 
 
Figure 6.2. Graph showing correlation between ruminative disposition (RRS) and attentional 
bias in each rumination condition. 
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disengagement bias. Similarly, there were also no interactions between ruminative disposition 
and bias type within either of the rumination conditions (F (1, 36) = 0.09, p = .762, ηp² = .00 
in the positive basking condition; F (1, 36) = .00, p = .987, ηp² = .00 in the negative 
rumination condition), indicating that the relationship between ruminative disposition and 
attentional bias in each condition was not moderated by bias type (see Table 6.5 for bivariate 
correlations).  
 
Table 6.5. Bivariate correlations between ruminative disposition (RRS, brooding and 
reflection) and attentional biases in each rumination condition. 
 Positive Basking  
(N = 38) 
Negative Rumination  
(N = 38) 
RRS   
     Overall Attentional Bias r = -.43, p = .007 r = .09, p = .608 
     Engagement Bias r = -.21, p = .215 r = .07, p = .670 
     Disengagement Bias r = -.27, p = .105 r = .05, p = .747 
Brooding   
     Overall Attentional Bias r = -.41, p = .010 r = -.17, p = .303 
     Engagement Bias r = -.17, p = .299 r = .00, p = .998 
     Disengagement Bias r = -.28, p = .095 r = -.21, p = .207 
Reflection   
     Overall Attentional Bias r = -.47, p = .003 r = .12, p = .463 
     Engagement Bias r = -.21, p = .199 r = -.04, p = .828 
     Disengagement Bias r = -.30, p = .069 r = .18, p = .291 
Note: RRS = Ruminative Responses Scale 
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There were also no other higher-order interactions between ruminative disposition, 
rumination condition and any of the within-subjects factors (all p’s > .30), indicating that the 
moderating effect of ruminative disposition was also not further moderated by stimulus 
domain or exposure duration. 
Similar analyses were also conducting using brooding and reflection as covariates 
instead of the full RRS. Both brooding and reflection were found to be strongly associated 
with attentional bias in the positive basking condition, with higher rumination associated with 
reduced bias for negative relative to positive stimuli in each case (r (38) = -.41, p = .010 for 
brooding; r (38) = -.47, p = .003 for reflection), but no significant relationships were found in 
the negative rumination condition (both p’s > .30). However, although there was a significant 
interaction between rumination condition and reflection, F (1, 72) = 5.84, p = .018, ηp² = .08, 
there was no interaction between rumination condition and brooding, F (1, 72) = 0.18, p = 
.669, ηp² = .00, indicating that the effects of the ruminations inductions was not moderated by 
brooding. Thus, although there was only a significant relationship between brooding and 
attentional bias in the positive basking condition, higher brooding may have been associated 
with reduced bias for negative relative to positive stimuli in both rumination conditions. 
There were no higher-order interactions between either brooding or reflection, rumination 
condition and any of the within-subjects factors (all p’s > .10), indicating that the moderating 
effects of brooding and reflection were not further moderated by bias type, stimulus domain 
or exposure duration (see Table 6.5 for bivariate correlations with engagement and 
disengagement biases). 
6.4 Discussion 
The aim of the present study was to investigate the causal effect of induced 
rumination on attentional bias for negative information. It was hypothesised that negative 
rumination would result in greater attentional bias for negative relative to positive stimuli in 
205 
 
comparison to positive basking. However, there was no significant overall difference in 
attentional bias between rumination conditions. The between-group difference in attentional 
bias was also not moderated by bias type (engagement vs. disengagement bias), emotional 
domain (depression vs. anxiety relevant stimuli), or stimulus exposure duration (500ms vs. 
1000ms).  
The present study also investigated whether the effect of induced rumination on 
attentional bias would interact with ruminative disposition. It was hypothesised that 
individuals with heightened levels of ruminative disposition may demonstrate greater 
attentional biases for negative relative to positive stimuli in response to negative rumination, 
in comparison to positive basking.  As predicted, the effect of induced rumination on 
attentional bias was moderated by ruminative disposition, such that individuals with higher 
levels of ruminative disposition demonstrated greater valence-congruency bias relative to 
individuals with lower levels of ruminative disposition. However, contrary to predictions, 
individuals with low levels of ruminative disposition demonstrated a bias for valence-
incongruent stimuli, such that individuals in the positive basking condition demonstrated 
greater bias for negative relative to positive stimuli compared to individuals in the negative 
rumination condition. In contrast, individuals with high levels of ruminative disposition 
demonstrated a bias for valence-congruent stimuli, such that individuals in the positive 
basking condition demonstrated greater bias for positive relative to negative stimuli 
compared to individuals in the negative rumination condition. 
When the relationship between ruminative disposition and attentional bias was 
examined separately in each rumination condition, surprisingly, greater levels of ruminative 
disposition were associated with more bias for positive relative to negative stimuli in the 
positive basking condition. In contrast, ruminative disposition was not significantly 
associated with attentional bias in the negative rumination condition. The finding that higher 
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levels of ruminative disposition were associated with greater bias for positive stimuli was 
unexpected, since previous research has typically found evidence that rumination is 
associated with greater bias for negative stimuli. However, as far as we are aware, this is the 
first study to investigate the relationship between ruminative disposition and attentional bias 
following both negative rumination and positive basking. Previous research has only ever 
examined this relationship in the absence of a rumination induction, and often in patients 
currently suffering from depression. One possible explanation for the present findings is that 
individuals with heighted ruminative disposition have a greater tendency to attend to 
information that is similar to recent thought contents, resulting in more biased attention 
towards valence congruent information. Since this is the first study to investigate the link 
between ruminative disposition and attentional bias in the context of positive repetitive 
thought, replication of the present findings and further research investigating the valence 
congruency hypothesis will be necessary. 
However, the valence congruency hypothesis would also predict that higher levels of 
ruminative disposition would also be associated with greater bias for negative information in 
the negative rumination condition, but there was no significant relationship between 
ruminative disposition and attentional bias in the negative rumination condition. It is worth 
noting though, that although the relationship was not statistically significant, higher levels of 
ruminative disposition were associated with greater bias for negative stimuli in the negative 
rumination condition, which is consistent with the valence congruency hypothesis. Power 
analyses conducted in G-Power revealed for correlations within each condition (N = 38), the 
present study achieved a statistical power of only .08 to detect the observed effect size (r = 
.09) at the .05 level, and a power of .47 to detect a medium effect size (r = .30). Thus, the 
present results may be attributed to low statistical power, meaning that it would be useful for 
any future replication studies to use a larger sample size.  
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A potential mechanism which could account for heightened valence congruency bias, 
is a more narrowed attentional scope. According to the attentional scope model of rumination 
(Whitmer & Gotlib, 2013), heightened levels of ruminative disposition are associated with a 
more narrowed attentional scope, which results in more exacerbated attentional bias for 
emotional information. Thus, to the extent that rumination causally influences attentional 
bias, this narrowed attentional scope would result in greater valence congruency bias in 
individuals with higher relative to lower levels of ruminative disposition.  
However, it is unclear why individuals with low levels of ruminative disposition 
demonstrated an attentional bias for valence-incongruent information. Although the 
attentional scope model predicts greater valence-congruency bias in individuals with higher 
levels of ruminative disposition, it was expected that this would reflect an exaggeration of 
valence-congruency bias relative to individuals with lower levels of ruminative disposition. 
Instead, the present findings demonstrated a shift in the direction of bias from valence-
incongruent to valence-congruent stimuli as ruminative disposition increased. Thus findings 
from Study Five were not consistent with the attentional scope model of rumination. 
Furthermore, the attentional scope model predicts that rumination-linked attentional 
bias favouring negative information would only be apparent in the context of negative affect, 
yet rumination-linked attentional bias for negative stimuli has also been observed in non-
clinical samples in the absence of any negative mood inductions (Studies One, Two & Four). 
Thus, although a narrowed attentional scope may account for some of the findings of the 
present study, previous findings suggest that an attentional preference for negative 
information independent of negative emotional context is also present in individuals with 
high levels of ruminative disposition.  
It is also notable that there was no main effect of the rumination inductions on 
attentional bias. The interaction between rumination condition and ruminative disposition 
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suggests that rumination has at least some effect on attentional bias, although this may be 
restricted to individuals with a certain level of ruminative disposition. It is possible that the 
lack of a main effect of induced rumination is again simply a result of low power, particularly 
considering that induced ruminative states are unlikely to be as strong as naturally occurring 
ones (Donaldson et al., 2007). Indeed, power analyses conducted in G-Power demonstrated 
that for between-group effects (N = 74), the present study achieved a power of only .14 to 
detect small effect sizes (ηp² = .01) at the .05 level, and a power of .58 to detect medium 
effect sizes (ηp² = .06), both of which are below the recommended level of .80, indicating that 
larger sample sizes may be required to detect genuine effects using the present design. 
Furthermore, since the present study involved a one-off manipulation, the effects of 
rumination on attentional bias may have been limited. It is possible that more prolonged and 
repeated episodes of rumination may be necessary to reliably influence selective attention. 
The present study also only measured post-induction attentional bias, whereas assessing 
change in attentional bias from pre- to post-induction may have been more sensitive to 
detecting smaller effects of rumination on attentional bias. 
Another limitation of the present study is that our rumination manipulation is 
confounded by the effects of the rumination inductions on mood, such that negative affect 
was higher in the negative rumination than the positive basking condition.  There is evidence 
that mood has a causal influence on attentional biases for emotional information (Bradley, 
Mogg, & Lee, 1997), so it is unclear whether the between-group differences in the 
relationship between ruminative disposition and attentional bias in the present study can be 
attributed directly to induced rumination or to the associated mood effects. Separating the 
effects of ruminative thought and mood on cognition is inevitably challenging, since it is well 
established that ruminating on negative feelings results in increased negative affect (e.g., 
Morrow & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1990; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1993), but there are a 
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range of methodologies that could be used to help delineate them. The present rumination 
inductions could be compared to mood inductions without a rumination component, but with 
comparable effects on mood.  
Furthermore, the present study did not include a pre-rumination measure of attentional 
bias. Thus, although comparison between rumination conditions following each induction 
was possible, we could not specifically measure change in attentional bias as a result of 
rumination. Research comparing the relationship between ruminative disposition and 
attentional bias before and after rumination would be particularly useful for investigating 
default biases in selective attention in individuals with varying levels of rumination 
disposition, and how this relationship changes following rumination on different emotional 
material.  
It would also be valuable for future research to investigate the causal relationship 
between rumination and attentional bias from the opposite direction, given the hypothesis that 
impaired disengagement of attention is an underlying process contributing to heightened 
levels of rumination (Koster et al., 2011). Attentional bias modification procedures  (ABM; 
MacLeod, Rutherford, Campbell, Ebsworthy, & Holker, 2002), which train attentional 
preference either towards or away from negative stimuli, can be utilised to test whether 
manipulating selective attention has a causal influence on levels of rumination during 
negative mood states. There is promising initial support for the causal effect of attentional 
bias on ruminative disposition, as a recent study found that repeated sessions of ABM 
training attention away from negative information resulted in reduced levels of rumination 
relative to placebo-training (Yang, Ding, Dai, Peng, & Zhang, 2015). Further research might 
extend this by investigating whether ABM specifically targeting bias in either attentional 
engagement or disengagement differentially influence the tendency to ruminate, although this 
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will depend on the successful development of ABM paradigms which exclusively manipulate 
either attentional engagement or disengagement bias. 
In summary, the aim of the present study was to investigate the causal influence of 
rumination on selective attention for emotional information, and whether this influence was 
moderated by ruminative disposition. Although there was no direct effect of induced 
rumination on attentional bias, there was evidence that the effect of induced rumination was 
moderated by ruminative disposition. However, in contrast to predictions, individuals with 
low levels of ruminative disposition demonstrated a bias for valence-incongruent stimuli, 
which shifted toward a bias for valence-congruent stimuli as ruminative disposition 
increased. Thus, the causal effect of rumination on attentional bias, and the moderating effect 
of ruminative disposition on this relationship are unclear from the present study. Further 
research investigating the impact of attentional bias modification on the tendency to ruminate 
in response to negative mood will be necessary to examine the causal relationship between 
rumination and selective attention from the opposite direction. 
  
211 
 
CHAPTER SEVEN: General Discussion 
 
7.1 Summary of Aims and Findings 
Prior research has demonstrated that heightened levels of ruminative disposition are 
associated with an attentional bias for negative relative to non-negative information 
(Donaldson, Lam, & Mathews, 2007; Joormann, Dkane, & Gotlib, 2006; Pe, 
Vandekerckhove, & Kuppens, 2013), leading some investigators to suggest that impaired 
disengagement of attention from negative information may be an underlying process 
contributing to rumination (Joormann, 2010; Koster, De Lissnyder, Derakshan, & De Raedt, 
2011). The aim of this thesis was to further examine the relationship between rumination and 
attentional bias for negative information, in particular to investigate whether the tendency to 
ruminate is associated with impaired attentional disengagement from, or enhanced attentional 
engagement with negative information. Five studies investigated the relationship between 
rumination and biased attentional processing of negative information using attentional 
assessment paradigms that were capable of distinguishing between bias in attentional 
engagement and disengagement. The design, hypotheses, and findings of each of these 
studies are summarised in Table 7.1. 
Study One (Southworth, Grafton, MacLeod & Watkins, under revision) investigated 
the relationship between individual differences in ruminative disposition and selective 
attention for negative information, using a modified dot-probe task designed by Grafton, 
Watkins, and MacLeod (2012) to enable the discrete assessment of biases in attentional 
engagement and disengagement. This study was also interested in whether biased attentional 
processing of negative information was specifically associated with ruminative brooding, but 
not reflection. Ruminative disposition was assessed using both the Ruminative Responses 
Scale (RRS; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991) and an in-vivo assessment of ruminative  
212 
 
Table 7.1. Summary of studies and findings. 
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brooding. It was hypothesised that higher levels of ruminative brooding, but not reflection, 
would be associated with greater attentional bias for negative relative to positive information, 
and that this could involve either impaired attentional disengagement from or enhanced 
attentional engagement with negative information. Consistent with the impaired 
disengagement account of rumination (Koster et al., 2011), higher levels of dispositional 
ruminative brooding, as measured by both the brooding subscale of the RRS and the in-vivo 
assessment of ruminative brooding, was significantly associated with greater relative 
impairment disengaging attention from negative compared to positive stimuli. Ruminative 
disposition was not significantly associated with attentional engagement bias, although the 
relationship between dispositional ruminative brooding and attentional disengagement bias 
was not significantly stronger than the relationship with attentional engagement bias. Also, 
there was some evidence that in-vivo ruminative brooding indices were associated with 
attentional engagement bias, but only for depression relevant negative stimuli presented for 
1000ms. 
Study Two (Grafton, Southworth, Watkins, & MacLeod, in press) also utilised 
Grafton et al.’s (2012) modified dot-probe paradigm to examine the relationship between 
ruminative disposition and attentional bias for negative information. By employing a larger 
sample size, this study was better equipped to investigate whether the relationship between 
ruminative disposition and attentional bias is moderated by stimulus presentation duration 
and the emotional domain relevance of stimuli. Prior research has suggested that rumination 
is specifically associated with attentional bias for depression relevant information (Joormann 
et al., 2006), and that rumination-linked attentional bias is only observed under longer 
stimulus presentation durations (1000ms, but not 500ms; Donaldson et al., 2007). Consistent 
with previous findings, higher levels of ruminative disposition were found to be significantly 
associated with more impaired attentional disengagement from negative relative to positive 
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stimuli, but only when stimuli were relevant to depression rather than anxiety, and only when 
stimuli were presented for 1000ms rather than 500ms. There was no significant relationship 
between ruminative disposition and attentional engagement bias, but there was also no 
evidence that ruminative disposition was more strongly associated with attentional 
disengagement bias than attentional engagement bias. 
Study Three went on to further investigate the nature of this rumination-linked 
attentional disengagement bias using an eye-tracking assessment of selective attention. Eye-
tracking assessments of attentional bias have the advantage of enabling continuous 
assessment of the allocation of attention throughout stimulus presentation, resulting in greater 
temporal sensitivity (Armstrong & Olatunji, 2012). Also, since attentional assessment is not 
reliant on the presence of a response probe, or other task constraints, it is possible to measure 
the spontaneous allocation of attention between stimuli. Thus, we developed an eye-tracking 
assessment of attentional engagement and disengagement biases involving free-viewing of 
emotional stimuli. It was hypothesised that higher levels of ruminative disposition, as 
measured by both the RRS and the in-vivo ruminative brooding assessment used in Study 
One, would be associated with more impaired attentional disengagement from negative 
relative to positive stimuli. However, ruminative disposition was not significantly associated 
with any index of attentional bias during the eye-tracking assessment, neither with biased 
attentional disengagement, nor with biased attentional engagement or maintenance of 
attention. 
Study Four sought to replicate and extend the findings of Study Two, using a selected 
sample of high and low ruminators. Our previous studies used healthy, unselected samples 
with levels of ruminative disposition within a relatively normal range. We therefore sought to 
investigate whether the observed relationships were maintained when examining individuals 
with more elevated levels of rumination, thus increasing generalizability to clinical 
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populations. Participants completed a modified dot-probe task identical to the assessment 
used in Study Two. It was hypothesised that participants in the high compared to low 
rumination group would demonstrate more impaired attentional disengagement from negative 
relative to positive stimuli, specifically for depression relevant stimuli presented for 1000ms. 
Participants in the high rumination group demonstrated greater attentional bias for depression 
relevant negative stimuli presented for 1000ms in comparison to those in the low rumination 
group. However, this between group difference reflected a general attentional preference for 
negative relative to positive stimuli (i.e., composite of attentional engagement and 
disengagement bias), but no specific difference in attentional disengagement bias or 
attentional engagement bias was observed. Participants in the high rumination group also 
demonstrated reduced bias for anxiety relevant negative stimuli presented for 1000ms in 
comparison to those in the low rumination group. 
Study Four also sought to investigate the role of attentional control in rumination-
linked attentional biases. Koster et al.’s (2011) disengagement hypothesis suggests that 
deficits in attentional control contribute to rumination-linked impairments in attentional 
disengagement. Prior research has established that heightened levels of ruminative 
disposition are associated with attentional control deficits (Davis & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000; 
De Lissnyder, Derakshan, De Raedt, & Koster, 2011; De Lissnyder, Koster, Derakshan, & De 
Raedt, 2010; Whitmer & Banich, 2007), but since attentional control, attentional biases and 
rumination have not been assessed within the same study, it is unclear whether rumination-
linked attentional control deficits  and impaired disengagement from negative stimuli are 
functionally related, or represent separate facets of the heightened tendency to ruminate. 
Study Four attempted to address this question by including a response-probe version of the 
antisaccade task in order to assess attentional control. However, contrary to well established 
patterns of attentional distribution during antisaccade tasks (Hutton & Ettinger, 2006; Munoz 
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& Everling, 2004), participants were slower to identify probes on prosaccade than on 
antisaccade trials, calling into question the validity of this particular antisaccade task as a 
measure of attentional control. Thus, this study was unable to examine the relationship 
between attentional control and rumination-linked biases in selective attention. 
Finally, Study Five took a first step towards examining the causal relationship 
between rumination and selective attention, by investigating the hypothesis that rumination 
has a causal effect on attentional bias. Consistent with theories that characterise rumination as 
being triggered by and involving thoughts focused on unresolved personal goal discrepancies 
(Martin & Tesser, 1996; Watkins 2008), rumination was induced using a goal-cuing 
manipulation, where participants were instructed to focus on either a problem or difficult 
(unresolved goal; negative rumination condition), or a success or achievement (resolved goal; 
positive basking condition) (Roberts, Watkins, & Wills, 2013). Selective attention for 
emotional stimuli was then assessed using a version of Grafton et al.’s (2012) modified dot-
probe task to assess biases in attentional engagement and disengagement. It was hypothesised 
that participants in the negative rumination condition would demonstrate greater attentional 
bias for negative relative to positive stimuli compared to those in the positive basking 
condition. Furthermore, Study Five also investigated the hypothesis that the effects of 
induced rumination would be moderated by ruminative disposition, such that individuals with 
higher levels of ruminative disposition would demonstrate a more pronounced bias towards 
negative stimuli in the negative rumination compared to positive basking condition. 
Although there was no overall significant difference between the rumination 
conditions in either attentional engagement or disengagement, the difference in attentional 
bias between rumination conditions was found to be moderated by ruminative disposition. 
However, in contrast to predictions, individuals with low levels of ruminative disposition 
demonstrated a bias for valence-incongruent stimuli, whereas individuals with high levels of 
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ruminative disposition demonstrated a bias for valence-congruent stimuli. The moderating 
effect of ruminative disposition was not found to be specific to either attentional engagement 
or disengagement bias. Analyses of the relationship between ruminative disposition and 
attentional bias in each rumination condition separately revealed that higher levels of 
ruminative disposition were associated with greater attentional bias for positive relative to 
negative stimuli in the positive basking condition. There was no significant relationship 
between ruminative disposition and attentional bias in the negative rumination condition. 
 Overall, there was support across the studies for the primary hypothesis that 
heightened ruminative disposition is associated with impaired attentional disengagement 
from negative information. However, the findings did not suggest that ruminative disposition 
is exclusively associated with attentional disengagement bias, but instead indicated that 
facilitated attentional engagement may also be involved under some circumstances. 
Furthermore, there was also strong evidence across the studies to suggest that ruminative 
disposition is specifically associated with attentional bias for depression relevant stimuli 
presented for longer exposure durations.  
7.2 Theoretical Implications 
Following the observation that heightened levels of ruminative disposition are 
associated with an attentional bias favouring negative information, various theoretical models 
have proposed how individual differences in the attentional processing of negative 
information may be an underlying mechanism contributing to increased tendency to ruminate 
in response to negative mood. In particular, it is commonly suggested that heightened levels 
of ruminative disposition may be associated with difficulties disengaging attention from 
negative information, as a result of impairments in the control and inhibition of attention for 
negative information (Joormann, 2010; Koster et al., 2011). An alternative account suggests 
that heightened ruminative disposition is associated with a more narrowed attentional scope, 
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which results in greater attentional bias for negative information during negative mood states 
(Whitmer & Gotlib, 2013). The following section will discuss the theoretical implications of 
the findings from this thesis, with regard to various aspects of these attentional processing 
models of rumination.  
7.2.1 Attentional Engagement and Attentional Disengagement Bias 
A number of theorists have suggested that high levels of rumination may be 
associated with difficulties disengaging attention away from negative information. The 
impaired disengagement hypothesis (Koster et al., 2011) maintains that experiencing negative 
thoughts in response to negative life events, mood states, or stressors is a normal, non-
pathological process, but that this typically triggers attempts to disengage attention in order to 
terminate negative thoughts. If the disengagement of attention from negative information is 
disrupted, then negative thoughts will be maintained resulting in persistent rumination. This 
impaired disengagement model of rumination is illustrated in Figure 1.1 (see Chapter One). 
Similarly, Joorman’s (2010) cognitive inhibition model proposes that inhibition deficits in the 
form of difficulty disengaging from and inhibiting the elaborative processing of negative 
material lead to difficulty terminating negative thoughts, resulting in more persistent 
rumination.  
Whilst both Koster et al. (2011) and Joormann’s (2010) emphasise the role of 
impaired attentional disengagement in contributing to heightened levels of rumination, 
neither model explicitly discusses the potential role of attentional engagement in rumination. 
A strong interpretation of this model would therefore suggest that, as far as selective attention 
is concerned, only attentional disengagement bias contributes to ruminative disposition, and 
that attentional engagement bias is not associated with ruminative disposition. Alternatively, 
a more open interpretation would suggest that attentional engagement bias could be an 
additional, unspecified factor contributing to heightened ruminative disposition. 
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The findings from this thesis generally supported the prediction that heightened 
ruminative disposition would be associated with impaired attentional disengagement from 
negative information. In this regard, our findings provide strong support for the central tenet 
of the impaired disengagement account of rumination, namely that the tendency to experience 
persistent ruminative thought is associated with difficulty in the disengagement attention 
from negative information.  
However, evidence of specificity to attentional disengagement bias was limited, as 
ruminative disposition was not found to be more strongly associated with attentional 
disengagement bias than attentional engagement bias in any of the thesis studies. 
Furthermore, there was some evidence that heightened levels of ruminative disposition were 
also associated with facilitated engagement with negative information (Studies One & Four). 
Thus, our findings indicate a potential refinement of the impaired disengagement model to 
incorporate the role of attentional engagement bias in heightened ruminative disposition.  
Impaired disengagement models of rumination have generally focused on explaining 
individual differences in the persistence of negative ruminative thoughts through differences 
in attentional disengagement and control (Joormann, 2010; Koster et al., 2011). However, 
there may be a useful distinction between the onset of rumination and the persistence of 
rumination. As noted by Koster et al., encountering negative events or mood states will 
typically trigger negative self-critical thoughts (i.e., ruminative onset). However, although 
experiencing negative thoughts in response to major stressors or severe emotional distress is 
relatively normal, the tendency for negative thoughts to arise in response to milder stressors 
may be more characteristic of pathological rumination. Facilitated attentional engagement 
with negative information could increase the readiness for negative thoughts to enter the 
focus of attention, thus broadening the range of situations in which negative ruminative 
thinking occurs. Therefore, whereas biased attentional disengagement from negative 
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information may be particularly associated with individual differences in ruminative 
persistence, biased attention engagement with negative information may be particularly 
associated with individual differences in ruminative onset. This modified impaired attentional 
disengagement model of rumination is illustrated in Figure 7.1. 
 
Figure 7.1. Outline of the modified impaired disengagement model of rumination, 
incorporating the role of attentional engagement bias. 
 
It is also worth noting that the strongest evidence for a rumination-linked attentional 
engagement bias occurred when comparing selected samples of individuals with high and low 
levels of ruminative disposition (Study Four). This tentatively suggests that increased 
attentional engagement with negative information may be specifically characteristic of 
individuals with particularly high levels of ruminative disposition, and that there may be 
differential thresholds of ruminative disposition at which bias in attentional engagement and 
disengagement are observed. Our model suggests that facilitated attentional engagement with 
negative information will lead to negative thoughts being more readily triggered by negative 
events or moods. However, if these negative thoughts are typically not persistent, then 
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individuals will simply experience more frequent transient negative thoughts, rather than 
more frequent onset of ruminative episodes. Thus, a bias in attentional engagement alone 
may not be sufficient to impact ruminative disposition. Instead, facilitated attentional 
engagement with negative information may need to be accompanied by impaired attentional 
disengagement from negative information in order to influence the degree to which 
individuals experience episodes of persistent ruminative thought. As such, whereas individual 
differences in attentional disengagement bias may distinguish between individuals with low, 
moderate, and high levels of ruminative disposition, individual differences in attentional 
engagement bias may only differentiate between individuals with moderate and high levels of 
ruminative disposition. Further research investigating the patterns of selective attentional 
distribution associated with low, high, and mid-range levels of ruminative disposition will be 
required to test this prediction. 
7.2.2 Stimulus Exposure Duration: Strategic vs. Automatic Processing Bias 
 This thesis also investigated the hypothesis that the relationship between ruminative-
disposition and attentional bias for negative information would be moderated by stimulus 
presentation duration, such that rumination-linked attentional bias would be observed 
specifically at longer stimulus presentation durations. Studies Two and Four both found that 
the rumination-linked bias for negative stimuli was specific for stimuli presented for 1000m, 
and not 500ms. These findings are consistent with previous research which found evidence of 
a rumination-linked attentional bias only for stimuli presented for 1000ms, and not 500ms 
(Donaldson et al., 2007).  
Some researchers have suggested that evidence of attentional bias specifically at 
longer stimulus exposure durations may indicate more strategic rather than automatic 
processing, as strategic processes are more likely to be evident when processing time is 
extended (McNally, 1995; Mogg & Bradley, 2005). Strategic processing is considered 
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controlled and effortful, as opposed to automatic processing which is effortless, unconscious, 
and involuntary. Thus, evidence that rumination-linked attentional bias is only observed at 
longer stimulus exposure durations may suggest that ruminative disposition is specifically 
associated with individual differences in the operation of controlled attentional processing 
bias. This does not necessarily imply that heightened rumination involves a voluntary 
attentional bias in favour of negative material, but could instead involve a deficit in the 
strategic and controlled inhibition of negative information. Such an interpretation would be 
consistent with models which suggest that heightened rumination is associated with a deficit 
in the attentional control and inhibition of negative information (Joormann, 2010; Koster et 
al., 2011). 
However, it is important to note that 500ms exposure duration is sufficient to enable 
the operation of strategic processes, although to a lesser extent than would be possible at 
longer durations (Holender, 1986; Mogg, Bradley, & Williams, 1995). It is possible that the 
restriction of rumination-linked attentional bias to 1000ms stimulus exposure duration could 
simply be attributed to the time taken for attentional engagement or disengagement to take 
place, rather than to the strategic nature of this bias. Thus, further research will be required to 
determine whether rumination-linked attentional bias involves strategic or automatic 
processes (see Section 7.4 below). 
7.2.3 Stimulus Domain Specificity 
 Attentional processing models of rumination have typically suggested that heightened 
ruminative disposition may be particularly associated with attentional bias for concern-
relevant negative information (Joorman, 2010; Koster et al., 2011; Whitmer & Gotlib, 2013). 
Previous research has highlighted the importance of emotional domain specificity in 
psychopathology, demonstrating that individuals typically demonstrate attentional biases 
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specifically towards information that is relevant to current emotional concerns (Pergamin-
Hight, Naim, Bakermans-Kranenburg, van Ijzendoorn, & Bar-Haim, 2015). 
Consistent with previous research (Joormann et al., 2006), findings from this thesis 
suggested that ruminative disposition was specifically associated with an attentional bias for 
depression-relevant negative information, and not anxiety relevant information (Studies Two 
& Four). Although rumination has been identified as a transdiagnostic process (Ehring & 
Watkins, 2008; Nolen-Hoeksema & Watkins, 2011), the phenomenological experience of 
depressive rumination (as assessed by the RRS) primarily involves focusing on sadness and 
depression (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991). Thus, although 
rumination may contribute to greater vulnerability to emotional disorders other than 
depression, it follows that heightened tendency to focus on depressive mood states might be 
specifically associated with increased attentional processing of depressive information.  
However, it is notable that the present studies used non-clinical samples, not currently 
experiencing high levels of negative affect. To the extent that ruminative disposition may be 
associated with attentional biases for concern relevant information (Joormann, 2010; Koster 
et al., 2011; Whitmer & Gotlib, 2013), it is possible that individuals with high levels of 
ruminative disposition may demonstrate increased bias towards anxiety relevant information 
during periods of high state anxiety.  
It is also notable that Study Four found that higher levels of ruminative disposition 
were associated with reduced attentional bias towards anxiety relevant negative stimuli (i.e., 
threat stimuli). Although this is the first study to suggest that heightened ruminative 
disposition is associated with reduced attentional bias for threatening information, similar 
findings have also been observed in the anxiety literature. Although anxious individuals 
exhibit an attentional bias towards threat at shorter stimulus presentation durations, they also 
demonstrate a reduced attentional bias for threat stimuli at longer presentation durations (e.g., 
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Koster, Crombez, Verschuere, Van Damme, & Wiersema, 2006; Koster, Verschuere, 
Crombez, & Van Damme, 2005; Mogg, Bradley, Miles, & Dixon, 2004), suggesting that 
heightened anxiety is associated with initial vigilance for threatening stimuli, followed by 
subsequent avoidance. It has been suggested that emotion regulation strategies may underlie 
avoidance of threatening information in anxiety (Cisler & Koster, 2010). Similarly, one 
interpretation of the findings from Study Four is that individuals with high levels of 
ruminative disposition exhibit similar patterns of strategic attentional avoidance of 
threatening information. However, since this is presently the only study to suggest that 
heightened ruminative disposition is associated with avoidance of threatening stimuli, further 
replication of this finding will be required. 
7.2.4 Ability vs. Tendency Explanations of Attentional Bias 
 Although studies using the modified dot-probe task found evidence of a rumination-
linked attentional bias for negative stimuli (Studies One, Two, & Four), no evidence was 
found of a relationship between ruminative disposition and attentional bias using an eye-
tracking assessment involving free-viewing of emotional stimuli (Study Three). A possible 
explanation for these discrepant findings is that rumination is particularly associated with a 
reduced ability to inhibit attentional processing of negative information, rather than a bias in 
spontaneous tendency to maintain or direct attention towards negative information. If 
rumination-linked attentional bias results from a reduced ability to control attentional 
processing of negative information, then this bias would only be apparent under conditions 
that impose explicit demands upon the allocation of attention. In contrast, if rumination-
linked attentional bias results from a spontaneous tendency to preferentially allocate attention 
to negative information, then this would be apparent in the absence of explicit demands upon 
attention.  
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A key methodological difference between the modified dot-probe task used in Studies 
One, Two and Four and the eye-tracking assessment employed in Study Three is that whereas 
the dot-probe task requires participants to direct their attention towards the target probe 
presented immediately after the emotional stimuli, this response probe was absent in the eye-
tracking assessment. The task demands imposed by the response probe may have influenced 
the allocation of attention during stimulus presentation to facilitate rapid responding to the 
target probe, such that participants pre-emptively disengaged attention from its initial location 
prior to probe onset, and strategically directed their attention towards the central location. As 
such, whereas an attentional bias as assessed by the dot-probe task could reflect either 
reduced ability to inhibit attentional processing of negative information, or increased 
tendency to direct attention towards negative information, the role of ability is diminished if 
no constraints are placed on attention. As such, any rumination-linked difficulties in 
inhibiting the attentional processing of negative information may result in an attentional bias 
towards negative stimuli on the modified dot-probe task, but may not manifest as a 
spontaneous bias in selective attention during free-viewing of stimuli. One hypothesis 
generated by the present findings is therefore that attentional bias associated with rumination 
is based on a reduced ability to control attention for negative information. 
 However, the absence of a rumination-linked attentional bias using the eye-tracking 
assessment could also be attributed to the fact that eye-movements can only index overt shifts 
in attention (i.e., attentional selection performed via eye-movements). If rumination-linked 
attentional bias does not translate into shifts in overt attention, but instead only involves shifts 
in covert attention (i.e., shifts in attentional selection occurring in between eye-movement 
without redirecting gaze), then eye-tracking assessments of attentional bias would be 
incapable of detecting this. This explanation seems unlikely, as in naturalistic viewing, eye-
movements are the primary method of attentional selection, with covert attention generally 
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guiding eye-movements (Findlay & Gilhchrist, 2003; Hayhoe & Ballard, 2005), but cannot 
be completely ruled out by the present methodology. Further research will be required to 
determine whether methodological differences in terms of sensitivity to shifts in covert 
attention, or capability to distinguish between biases in the ability and tendency to disengage 
attention from negative information can account for the present findings (see Section 7.4 
below).  
7.2.5 Attentional Bias vs. Attentional Scope Accounts 
The attentional scope model of rumination (Whitmer & Gotlib, 2013) proposes that 
individuals with high levels of ruminative disposition exhibit a more narrowed attentional 
scope, such that attentional processing is generally more constricted and less flexible. The 
model notes that negative mood states generally result in biased attentional processing 
towards negative information and activation of negative thoughts. Individuals with a narrow 
attentional scope will find it more difficult to direct attention away from negative information 
during negative mood states, resulting in an enhanced attentional bias for negative 
information and more persistent negative thoughts in the form of rumination. In contrast, 
individuals with a broader attentional scope will more easily direct attention towards a wider 
array of mood-incongruent information, thus attenuating attentional bias for negative stimuli, 
and facilitating the termination of negative thoughts in favour of distracting thoughts and 
activities.  
A central tenet of the attentional scope model is that narrowed attentional scope 
results in an exaggeration of mood-congruent attentional bias effects, and thus individuals 
with high levels of ruminative disposition demonstrate enhanced mood-congruent attentional 
bias in response to negative mood states. Similarly, a logical inference would be that to the 
extent that state rumination might influence attentional biases for emotional information, 
these effects should be greatest in individuals with higher levels of ruminative disposition. 
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However, contrary to predictions, Study Five found that individuals with low levels of 
ruminative disposition demonstrated a bias for valence-incongruent stimuli, such that 
individuals in the positive basking condition demonstrated greater bias for negative relative to 
positive stimuli compared to individuals in the negative rumination condition. This bias for 
valence-incongruent stimuli then shifted to a bias for valence-congruent stimuli as ruminative 
disposition increased. Thus, findings from Study Five were not consistent with the attentional 
scope model, which predicts that higher levels of ruminative disposition will be associated 
with exaggeration of valence-congruent biases. The assumptions of the attentional scope 
model also have implications for the circumstances under which heightened ruminative 
disposition will be associated with biased attentional processing of negative information. One 
key assumption is that high levels of ruminative disposition are only associated with more 
biased attentional processing of negative information during negative mood states (Whitmer 
& Gotlib, 2013). However, the present thesis has demonstrated a relationship between 
ruminative disposition and attentional bias for negative stimuli in non-clinical samples not 
currently experiencing negative affect (Studies One, Two & Four). Thus, although a 
narrowed attentional scope may well be a factor associated with heightened ruminative 
disposition, this alone cannot account for the present findings. Instead, it seems that 
heightened ruminative disposition is also associated with an attentional bias favouring 
negative information independent of the presence of negative affect. These findings are 
therefore inconsistent with the original version of the attentional scope model. 
7.2.6 Causal Effect of State Rumination on Attentional Bias 
There are two directions of causality which might account for the observed 
relationship between ruminative disposition and attentional bias. As suggested by impaired 
disengagement models of rumination (Joorman, 2010; Koster et al., 2011), biased attentional 
processing of negative information may be an underlying process contributing to heightened 
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ruminative disposition. Alternatively, more frequent engagement in ruminative thought may 
causally contribute to increased attentional bias for negative information. Either one, or both, 
of these causal relationships could account for the association between ruminative disposition 
and attentional bias. There are some practical difficulties associated with attentional bias 
modification, particularly with regard to reliability, as changes in attentional bias produced by 
this task are often short lived and unreliable (Clarke, Notebaert, & MacLeod, 2014). 
Furthermore, there are currently no well-established ABM paradigms that independently 
manipulate attentional engagement and disengagement bias. Thus, for pragmatic reasons, we 
chose to first investigate the causal effect of rumination on attentional bias. 
According to Nolen-Hoeksema’s (1991) response style theory, rumination 
exacerbates the effects of negative mood on information processing biases, as focusing on 
negative feelings heightens the accessibility of negative information (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991; 
Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco, & Lyubomirsky, 2008). If individuals habitually ruminate during 
negative mood states, as would be the case for those with high levels of ruminative 
disposition, such information processing biases could become increasingly ingrained and 
pervasive. Previous research has supported the causal influence of rumination on negative 
biases in a number of aspects of cognition, including negative interpretations (Lyubomirsky 
& Nolen-Hoeksema, 1995), increased negative future thinking and pessimism about future 
events (Lavender & Watkins 2004; Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1995), and greater 
negative autobiographical memory recall (Lyubomirsky, Caldwell, & Nolen-Hoeksema, 
1998). Thus, there is good reason to suspect that rumination might also causally influence 
information processing in the form of attentional bias for negative information.  
Study Five took a first step towards investigating the causal relationship between 
rumination and selective attention, by investigating the effect of induced rumination on 
attentional bias. There was no evidence of an overall significant main effect of the induced 
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rumination on attentional bias, although the interaction between the rumination manipulation 
and ruminative disposition suggests that rumination has at least some causal effect on 
attentional bias. It is possible that the effects of rumination on attentional bias may be 
restricted to individuals with high levels of ruminative disposition. Caution interpreting null 
findings from a single study is warranted though, particularly considering that induced 
ruminative states are unlikely to be as strong as naturally occurring ones (Donaldson et al., 
2007).  Thus, it is not yet clear whether the causal effects of rumination on attentional bias 
are restricted to individuals with high levels of ruminative disposition, or whether the lack of 
a clear main-effect can be attributed to low statistical power, measurement sensitivity, or the 
effectiveness of the rumination induction. 
7.3 Strengths and Limitations 
A key strength of all the studies presented in this thesis is that they utilised attentional 
assessment tasks capable of distinguishing between bias in attentional engagement and 
disengagement. It has been previously established that neither the conventional dot-probe 
task, nor the modified Posner cuing task used in prior research investigating the link between 
rumination and selective attention are able to adequately separate biased attentional 
engagement from biased attentional disengagement (Clarke, MacLeod & Guastella, 2013; see 
section 1.2.1 in Chapter One). By introducing an anchor stimulus, which fixed attention in a 
predetermined location prior to the presentation of emotional stimuli, the attentional 
assessment paradigms used in the present thesis allowed for the independent assessment of 
the tendency for attention to be disproportionately captured by initially distal negative 
information (engagement bias), and to be disproportionately held by initially proximal 
negative information (disengagement bias). As far as we are aware, the studies presented in 
the present thesis are the first to investigate the relationship between ruminative disposition 
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and selective attention using paradigms capable of independently assessing biased attentional 
engagement and disengagement. 
Whereas previous research demonstrating the link between heightened ruminative 
disposition and biased attentional processing of negative information has exclusively relied 
on the RRS questionnaire measure, Study One provided converging evidence for this 
relationship using a novel in-vivo assessment of ruminative disposition. There are two 
important problems with exclusive reliance on the RRS questionnaire approach to the 
assessment of ruminative disposition. Firstly, the RRS does not control for inter-individual 
variability in levels of exposure to negative events, meaning that a high score on the RRS 
could reflect more frequent, extended, or intense exposure to negative events capable of 
evoking rumination. Moreover, the RRS requires respondents to draw upon their long-term 
memory of potentially quite distant past episodes of rumination, and so permits 
contamination by biases in the operation of long-term memory, such as mood-congruency 
and recency effects (Kihlstrom et al., 2009; Trull & Ebner-Priemer, 2009). These limitations 
may be particularly problematic for attempts to demonstrate a link between ruminative-
disposition and selective attention, as both exposure to negative events and biases in the 
operation of long-term memory are likely to also be associated with attentional bias for 
negative information (e.g., Beevers & Carver, 2003; Everaet, Tierens, Uzieblo, & Koster, 
2013), thus introducing confounds which could account for the observed relationship between 
ruminative disposition and attentional bias. The in-vivo assessment reduces these limitations 
as participants are all equally exposed to the same standardized negative event, to reveal 
individual differences in the degree to which this serves to elevate ruminative thinking. 
Participants also report only the ruminative thinking they experienced in recent minutes, 
reducing distortion by biases in the operation of long-term memory. Therefore, Study One 
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strengthened evidence for the claim that attentional bias for negative information is directly 
associated with heightened ruminative disposition. 
A limitation of the attentional bias assessment tasks used in this thesis is that they 
exclusively measured attention to external visual-spatial stimuli, whereas rumination is a 
process that involves focusing on internal thoughts and feelings. It is therefore relevant to 
consider whether individual differences in ruminative disposition are associated with similar 
attentional bias for internal representations in working memory. Other research has examined 
the relationship between ruminative disposition and attentional bias for internal stimuli using 
the internal shift task (IST), which assesses ability to shift internal attentional focus between 
emotional and neutral representations of stimuli (De Lissnyder, Koster, & De Raedt, 2012a; 
Koster, De Lissnyder, & De Raedt, 2013). Consistent with attentional disengagement bias 
accounts of rumination, higher levels of ruminative disposition have been found to be 
associated with greater switching impairments on the IST, particularly when switching 
attentional processing from negative to neutral information (Koster et al., 2013). Thus, 
although the present thesis is limited by the reliance on assessments of attentional bias for 
external stimuli, there is converging evidence to suggest that similar attentional processing 
biases for internal information are associated with heightened ruminative disposition. 
The attentional bias assessment tasks used in this thesis are also potentially limited by 
the low reliability of attention probe tasks reported in previous studies (Schmukle, 2005; 
Staugaard, 2009; Waechter, Nelson, Wright, Hyatt, & Oakman, 2014; Waechter & Stolz, 
2015). Reliability refers to the extent to which a measure’s variance reflects true score 
variance, as opposed to measurement error. Low reliability is thus associated with increased 
error variance and reduced statistical power (Kopriva & Shaw, 1991; Waechter & Stolz, 
2015), and has been demonstrated to result in lower levels of replicability (LeBel & 
Paunonen, 2011). Although the particular attentional bias assessment tasks used in the present 
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thesis have not been tested for reliability, given that all versions of the dot-probe task tested 
to date have consistently demonstrated low reliability, it is reasonable to assume that the 
present tasks may also have low reliability. As a result, reliability issues could potentially 
account for some of the inconsistent findings within this thesis, assuming that the current 
attention probe tasks also showed relatively low reliability. 
In addition, it is important to note that with the exception of Study Two, the studies in 
this thesis were underpowered to detect small-to-medium effect sizes, which may account for 
some of the findings not being replicated across studies. In particular, the relationship 
between ruminative disposition and attentional disengagement bias found in Studies One and 
Two may not have been replicated in Study Four due to low statistical power. Similarly, the 
moderating effect of stimulus domain and exposure duration on the relationship between 
ruminative disposition and attentional bias (Studies Two and Four) may not have been 
statistically significant in Study One due to low power. Larger sample sizes may be required 
to consistently replicate findings across studies. Alternatively, using a more reliable 
attentional assessment task may help to improve power by reducing error variance and thus 
increasing effect sizes. 
Finally, another important limitation of this thesis is that all studies involved non-
clinical samples. It is possible that the relationship between rumination and attentional bias 
for negative information will differ in clinically depressed samples, or individuals 
experiencing high levels of negative affect. The relationship between rumination and negative 
attentional bias may simply be stronger during episodes of depression or anxiety, but there 
may also be various qualitative differences in rumination-linked attentional biases observed 
in clinical samples. Firstly, although our present findings tentatively suggest that impaired 
attentional disengagement from negative information might be a more prominent feature of 
heightened ruminative disposition than facilitated attentional engagement with negative 
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information, biases in attentional engagement might become more apparent during periods of 
heightened negative affect. Similarly, although we did not find evidence of rumination-linked 
biases in the allocation of attention via eye-movements during free-viewing of emotional 
stimuli, it is possible that such biases might emerge in clinical samples. Finally, although the 
present findings suggest that rumination is specifically associated with attentional bias for 
depression-relevant and not anxiety-relevant stimuli, to the extent that rumination might be 
associated with heightened attentional processing of concern relevant information, it is 
possible that a bias for anxiety-relevant stimuli could emerge in clinically anxious 
individuals. 
7.4 Future Research 
The main novel hypothesis generated from this thesis, which will require further 
investigation, is the proposal that whereas impaired attentional disengagement from negative 
information may be specifically associated with greater persistence of ruminative thoughts, 
facilitated attentional engagement with negative information may be associated with 
increased onset of negative ruminative thoughts. A crucial challenge of such research will 
involve developing a ruminative disposition assessment that can adequately distinguish 
between individual difference in the degree of ruminative onset and persistence. Experience 
sampling has previously been used to assess momentary levels of ruminative self-focus 
(Kircanski, Thompson, Sorenson, Sherdell, & Gotlib, 2015; Moberly & Watkins, 2008). This 
approach could conceivably be adapted to assess both the frequency of ruminative episodes 
(i.e., ruminative onset) and average duration of each ruminative episode (i.e., ruminative 
persistence). According to the model proposed in this thesis, facilitated attentional 
engagement with negative information would be associated with increased frequency of 
ruminative episodes, whereas impaired attentional disengagement from negative information 
would be associated with longer duration of ruminative episodes. 
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Further research will also be required in order to better understand why no 
relationship was observed between ruminative disposition and attentional bias assessed via 
eye-tracking in Study Three, but was observed when using a modified response-probe 
assessment of attentional bias (Studies One, Two & Four). At present, it is unclear whether 
these discrepant findings can be attributed to the absence of the response probe in Study 
Three or the inability of eye-tracking assessments to detect covert shifts in attention 
allocation. Future research could address this issue by applying eye-tracking to Grafton et 
al.’s (2012) modified attention probe task. If this combined approach were to produce 
evidence of a relationship between ruminative disposition and attentional bias on the response 
probe measure, but without a simultaneous bias in the allocation of attention via eye-
movements, then this would indicate that the discrepant results can be accounted for by 
differences in the ability to detect covert shifts in attention. However, if simultaneous biases 
in selective attention were found using both measures, then the role of the response probe in 
eliciting this bias could be further investigated. A mixture of assessment trials both with and 
without the response probe would enable the determination of whether the task constraints 
imposed by the response probe are necessary for rumination-linked attentional biases to 
become apparent. Such research would have theoretical implications for the nature of the 
rumination-linked attentional bias, particularly the distinction between biases based on the 
ability to control the distribution of attention, or spontaneous tendencies in attentional 
preference. Specifically, if a an attentional bias for negative information performed via eye-
movements was observed in the presence of the response probe, but not during free-viewing 
of stimuli in the absence of a response probe, this would indicate that this rumination-linked 
attentional bias principally involved impaired ability to inhibit attentional processing of 
negative information, rather than a spontaneous tendency to preferentially direct attention 
towards negative information. 
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Although previous research has established that heightened ruminative disposition is 
associated with deficits in attentional control (Davis & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000; De Lissnyder 
et al., 2011; De Lissnyder et al., 2010; Whitmer & Banich, 2007), it is not yet clear whether 
attentional control and attentional bias are functionally related, as suggested by attentional 
models of rumination (Joormann, 2010; Koster et al., 2011), or represent separate facets of 
ruminative disposition. The present thesis attempted to address this issue by assessing 
ruminative disposition, attentional bias, and attentional control within the same study (Study 
Four). However, due to reservations over the validity of the antisaccade task used in this 
study, we were unable to adequately assess attentional control. As such, further research 
using a more clearly valid measure of attentional control will be necessary to adequately 
investigate the relationship between rumination-linked deficits in attentional control and 
biased attentional processing of negative information. Alternative, well-established measures 
of attentional control that would be appropriate for addressing this question include task-
switching paradigms (e.g., De Lissnyder et al., 2010; Whitmer & Banich, 2007), and eye-
tracking assessments of attentional distribution during antisaccade tasks (e.g., Chen, Clarke, 
Watson, MacLeod, & Guastella, 2015; De Lissnyder et al., 2011). Another approach could 
involve training attentional control to investigate the hypotheses that improving attentional 
control would attenuate ruminative disposition, and that reductions in attentional bias for 
negative information would mediate the effects of attentional control training on rumination. 
Another aspect of the impaired disengagement hypothesis not investigated in this 
thesis is the role of impaired conflict signalling in rumination-linked attentional bias. Koster 
et al.’s (2011) attentional disengagement model proposes that when individuals experience 
negative ruminative thoughts, this will typically result in conflict signalling triggering 
attempts to disengage attention from negative thoughts. Thus, impaired attentional 
disengagement from negative information may also occur due to impaired conflict signalling. 
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Previous research has indicated that conflict signalling in the presence of negative material is 
reduced during negative mood states, as indicated by reduced neural sensitivity to non-
rewards versus rewards (Foti & Hajcak, 2010), and that increasing numbers of depressive 
episodes are associated with reduced conflict monitoring (Vanderhasselt & De Raedt, 2009). 
Further research might seek to investigate whether such impairments in conflict signalling are 
specifically associated with both heightened ruminative disposition and impaired attentional 
disengagement from negative stimuli. 
Further research will also be necessary to investigate whether rumination-linked 
attentional bias involves strategic or automatic processing. One approach to determining the 
relative contribution of strategic and automatic processes would involve investigating the 
impact of secondary cognitive load disrupts on selective attention (Sternberg, 1966; van 
Dillen, Papies, & Hofmann, 2012). Whereas automatic attentional processing biases are 
considered effortless and involuntary, strategic attention is effortful and requires sufficient 
availability of cognitive resources. Therefore, if the presently observed rumination-linked 
attentional biases involve strategic processing, then these biases should be attenuated under 
cognitive load.  
Finally, the studies presented in this thesis primarily involved correlational designs, 
meaning that conclusions regarding the causal relationship between rumination and selective 
attention are limited. Study Five took a first step towards examining the causal relationship, 
by investigating the effect of induced rumination on attentional biases for negative 
information. Theoretical models of rumination have, however, also highlighted biased 
attentional processing of negative information as a potential underlying process contributing 
to heightened ruminative tendencies (Joormann, 2010; Koster et al., 2011). To directly 
investigate the causal effect of biased attentional processing of negative information on 
rumination, it will be necessary to investigate whether attention bias modification procedures 
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(ABM; MacLeod, Rutherford, Campbell, Ebsworthy, & Holker, 2002) that train individuals 
to direct attention away from negative information can serve to attenuate the tendency to 
engage in depressive rumination. A recent study involving repeated sessions of ABM found 
that training attention away from negative information resulted in reduced levels of 
rumination relative to placebo-training, and that decreases in rumination mediate the effects 
of ABM on depressive symptoms (Yang, Ding, Dai, Peng, & Zhang, 2015). Thus, there is 
some initial support for the hypothesis that attentional biases favouring negative information 
causally contribute to heightened levels of rumination.  
An interesting extension of this research could involve investigating whether 
attentional training specifically targeting bias in either attentional engagement or 
disengagement influences the efficacy of ABM aimed at reducing rumination. Whereas ABM 
targeting attentional engagement bias might specifically prevent any engagement with 
negative stimuli, ABM targeting attentional disengagement bias might strategically engage 
attention with negative stimuli, whilst encouraging swift disengagement from such stimuli. 
Building on new hypotheses concerning the roles of attentional engagement and 
disengagement bias in ruminative onset and persistence, such research could investigate 
whether training attentional engagement bias specifically influenced ruminative onset, 
whereas training attentional disengagement bias specifically influenced ruminative 
persistence. However, exclusive training of one mechanism of attentional bias, without 
transfer effects to the other (e.g., targeting attentional engagement bias without influencing 
attentional disengagement bias) may prove difficult in practice. In this case, an alternative 
approach could involve investigating the effects of standard ABM on attentional engagement 
and disengagement bias as assessed by the tasks used in Study One and Two, and the extent 
to which changes in attentional engagement and disengagement bias mediated effects of 
ABM on various aspects of ruminative disposition. According to new hypothesis generated 
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from this thesis, changes in attentional engagement bias would be expected to mediate the 
effects of ABM on ruminative onset, whereas changes in attentional disengagement bias 
would be expected to mediate the effects of ABM on ruminative persistence. 
7.5 Clinical Implications 
It is well established that heightened ruminative tendencies are associated with greater 
vulnerability to depression and other emotional disorders (Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco, & 
Lyubomirsky, 2008). As such, interventions aimed at reducing rumination are likely to have 
value in the treatment of emotional disorders. There is growing evidence to suggest that 
biased attentional processing of negative information is an underlying process associated with 
heightened tendency to ruminate during negative mood states. Attempting to attenuate biased 
attentional processing of negative information using ABM may therefore be effective as a 
means of reducing ruminative disposition. Various studies have already demonstrated that 
ABM may be an effective intervention in the treatment of depression and anxiety (Hakamata 
et al., 2010; Yang et al., 2015), and that reductions in rumination mediate the effects of ABM 
on depressive symptoms (Yang et al., 2015).  There is therefore good initial evidence to 
suggest that ABM has potential as a clinical intervention particularly targeted at individuals 
with high levels of ruminative disposition. 
Furthermore, ABM may also have potential as a preventative intervention aimed at 
reducing emotional vulnerability in individuals with high levels of ruminative disposition. 
The negative effects of rumination are not necessarily restricted to clinical patients, as levels 
of ruminative disposition have also been found to predict vulnerability to the future 
development of emotional disorders in non-clinical samples (e.g., Just & Alloy, 1997; Nolen-
Hoeksema, 2000). The present thesis found that biased attentional processing of negative 
information was associated with levels of ruminative disposition in non-clinical samples. 
Thus, training individuals with high levels of ruminative disposition to direct attention away 
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from negative information may help prevent the development of future episodes of emotional 
distress. 
7.6 Summary and Conclusion 
 The aim of this thesis was to further investigate the nature of rumination-linked bias 
in selective attention for negative information. Three studies found evidence that heightened 
ruminative disposition was associated with greater attentional bias for negative information 
(Studies One, Two & Four). Consistent with the impaired disengagement account of 
ruminative disposition, this rumination-linked attentional bias was found to involve impaired 
attentional disengagement from negative information (Studies One & Two), although 
facilitated attentional engagement with negative information also appears to be involved, 
possibly with more pathological levels of rumination. As such, the findings from this thesis 
suggest a refinement to the impaired disengagement hypothesis to incorporate the role of 
attentional engagement bias in heightened ruminative disposition. We propose that whereas 
impaired attentional disengagement from negative information may contribute to heightened 
persistence of rumination, facilitated attentional engagement with negative information may 
contribute to more frequent onset of negative thoughts that increase the likelihood of 
rumination. 
There was also reliable evidence to suggest that heightened ruminative disposition is 
specifically associated with attentional bias for depression-relevant stimuli presented for 
longer exposure durations. The finding that rumination-linked attentional bias operates at 
longer exposure durations may indicate a deficit in the strategic processing of negative 
information, consist with theories suggesting such attentional bias may result from deficits in 
the inhibition and control of attention for negative information. Research further illuminating 
the role of impaired attentional control in contributing to rumination-linked attentional bias 
will be an interesting area for future research to consider. 
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Finally, the present thesis took a first step towards investigating the causal 
relationship between ruminative disposition and selective attention, by investigating the 
effect of induced rumination on attentional bias. There was some evidence to suggest that 
rumination might causally influence attentional bias, although possibly only for individuals 
with higher levels of ruminative disposition. Further research investigating the causal effect 
of attentional bias on ruminative disposition will also be necessary, particularly since such 
research may have valuable implications for the potential use of ABM as a clinical and 
preventative intervention aimed at reducing the tendency to ruminate in response to negative 
mood. 
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Appendix One: Questions and response options for rumination ratings, with scores 
given for each response. 
 
Score 0 1 2 3 4 
 
Frequency 
How often did this thought or a 
very similar thought come to  
mind during the 5 minutes of the 
breathing exercise? 
 
 
Only 
once 
 
 
Twice 
 
 
Three 
times 
 
 
Four times 
 
 
More than 
four times 
 
Duration 
How long were you thinking 
about the subject of the thought  
during the 5 minutes?  
 
 
 
Only for 
an 
instant 
 
 
Under 10 
seconds 
 
 
About 30 
seconds 
 
 
 
About half 
the time 
 
 
Nearly all 
of the time 
Repetitiveness 
When thinking about this 
subject, how much did your 
thoughts keep coming back to 
the same or similar ideas again 
and again? 
 
 
Not at 
all 
 
 
A bit 
 
 
Somewhat 
 
 
Moderately 
 
 
Extremely 
 
Severity 
How upsetting or distressing 
was the thought? 
 
 
Not at 
all 
 
 
A bit 
 
 
Somewhat 
 
 
Moderately 
 
 
Extremely 
 
Control 
How difficult did you find it to 
stop this thought coming or to 
move on to other thoughts? 
 
 
Not at 
all 
 
 
A bit 
 
 
Somewhat 
 
 
Moderately 
 
 
Extremely 
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Appendix Two: List of Emotional Word Stimuli  
 
Sad/Happy Anxious/Relaxed 
Negative Word Positive Word Negative Word Positive Word 
sluggish happier intimidated brave 
disappointed enjoy fretting ease 
aimless pleased fearful relaxed 
unhappy brightness tense composed 
emptiness energetic dangerous heroic 
lonely lively worried confident 
dreary satisfaction neurotic serene 
forlorn buoyant agitation calm 
dismal merry frightened restful 
defeat passionate nervous tranquil 
brooding euphoric suffocating assertive 
hopeless zeal attack courageous 
gloomy excited panicky peaceful 
failure eager uneasy secure 
upset fulfilled restless safe 
discouraged fun alarmed fearless 
